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This research project examines how various political events and factors influence the composition of 
senior government elites in a range of African states. Using a newly created dataset of African cabinet 
ministers, this thesis creates a number of metrics to measure elite volatility and ethnic, regional and 
political representation. These metrics are used to assess leader and regime strategies of elite power-
sharing. It then employs a range of quantitative and qualitative methods to investigate how factors 
such as ethnic demography, regime strength, economic performance, opposition cohesion and popular 
unrest influence these metrics. Through this process the thesis aims to demonstrate how the 
distribution of political power within a state can be estimated by allocation and reshuffling of cabinet 
ministers.   
This research project contributes a number of key findings. Firstly, most regimes represent the 
majority relevant subnational groups within the senior government, but that representation is 
unbalanced with certain groups being overrepresented and others underrepresented. Secondly, these 
imbalances and variation in which groups are favoured provide information on the distribution of 
political power. Thirdly, that different political environments lend themselves to different 
compositions in the senior government and different strategies of elite power-sharing. In the same 
vein, individual political events which alter the balance of power are accompanied with corresponding 
changes in senior government which reflect these shifts in the political hierarchy. 
These findings contribute to the debates on the determinants of African political power distributions, 
elite designations and processes, formal vs informal institutions and the political survival literature. A 
broad benefit of this work is to demonstrate the variance in power sharing arrangements across the 
African continent. Furthermore, this project demonstrates that external events change leader and elite 




Table of Contents 
1.0 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 9 
1.1 Motivation and Context of the Research Project .......................................................................... 9 
1.2 Ongoing Debates and Gaps in Existing Research ....................................................................... 10 
1.3 Chapters of Research Project ...................................................................................................... 12 
1.3.1 Literature Review ................................................................................................................. 12 
1.3.2 Introduction to African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED) ....................................... 12 
1.3.3 Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus? Representation and Accommodation in African 
Cabinets (joint paper with Professor Clionadh Raleigh) ............................................................... 12 
1.3.4 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility ........................... 13 
1.3.5 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains ............................... 15 
1.3.6 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa (joint paper with 
Andrea Carboni) ............................................................................................................................ 16 
1.3.7 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes (joint paper with 
Professor Clionadh Raleigh, Dr Hyun-Jin Choi and Dr Giuseppe Maggio) ................................. 17 
2.0 Literature Review ......................................................................................................................... 19 
2.1 Political survival ......................................................................................................................... 19 
2.2 Patronage, personal networks and the African state ................................................................... 21 
2.3 The role of ethnicity and subnational identities .......................................................................... 22 
2.4 Balancing elite interests, sharing power and security ................................................................. 25 
2.5 Political context, political change and elite power-sharing strategies ........................................ 28 
3.0 Methodology and Data: the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED) ...................... 31 
3.1 Information Included in ACPED ................................................................................................ 31 
3.1.1 Name .................................................................................................................................... 31 
3.1.2 Gender .................................................................................................................................. 31 
3.1.3 Position ................................................................................................................................ 32 
3.1.4 Political Affiliation .............................................................................................................. 32 
3.1.5 Ethnicity and Politically-Relevant Ethnicity ........................................................................ 32 
3.1.6 Regional Background and Administrative Divisions ........................................................... 33 
3.1.7 Change ................................................................................................................................. 34 
3.2 Collection Process ....................................................................................................................... 36 
3.3 Created Metrics ........................................................................................................................... 36 
3.3.1 Cabinet Size ......................................................................................................................... 36 
3.3.2 Ethnic/Regional Representation ........................................................................................... 37 
3.3.3 Ethnic/Regional Disproportion ............................................................................................ 37 
3.3.4 Representation of Co-Ethnics/Co-Regionalists/Party Members .......................................... 37 
3.4 Improvement over Existing Datasets .......................................................................................... 38 
3.4.1 Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) ............................................................................................. 38 
6 
 
3.4.2 Francois Rainer and Trebbi (FRT) ....................................................................................... 40 
3.4.3 Multiple Forms of Identity ................................................................................................... 43 
3.4.4 Regime Categorical Data ..................................................................................................... 46 
4.0 Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus? Representation and Accommodation in African 
Cabinets ............................................................................................................................................... 50 
4.1 The Logic of Representation ....................................................................................................... 53 
4.2 Political Calculus ........................................................................................................................ 54 
4.3 Assessing Elite Power and Distributions .................................................................................... 56 
4.4 ACPED ....................................................................................................................................... 57 
4.5 Cabinet and Group Measures ...................................................................................................... 60 
4.5.1 Representation ...................................................................................................................... 61 
4.5.2 Distortion ............................................................................................................................. 61 
4.5.3 Malapportionment ................................................................................................................ 62 
4.6 Investigation ................................................................................................................................ 63 
4.6.1 Size ....................................................................................................................................... 63 
4.6.2 Volatility .............................................................................................................................. 65 
4.6.3 Representation ...................................................................................................................... 67 
4.6.4 Seat Allocation in Cabinet and Distortion across Groups .................................................... 69 
4.7 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 72 
5.0 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility .............................. 75 
5.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 75 
5.2 Literature review ......................................................................................................................... 76 
5.2.1 The benefits of leadership and risks of losing power ........................................................... 76 
5.2.2 Political survival and its application within Africa .............................................................. 77 
5.2.3 Winning coalitions and strategies of survival ...................................................................... 78 
5.2.4 Competitive and hegemonic regimes ................................................................................... 79 
5.2.5 The threat of elections .......................................................................................................... 80 
5.2.6 Threat of economic downturn .............................................................................................. 81 
5.3 Data and methodology ................................................................................................................ 82 
5.3.1 Determining regime strength ............................................................................................... 85 
5.3.2 Independent variables .......................................................................................................... 86 
5.3.3 Statistical Methodology ....................................................................................................... 88 
5.4 Results and discussion ................................................................................................................ 89 
5.4.1 Volatility .............................................................................................................................. 89 
5.4.2 Pre-election vs other observations ....................................................................................... 91 
5.4.3 Economic performance ........................................................................................................ 96 
5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 100 
6.0 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains ................................. 102 
7 
 
6.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 102 
6.2 Electoral Autocracies; Hegemonic and Competitive Regimes ................................................. 103 
6.3 Hybrid Regimes and Elections in Africa .................................................................................. 105 
6.4 Politics of Co-Option, the ‘Politics of the Belly’ and the Politics of Punishment .................... 107 
6.5 Data and Methodology .............................................................................................................. 110 
6.5.1 Data .................................................................................................................................... 110 
6.5.2 Classifying Elections.......................................................................................................... 112 
6.6 Descriptive Statistics and Discussion ....................................................................................... 114 
6.6.1 Change in Post-Electoral Cabinet Size and Ethnic Representation ................................... 114 
6.6.2 Change in Post-Electoral Representation of Leader and Opposition Co-Ethnics .............. 116 
6.6.3 Change in Post-Electoral Representation of Regime and Opposition Parties .................... 118 
6.7 Predicting Opposition Status by Post-Electoral Elite Change .................................................. 121 
6.7.1 Methodology ...................................................................................................................... 121 
6.7.2 Results and Discussion....................................................................................................... 123 
6.8 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 128 
7.0 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa ........................... 130 
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 130 
7.2 Cabinets as coalition building and crisis mitigation ................................................................. 132 
7.2.1 The dangers of protests ...................................................................................................... 133 
7.3 Crisis cabinets in Africa, 2007-2018 ......................................................................................... 135 
7.3.1. Protest, Cabinet Volatility and Crisis Cabinets ................................................................. 135 
7.3.2 Variations in Crises and Crisis Cabinets ............................................................................ 137 
7.3.3 Comparing Crisis Cabinets ................................................................................................ 138 
7.4 The politics of crisis cabinets after mass protests ..................................................................... 141 
7.4.1 Ethiopia .............................................................................................................................. 141 
7.4.2 Guinea ................................................................................................................................ 144 
7.4.3 Tunisia ................................................................................................................................ 147 
7.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 150 
8.0 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes ...................................... 152 
8.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 152 
8.2 Leaders Make Choices, Choices have Consequences ............................................................... 154 
8.3 Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 162 
8.3.1 Operational Data ................................................................................................................ 162 
8.3.2 Measure of Representation ................................................................................................. 164 
8.3.3 Measure of Malapportionment ........................................................................................... 164 
8.3.4 Measure of Volatility ......................................................................................................... 165 
8.3.5 African Political Settlements ............................................................................................. 166 
8 
 
8.3.6 Research Design ................................................................................................................. 167 
8.4 Results: Allocation of Power and Conflict ............................................................................... 170 
8.5 Discussion ................................................................................................................................. 174 
9.0 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................... 178 
9.1 Project Aim, Question and Sub Questions ................................................................................ 178 
9.1.1 How to Measure Representation in the Senior Government? ............................................ 178 
9.1.2 What Factors Effect the Distribution of Power? ................................................................ 178 
9.1.3 Do These Factors Explain Variance in Senior Government Patterns of Representation? . 179 
9.2 Chapters .................................................................................................................................... 179 
9.2.1 Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus ............................................................................. 179 
9.2.2 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility ......................... 180 
9.2.3 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains ............................. 181 
9.2.4 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa ........................ 182 
9.2.5 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes ................................ 183 
9.3 Limitations ................................................................................................................................ 183 
9.4 Contributions and Implications for Future Research ................................................................ 185 
10.0 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................. 188 
11.0 Appendices ................................................................................................................................. 206 
11.1 Literature Review .................................................................................................................... 206 
11.2 Methodology and Data: the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset ...................................... 207 
11.3 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility .............................. 221 
11.4 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains .................................. 228 
11.5 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa............................. 244 








1.1 Motivation and Context of the Research Project 
This research project examines does the distribution of power in African states can be understood 
through examining the composition of elites in government. Politics in Africa is frequently described 
as a process of negotiation between political elites and nodes of power within a multipolar 
environment of political authority (De Waal, 2009; Reno, 1999; Bagayoko et al., 2016). Coups, riots, 
rebellions, political alliances and party politics are perceived as symptoms of the distribution of 
political power among different elite players (Arriola, 2009; Arriola, 2013; Choi and Kim, 2018; 
Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Langer, 2005; Roessler, 2011; Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Lindemann, 
2011a; Lindemann, 2011b; De Waal, 2009). Consequently, the judicious distribution of power among 
competing elites and interests is a major concern for leaders seeking to retain or strengthen their rule. 
This project argues that the allocation of senior government posts is an important tool for leaders to 
ensure their political survival. The composition of the cabinet therefore provides insight into how 
leaders balance and manage the competing power blocs within the state, and which blocs are deemed 
powerful enough to be included into the leader’s or regime’s calculations.  
If the composition of the senior government reflects the distribution of political power, then different 
types of political environment should have noticeably different configurations of senior government. 
Furthermore, events that acutely change the distribution of political power should be associated with a 
change in the composition of the cabinet. This research project tests this theory through examining 
how a number of political variables – regime strength, opposition unity, elections, economic 
performance and mass protest – are associated with different patterns in cabinet size, the allocation of 
posts among different ethno-political blocs and ministerial volatility. 
This research project shows how the commonly accepted features of African politics – such as elite 
bargaining, patronage and subnational identities – interact with different landscapes of political power 
and political histories to create different cabinet characteristics and divergent forms of elite power-
sharing.  
This research project shows the important role the allocation of official positions within the state 
apparatus plays in informal or semi-formalised strategies of power-sharing between elite actors.  
While a few previous studies have used formal positions to approximate the divisions of power – 
notably Francois, Rainer and Trebbi’s annual cabinet dataset and the Ethnic Power Relations dataset.  
- this project has created a new dataset which significantly improves upon existing data in terms of 
disaggregation, detail and multiple forms of identity. This new dataset is not only used to show the 




The diversity shown between different individual African states has caused some theorists to question 
whether it is possible to analyse ‘African politics’ or merely politics in Kenya/Tanzania/Liberia/etc. 
(Allen, 1995). This research project shows that the diversity of African politics does not preclude 
researchers from systematically analysing leader-regime-elite interactions. Generalised descriptions of 
the process of African politics - such as ‘winner-take-all’, ‘exclusionary’ or ‘broad-based’ – only 
describe different regimes at different points in time,  failing to accurately describe the dynamic 
relationship between regimes and elites, which are in a continual process of negotiation. This paper 
demonstrates that  common trends in the strategic motivations of African regimes and elites can lead 
to a variety of elite power-sharing arrangements. 
 
1.2 Ongoing Debates and Gaps in Existing Research 
In the existing literature on African politics, patron-client relationships are presented as the main 
bonds tying leaders to elites and elites to the communities they represent (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; 
Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, 1993; Berman, 1998; Reno, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997). Yet the non-
institutional nature of these patrimonial relationships means that they are difficult, if not impossible, 
to quantify. As a result, research that examines the role of neo-patrimonialism in political power-
sharing and coalition building has been unable to conduct a systematic analysis of power-sharing or 
elite-bargaining strategies. This limits the ability of the neo-patrimonial approach to account for why 
some strategies of power-sharing are adopted and others are dismissed, why some configurations are 
stable and others degenerate into conflict (Lindemann, 2008). 
Traditionally, neo-patrimonial relationships have been approximated through the ethnic composition 
of the state, with ethnic heterogeneity or demography serving as an approximation of interest group 
polarisation and patronage networks (Posner, 2004a; Francois et al., 2015). If all African politics 
derived from a zero-sum competition between ethnic clusters, then political coalitions and regimes 
should remain largely static. Yet across Africa, political coalitions inside and outside of government 
are in a constant state of flux. Opposition parties frequently materialise and fragment with rapidity. 
Longstanding rulers fall to popular protests, insurgencies or defections from within the regime. 
Regimes which retain power through thin margins form loose coalitions with any group which can 
help secure their majority. Existing research has proven that ethnicity is an important factor for 
guiding the political loyalty of the general public, but that the importance and effect of ethnicity varies 
across countries and time periods (Bratton et al., 2012; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Wahman, 2017; 
Basedau et al., 2011). 
Within these limitations of accurately observing and quantifying elite relationships within 
government, an increasing body of literature estimates leader strategies of power-sharing through the 
composition of senior government positions (Lindemann, 2011a; Wimmer et al., 2009; Langer, 2005; 
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Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015). Kramon and Posner (2016) summarises the importance of senior 
government positions in managing intra-elite relations: 
“Scholars such as Joseph (1987), van de Walle (2007), and Arriola (2009) emphasize the 
extent to which presidents keep themselves in power by co-opting other powerful elites—
usually elites that control ethnic or regional support bases that are distinct from the 
president’s—by granting them access to portions of the state in exchange for their loyalty and 
that of their followers. [. . . ] In practice, this is done by allocating cabinet positions, with the 
understanding that the holders of those cabinet positions will use their ministries to enrich 
themselves and shore up their own regional or ethnic support bases, and then deliver them to 
the president when called upon.”  
However, the existing research is limited in a number of ways. Firstly, many existing studies which 
explore elite power sharing – such as Lindeman’s (2011a; 2011b) work on Zambia and Uganda and 
Cheeseman’s (2011) work on elite settlements in the aftermath of conflict – focus on individual cases 
to extrapolate wider relationships at play throughout the continent. Secondly, large-N comparative 
studies – such as Francois et al’s. data on African cabinet ministers and Arriola’s (2009) study on 
cabinet size and coups – focus on general trends in cabinet composition and leader survival strategies, 
rather than how these strategies diverge and change according to different political topographies. 
Consequently, the existing literature fails to account for the variance in elite power-sharing 
arrangements, and why these arrangements are frequently volatile and subject to change.  
This contrasts with the level of detail in existing research on ministerial stability or political survival 
strategies in Latin American and European countries. Martinez-Gallardo (2014) and Camerlo and 
Perez-Linan (2015) both analyse how political crises or scandals affect ministerial tenure or turnover. 
Long-established studies on European regimes have shown how the political and ideological 
fragmentation of parliament affects regime stability (Powell, 1981; Taylor and Herman, 1971). This 
research project aims to improve upon the existing African research by demonstrating how different 
political variables, which influence the distribution of political power, lead to divergent strategies of 
elite power-sharing.  
To achieve this, I created a dataset that provides a disaggregated resource for analysing the status of 
elite coalitions and power-sharing in multiple countries. The data set is then used to examine how 
specific political factors, established in the literature to affect the distribution of power, are associated 
with variations in cabinet size, ethnic representation and stability. This in turn shows how the make-
up and volatility of senior government posts offers a useful mechanism for estimating the distribution 
of political power. The focus of this research project is on how political events influence elite power-




1.3 Chapters of Research Project 
To demonstrate how the allocation of senior government posts reflects the distribution of political 
power, this project needs to achieve two objectives: show the insufficiency of current metrics, 
especially those based on a regime’s supposed institutional traits or ethnic demography; and show that 
events which change the distribution of political power within a state result in substantive changes 
within the senior government and political elite. The chapters are therefore laid out in the following 
manner: 
 
1.3.1 Literature Review 
This section provides a review of the existing literature on politics in Africa, along with features 
which are commonly associated with African governance: political survival, elite interests, patronage 
and subnational identities such as ethnicity. This section also situates this research project within the 
context of existing research and outlines how the project will bridge gaps in the current literature.   
 
1.3.2 Introduction to African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED) 
This section will introduce the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (hereafter ACPED). This 
section acts as an introduction to ACPED’s collection process and the metrics derived from the data. 
This section also demonstrates ACPED’s improvements over existing datasets which similarly seek to 
merge subnational identities (mainly ethnicity) with hierarchies of political dominance, specifically 
temporally disaggregated data and multiple metrics of identity. These improvements make the data 
ideal for investigating how changes in the distribution of political power are reflected by changes in 
power-sharing at the elite level. Lastly, this section investigates the relationship between ACPED’s 
metrics and other datasets which measure the institutional character of states (democratisation, 
personalisation of power, etc.) and their distribution of power. ACPED metrics are shown to vary 
widely within the regime classifications of existing datasets such as PolityIV or Varieties of 
Democracy (VDEM). This unexplained variance within existing datasets shows the necessity of 
ACPED as both an alternative and a supplementary means of investigating the distribution of political 
power.  
 
1.3.3 Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus? Representation and Accommodation in African 
Cabinets (joint paper with Professor Clionadh Raleigh) 
This chapter investigates generalised characteristics of ethnic representation and the allocation of 
posts among different groups in Africa. Previous literature on African political representation focusses 
on the dynamics of exclusion of political losers within a zero-sum game (Langer, 2005; Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997). There are similarly counter narratives which argue that African regimes 
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attempt to be as representative and balanced as possible in order to minimise dissent against the 
regime and broaden their support base (Francois et al., 2015; Lindemann, 2011b; De Mesquita et al., 
2005; Arriola, 2009).  
The historical record shows that demographic weight does not determine the ethno-political hierarchy 
(prominent examples include the Tutsi domination of Burundi or Kabre dominance of Togo). 
Furthermore, the ethnic arithmetic paradigm assumes regimes react automatically to ethnic 
demographics and does not account for the geographical and temporal variance seen across and within 
countries.  
Overall this chapter finds that, although most salient ethno-political groups are represented within the 
cabinet, in many instances the allocation of seats does not reflect the ethnic demography of the 
country in question. Political salience is not necessarily defined by size, with certain small groups 
acting as kingmakers or dependent allies of the regime (De Mesquita et al., 2005; Posner, 2004a; 
Londregan et al., 1995). Nor do the positions of groups within the ethno-political hierarchy remain 
static over time. In more fluid political environments, groups which have previously been key allies in 
multi-ethnic coalitions have fractured and former adversaries have teamed up when politically 
expedient.  In more stagnant or enduring regimes leaders may be able to retain control without 
changing the ethno-political power-sharing within their cabinet. This chapter demonstrates that there 
is no ‘one size fits all’ calculation for managing ethno-political interests in Africa’s varied states.  
With these points established, the remaining chapters of the research project will examine how 
different political contexts or changes in the political environment can lead to regimes adopting 
different power-sharing configurations or prioritising certain ethno-regional groups. 
This chapter is co-authored with my supervisor Professor Clionadh Raleigh. My contribution involves 
processing and supplying the necessary data and writing the initial drafts of the paper which would 
become the basis of the finalised paper. Professor Raleigh is responsible for the final analysis and the 
finalised draft included in this thesis. 
 
1.3.4 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility 
The former chapter establishes that strategies of representation and the allocation of posts vary across 
different political contexts. This chapter develops this argument by examining two potential political 
contexts which, as indicated by the literature, should change a leader’s calculations over what elite 
power-sharing arrangement is most robust. The two contexts under study are: the twelve months 
before an election and periods of economic downturn.  
The vast majority of states in Africa hold elections which, in spite of many states falling short of 
consolidated democracies (Hassan, 2017; Resnick, 2017; Ochieng’Opalo, 2012; Cheeseman, 2010), 
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nominally places the regime in danger of replacement by the opposition. Consequently the pre-
electoral period is a time when leaders should be implementing elite coalition strategies to reduce 
opposition  coordination and broaden regime appeal (Arriola, 2009; Arriola, 2013; Wahman, 2013; 
Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). Poor economic performance restricts the resources available to the 
regime to use for patronage, weakening the regime’s ability to retain thesupport of included elites 
(Schedler, 2013; De Mesquita et al., 2005). Poor economic performance also weakens the regime’s 
legitimacy and popularity with the electorate, making the regime more vulnerable to opposition elites 
and the leader more susceptible to being challenged t from within the regime (Alesina et al., 1996; 
Reuter and Gandhi, 2011). However, all regimes may not react to these challenges in the same way. 
Regimes in Africa vary widely in terms of electoral vulnerability and political dominance. Some 
parties or leaders have remained in power and dominated politics for  decades, while others have seen 
multiple democratic (and undemocratic) changes in regime. To account for this variance, regimes are 
classified as either stronger ‘hegemonic’ regimes, or weaker ‘competitive’ regimes (Schedler, 2013). 
This chapter finds that during the twelve months before an election, competitive regimes tend to have 
larger cabinets which are less dominated by the leader’s ethnic group, with posts  allocated more 
equitably among ethnic groups. In contrast, in hegemonic regimes the allocation of posts becomes less 
proportionate and the leader’s co-ethnics become a more dominant force in the cabinet. While 
competitive regimes face a legitimate threat from the opposition, leaders in hegemonic regimes are 
most in danger from rival factions within the regime and so will reformulate their cabinet so their 
network dominates to ward off threats from internal rivals (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Schedler, 
2013; Levitsky and Way, 2002). 
Similarly, competitive and hegemonic regimes react differently to economic decline. Cabinets in 
competitive regimes contract – shrinking in size while becoming less ethnically representative – 
during periods of poor economic growth.. During periods of high economic growth competitive 
regimes expand the size of the cabinet and become more ethically representative. In contrast, 
hegemonic regimes are able to accumulate slack resources (due to their longevity and lack of an 
effective opposition) which allows the leader maintain the size and inclusivity of their cabinets during 
periods of poor growth. These findings corroborate with the argument that weaker regimes are more 
responsive to the opportunity presented by short-term bonanzas or the threat posed by short-term 
crises (Schedler, 2013; De Mesquita et al., 2005). In contrast, hegemonic regimes are designed to 
weather political and economic crises. (ibid.). 
Importantly, this chapter provides an empirical context to support the arguments of the Ethnic 
Arithmetic or Political Calculus chapter and demonstrates that leader/regime survival strategies 
change according to context. 
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This chapter also finds that the cabinet experiences greater change in the post-electoral period, even in 
cases where the regime holds onto power. This finding creates the impetus for the following chapter 
where the effect of different electoral outcomes on elite power-sharing strategies is investigated. 
This chapter is entirely my own work. 
 
1.3.5 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains 
This chapter investigates how regimes alter their power-sharing strategies after surviving an election. 
Existing literature on elections in anocratic or autocratic states argues that elections function as a 
means of information gathering, allowing regimes to estimate their strength compared to the political 
opposition (Miller, 2015; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Previous studies have examined how regimes 
use electoral results to guide their strategies in distributing state resources, with a few examining 
specific states in Africa (Jablonski, 2014; Masaki, 2018). But no studies have examined how regimes 
use electoral results to inform their elite power-sharing strategies and alter their ruling coalition. There 
is a large body of literature on African regimes co-opting the opposition or prioritising their ethnic 
base or excluding disloyal elites (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lindemann, 2011b; Van de Walle, 2007; 
Langer, 2005; Ndegwa, 1997), yet there are few studies looking at when regimes choose one strategy 
over the other. This chapter argues that elections provide a unique opportunity for the regime to assess 
its strength vis-à-vis the political opposition and tailor their elite power-sharing strategy accordingly.  
It addresses these two gaps in the current literature by examining how different configurations of 
regime and opposition strength cause leaders to alter the composition of their cabinets post-election.  
Using the same regime classification as before, this chapter finds that more electorally vulnerable or 
‘competitive’ regimes make dramatic changes to their cabinet after retaining power during an 
election. These regimes engage in significant co-option when facing a unified opposition in order to 
strengthen their support base. This is primarily achieved through increasing the representation of 
elites from the opposition’s ethnic constituency, undermining support for the opposition. Conversely 
when the opposition is divided, these regimes capitalise on the opportunity to reward their own ethnic 
base and increase the dominance of the leader’s co-ethnics in the cabinet.  
In contrast, stronger or ‘hegemonic’ regimes do not engage in drastic changes to the ethnic or political 
composition of their cabinet post-election, supporting arguments that only weaker regimes launch 
defensive concessions when threatened by the opposition (Schedler, 2013; Magaloni, 2006; Horne, 
2016). However, this chapter finds that hegemonic regimes do not reliably engage in the strategy of 
excluding opponents at the elite level post-election. These regimes in fact do co-opt a strong 
opposition through including opposition co-ethnics in the cabinet, though this is not shown through 
the immediate changes made to the cabinet post-election. Instead opposition co-ethnics appear to be 
well represented in the cabinet outside of the immediate post-electoral reshuffle. This shows that 
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hegemonic regimes, like competitive regimes, are reactive to opposition strength but implement 
longer-term strategies of opposition containment.  
This chapter is entirely my own work. 
 
1.3.6 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa (joint paper 
with Andrea Carboni) 
This chapter investigates the influence of protests on the turnover of ministers.  Politics in Africa is 
frequently presented in the existing literature (and in this research project) as a process of negotiation 
between political elites both inside and outside of the regime. In contrast, non-elite masses are given 
secondary importance, and are portrayed as constituencies to feed with patronage or resources to be 
mobilised by elites for voting and violence (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Szeftel, 2000; Ndegwa, 1997; 
De Waal, 2009; Francois et al., 2015).  
Widespread protests – such as those seen during the Third Wave of Democratisation or during the 
Arab Spring - occur when a large section of the population demands a substantive change in how the 
government is run, either through reform, institutional changes or outright regime change (Lust-Okar, 
2004; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992). In these cases, slight changes to the elite bargain – such as 
integrating a few elites from marginalised communities – are unlikely to mollify public discontent and 
ensure the leader’s or regime’s political survival. Consequently, regimes create ‘crisis cabinets’ 
tailored to counter the populist threat posed by protests.  
It is accepted that regimes can rarely rely purely on repression to quash dissent and need to engage in 
accommodation to survive popular uprisings (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Carey, 2006). In spite of this, 
most of the literature on regime responses to protest has focussed on repression or has used 
government rhetoric to approximate whether regimes engage in concessions or co-option (Bhasin and 
Gandhi, 2013; Carey, 2006; Ash, 2015; Josua and Edel, 2015). This chapter represents a key addition 
to the literature by looking at how protest affects a regime’s elite power-sharing calculations and how 
regimes or leaders seek to mollify public discontent through changes in the senior government.  
Episodes of high ministerial turnover outside of the routine large-scale reshuffles which occur after an 
election or a democratic change in government, are rare and our initial investigation finds that there is 
not a strong relationship between protests and cabinet volatility. Many regimes in Africa manage to 
withstand high levels of public protest without resorting to drastically changing their ruling coalition.  
Consequently, we isolate instances of high ministerial turnover and analyse the preceding political 
crisis. We find that these ‘crisis cabinets’ are made in response to a number of different threats, 
including factional fights within the regime, strong opposition movements (both armed and unarmed), 
managed political transitions and protests. 
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Crisis cabinets which are made in response to protest are defined by certain traits which reflect the 
unique challenges presented by mass protest. Firstly, crisis cabinets in response to protests occur in 
less democratic environments. In more democratic regimes the government’s or leader’s right to rule 
is regularly contested in public discourse, while more autocratic regimes are more reliant on 
projecting an image of uncontested power. This conforms with the theory that autocratic regimes are 
vulnerable to a ‘snowball effect’  in which protests are rare but quickly cascade into open rebellions 
against the regime (Schedler, 2013; Kricheli et al. 2011; Rød and Weidmann, 2013). 
Secondly, protest-motivated crisis cabinets involve a higher turnover in personnel and the dismissal of 
long-standing ministers when compared to crisis cabinets which are spurred by other types of political 
crisis. Protests present the biggest threat to regimes when motivated by a desire for systemic reform to 
the political system (Josua and Edel, 2015). In response, regimes can signal a willingness to engage in 
substantive change through drastically changing their elite coalition and dropping long-term fixtures 
of the regime. 
Thirdly, the regional protest hotspots tend to become better represented in the resulting crisis cabinets.   
Lastly, we examine in depth the cases where protests caused the regime to create a crisis cabinet. 
Though popular protests often reflect the concerns of non-elites, they can cause significant change 
when the protests create a division within the regime elite. This was shown during the Third Wave of 
Democratisation in Africa and the Arab Spring (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Josua and Edel, 
2015). Protests can damage the regime’s legitimacy, reducing the cost and increasing the chance of 
success of a coup, defection or a factional conflict within the regime (Caspar and Tyson, 2014). 
This paper was created with my colleague Andrea Carboni. My main contributions include the data 
processing, methodology and analysis. I also wrote the qualitative analysis of protest-motivated crisis 
cabinets in Ethiopia and Guinea. Mr Carboni took charge of the introduction, conclusion and literature 
review, along with the qualitative analysis of Tunisia. The concept for the paper was jointly conceived 
by Mr Carboni and myself. 
 
1.3.7 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes (joint paper with 
Professor Clionadh Raleigh, Dr Hyun-Jin Choi and Dr Giuseppe Maggio) 
This chapter investigates the effect of different elite power-sharing arrangements on patterns of 
political violence. Violence is frequently interpreted as a potential tool for political elites to negotiate 
with the regime and the leader. Excluded elites can force their inclusion into the state through 
mobilising personal armies, either through gaining representation through a peace agreement or 
through replacing the incumbent regime (LeVan, 2011; Mehler, 2011; De Waal, 2009; Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999).  
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A large body of literature has examined how the exclusion of ethno-political groups is related to 
political violence, focussing mainly on instances of civil war between state forces and rebel forces 
(Østby, 2008; Buhaug et al., 2008; Roessler, 2011). Furthermore, much of the political violence which 
occurs in Africa does not fit neatly into this state-rebel dyad. Activity by political or communal 
militias, typically operating as the private armies of elites, accounts for a large portion of violent 
events (Raleigh, 2016). Consequently, the current literature mostly interprets the use of violence for 
political leverage only in terms of exclusion and inclusion while the use of violence as a tool of 
included elites seeking to improve their position within the political hierarchy is understudied.  
This chapter finds that in imbalanced regimes there is an increase in the incidence of rebel violence, 
especially if those regimes exclude multiple politically-relevant ethnic groups. Regimes which grant 
representation to the majority of ethnic groups but engage in large-scale over and underrepresentation 
suffer from a high instance of militia violence. Furthermore, when the cabinet is volatile and the 
position of elites is less secure, violence increases between non-state militias. These findings add a 
large caveat to the existing literature which focusses just on ethnic inclusion and exclusion. Leaders 
are not able to totally secure their rule by creating an inclusive broad-based coalition because included 
elites and communities will continue to compete over their position within the political hierarchy.  
This chapter was created jointly with Professor Clionadh Raleigh, Dr Giuseppe Maggio and Dr Hyun 
Jin Choi. My contribution to this chapter was small, primarily supplying data and advising Dr 




2.0 Literature Review 
Each chapter of the research project includes a literature review which provides context for the 
chapter’s research question and hypothesised relationships. This chapter provides a broader overview 
of the different strands of academic literature which have guided this project, along with the key 
findings and limitations within the existing literature. Common threads emerge from the all the 
chapters of the research project and these are the themes considered here. They are: the strategies 
employed to ensure political survival, the role of subnational identities such as ethnicity in politics in 
Africa, the importance of power-sharing within potentially fragmented political environments, and 
how instability in the political environment can lead to changes in previously stable elite bargains. 
 
2.1 Political survival 
Leadership politics in Africa is presented as both a potentially lucrative and potentially dangerous 
undertaking. Since independence, many African countries have developed ‘imperial presidencies’ in 
which power is centralised within the executive and position of leader (Prempeh, 2007). Presidents 
are often unencumbered by checks from the legislative and judicial branches of government (Kieh, 
2018; Prempeh, 2007). Presidents, along with other executive positions such as the ministries of 
finance or defence, frequently control vast slush funds which are not subject to parliamentary or 
judicial oversight (McKie and Van de Walle, 2010). Presidents are often able to award major 
contracts or appoint individuals to senior government posts with no reference to anyone else(Kieh, 
2018; Prempeh, 2007). Because of these powers, incumbents such as Kabila, Mugabe, Sassou-
Nguesso, Dos-Santos and Biya have accumulated vast fortunes of personal wealth, often in spite of 
their country’s enduring poverty and their limited public support (Felter, 2017). This means that the 
capture and retention of the highest executive office is a driving factor in political competition 
including party formation, electoral competition, factional infighting and military politicisation 
(Prempeh, 2007; Kollner and Basedau, 2005; Decalo, 1989; Kieh, 2018). 
The literature also shows that just as incumbency confers considerable benefits in Africa, the loss of 
incumbency carries considerable risk including assassination, exile or arrest (Goldsmith, 2001). The 
Archigos dataset (Goemans et al., 2009) records 285 leader exits in Africa, from the immediate post-
independence period to 2015. Of these exits, 93 resulted in the exile or imprisonment of the former 
leader while 27 resulted in execution. Literature on African politics frequently paints a picture of an 
imperial leader, a chief writ-large, attempting to navigate a hostile political environment and ensure 
the survival of their rule. 
“We find rulers who are not nearly as preoccupied with the problem of going somewhere as 
with the task of keeping themselves and their regimes afloat: they are trying to survive in a 
political world of great uncertainty and often turbulence.” (Jackson and Rosberg, 1984). 
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The third wave of democratisation in the 1990s enabled leaders to vacate power through retirement, 
party selection proceedings, presidential-term limits and elections, all of which soften the risks 
involved in vacating the seat of power (Prempeh, 2007; Goldsmith, 2001). Yet even within this more 
forgiving environment, losing power still contains risks. Leaders in much of Africa are granted a 
degree of immunity while in office, but forfeit their immunity upon exiting their post, leaving them 
vulnerable to legal challenges (Fombad and Nwauche, 2011). Globally, former presidents have faced 
prosecution for alleged crimes or corruption perpetrated during their tenure. In Africa, leaders who 
have been deposed, failed to install successors or lost elections  have been subject to criminal 
proceedings once out of office. Leaders such as Hassan Habre, Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed Morsi 
are examples of former leaders who were deposed and then faced trial. Jacob Zuma and Earnest Bai 
Koroma are two examples of ex-leaders who failed to install a successor and are currently either 
under investigation or facing trial. Hastings Banda and Didier Ratsiraka are examples of leaders who 
lost an election and were subsequently tried for crimes committed during their tenure. The legal 
vulnerability of former presidents means that the wealth and power accumulated during their reign 
can be quickly stripped from them by the new incumbent (Felter, 2017).  
Given the risks of losing the power of the ‘imperial presidency’ and benefits of office, political 
survival is a key concern guiding the political decisions made by leaders. Existing literature has 
shown how leaders in Africa put political survival above other interests by: coup-proofing their 
military, often at the cost of military effectiveness (Decalo, 1989; Lindemann, 2011a); refusing to 
adopt economic strategies which may promote growth if these also lower support or promote the 
creation of independent power bases (Arriola, 2013; Goldsmith, 2001); adopting costly devolution or 
redistricting schemes (Green, 2011); empowering regional chiefs (Baldwin, 2014); and  allocating aid 
or development funds to either reward loyal constituencies or to try to sway doubtful voters 
(Jablonski, 2014; Masaki, 2018). 
Another aspect of politics which is increasingly perceived as a means for ensuring political survival is 
coalition building among elites. Much of this comes through the concepts outlined in De Mesquita’s 
work on winning coalition creation and political survival (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Leaders need to 
create winning coalitions from the selectorate (the pool of individuals who can engage in choosing the 
leadership of the country, to protect themselves from both internal and external threats.  
To build an effective coalition, these supporters should control resources critical to the leader’s 
political survival. Relevant resources can include: financial wealth; political support from a subsection 
of society; coercive capacity; strong links with other influential countries; and technical expertise. 
These individuals are what this project classes as ‘elites’. Elites are commonly referenced in the 
academic literature on Africa, and politics in general, but the term is rarely defined.  Instead the term 
‘elite’ acts as a container concept to mean someone of importance whose resources can be mobilised 
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in the exercise of power (Salverda and Abbink, 2013). This definition is inferred throughout the extant 
literature by referring to a wide array of power brokers – regime or opposition politicians, senior 
political party members, rebel or militia leaders, securocrats, financiers and traditional leaders – as 
‘elites’ (De Waal, 2009; Langer, 2005; Arriola, 2013; Arriola, 2009; Baldwin, 2014; Mehler, 2011; 
Reno, 1999; Cheeseman, 2011).  
 
2.2 Patronage, personal networks and the African state 
Leaders do not rule alone and need to convince other politically powerful individuals that it is 
beneficial to support the regime and ensure the leader’s survival. Just as leaders can use the financial 
resources of the African state for self-enrichment, the reservoir of wealth contained in civil service 
departments and public enterprises are a necessary tool for creating a coalition of allies to insulate the 
leader from political threats (Berman, 1998; De Waal, 2009; Szeftel, 2000; Lindemann, 2008). De 
Mesquita et al. (2005) frequently refer to these benefits as ‘private goods’, but in much of the 
literature on African politics it is simply referred to as ‘patronage’.  
Within the literature on African politics, patronage is portrayed as the glue that binds elites within 
government to the regime or leader (Van de Walle, 2007; Van de Walle, 2003; Chabal and Daloz, 
1999; Bayart, 1993; Berman, 1998; Reno, 1999; Arriola, 2009). There are several popularly cited 
reasons for the enduring role of patronage in African politics. Firstly the lack of constraints and 
oversight on the leader and the executive creates a system in which personal networks of obligation 
and mutual interest are a guiding factor in resource allocation rather than institutional rules (Francois 
et al., 2015; Prempeh, 2007; Jackson and Rosberg, 1984). This grants leaders, and elites included 
within their network, the ability to distribute state resources at their discretion and cultivate a network 
of clients.  
Secondly, some theorists have argued that this practice took root after independence because the 
colonial rulers had not had sovereignty in mind when creating the state boundaries (Reno, 1999; Van 
de Walle, 2007; Van de Walle, 2003; Berman, 1998; Rothchild, 1995). The rulers of the newly 
independent African states needed to exert control over heterogeneous, contested and poorly 
integrated political environments. Including key elites and groups into the regime’s patronage network 
allowed leaders to extend their rule over the fractious political environment of post-independence 
Africa. These patronage networks were frequently located within dominant ruling parties, such as the 
Parti Democratique de la Cote d’Ivoire (PDCI) of Ivory Coast or Tanganyika African National Union 
(TANU) of Tanzania (Van de Walle, 2007). Leaders continue to rely on creating webs of dependency 
or loyalty through patronage in the modern era in order to sustain their power, through winning 
elections, maintaining control over violent actors within the state or dominating factional struggles 
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within government (Reno, 1999; Green, 2011; Baldwin, 2014; Köllner and Basedau, 2005; 
Lindemann, 2011a). 
Lastly, fault-lines in African politics are often not due to ideology but rather pragmatic contests over 
the distribution of spoils of the state (Szeftel, 2000; Van de Walle, 2007; Van de Walle, 2003; 
Kendhammer, 2010; Carbone, 2007).  
“…neopatrimonial elites are more likely to take sides on pragmatic grounds in the struggles 
over spoils. Their political positions come to be defined according to whether they are 
insiders or outsiders in relation to the patronage system.” (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994) 
This situation makes patronage an effective instrument for creating coalitions of convenience which 
can be used to enhance the leader’s survival prospects. Africa presents many examples of former 
rivals joining forces to increase their hold on political power. Examples include Alassane Ouattara 
and Henri Konan Bedie in Ivory Coast, Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto in Kenya and Yoweri 
Museveni and Moses Ali in Uganda.  
A key issue with the current literature is that the non-institutional nature of these patrimonial 
relationships means that they are difficult, if not impossible, to quantify. Reno (1999) describes these 
relationships as a ‘shadow state’, a “a very real, but not formally recognized, patronage system that 
was rigidly organized and centred on rulers’ control over resources.” 
Though political relationships in Africa are frequently described as personal or informal, the main 
sources of wealth are accessed through official positions in government (Lindemann, 2008; 
Lindemann, 2011a; Francois et al., 2015). Lindemann (2008) describes the relationship between the 
informal relationships which govern politics in Africa and formal positions within the state: 
“The allocation of public office determines the means that different elites have to influence 
what happens at the level of the state (including rent deployment) and is therefore an 
important instrument for the building of political coalitions.”  
In short, the neo-patrimonial ‘shadow state’ cannot exist without control over the wealth flows of the 
actual state. In the absence of reliable data on patronage networks, an increasing body of literature 
estimates leader strategies of power-sharing through the composition of senior government positions 
(Lindemann, 2011a; Wimmer et al., 2009; Langer, 2005; Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015). 
 
2.3 The role of ethnicity and subnational identities 
There is an academic consensus that subnational identities, most notably ethnicity, play an important 
role in shaping African politics. Subnational identities function as markers of ‘common interest’ and 
are presumed to govern the networks of mutual obligation and interest which guide the distribution of 
patronage (Ndegwa, 1997; Mhlanga, 2012; Berman, 1998; Rothschild, 1995; Szeftel, 2000; Azam, 
2001). Ethnic, regional or religious elites within the African context act as ‘bloc leaders’ or ‘super-
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representatives’ which represent the interests of a large section of the selectorate and, if included, can 
deliver their constituency’s support to the leader or regime (De Mesquita et al., 2005; Arriola, 2009). 
Elites gain legitimacy from effectively representing their group’s communal interests and in return, 
their group’s membership can, be mobilised to help elites achieve their political goals (Chabal and 
Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997; Langer, 2005). Szeftel (2000) quotes a Zambian political leader who 
summarises this process of political reciprocity: 
“If you do not act cohesively, your leaders won’t get sufficient party and government posts. If 
your leaders do not get sufficient posts, they will not be able to wield sufficient power on 
your behalf in order to make sure that you ... get your fair share of the jobs and development 
funds going.” 
Many existing datasets on ethnic fractionalisation, polarisation or ethno-political hierarchies were 
created with the expressed intention of estimating the competing ‘interest groups’ attempting to access 
state resources and patronage (Alesina et al., 2003; Posner, 2004a; Cederman et al., 2010). 
There is controversy over the degree to which constituencies benefit from the inclusion of their elite 
representatives in government. Van de Walle (2003) argues that these resources generally remain in 
elite hands and do not extend out past a small circle of followers. The IMF-mandated reforms of the 
1980s limited fiscal resources and many African states now have smaller civil services in terms of 
population and public expenditure budgets in terms of GDP than most OECD states (ibid.). Van de 
Walle (2003; 2007) and Randall (2007) instead characterise the attachment communities exhibit 
towards their elite representatives is due to the importance of symbolic representation rather than 
material dividends.  
However, the shrinking of the civil service only limits some forms of patronage, such as public or 
parastatal employment, whereas other forms, such as targeted development or business licenses, are 
still available to maintain patron-client networks (Van De Walle, 2003; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; 
Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Recent large-N studies have found that in Africa (and in less 
institutionalised countries in general) the co-ethnics or co-regionalists of either the leader or relevant 
senior government officials materially benefit from better health and education outcomes, better 
investment in infrastructure or education and the disproportionate allocation of aid and development 
projects (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Jablonski, 2014; Holder and Raschky, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015; 
Kramon and Posner, 2016). 
Consequently, subnational identities are a serious concern for leaders when creating winning coalition 
and few political decisions in Africa are made without some “clientistic calculations or considerations 
of identity” (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). Leaders frequently depend on the presumed loyalty of certain 
subnational groups to protect them from political challengers. This is shown by preferential 
recruitment of the leader’s co-ethnics into the armed forces officer corps and elite military units, or 
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loyalists into senior government positions (Decalo, 1989; Roessler, 2011; Lindemann, 2011a).1 But 
creating exclusionary regimes which fail to represent a large segment of the population and retain 
power through force can motivate excluded constituencies to rebel against the regime (Choi and Kim, 
2018; Buhaug et al., 2008). Many civil wars in Africa – including Somalia, Sierra Leone, Angola, 
Uganda, Liberia and Ivory Coast – have been attributed to leaders failing to effectively share power 
with other subnational identities and incorporate important bloc leaders into their ruling coalitions 
(Lindemann, 2008; Malaquias, 2000; Rothchild, 1995; Zack-Williams, 2010; Langer, 2005; Roessler, 
2011).  
Despite a general consensus about the importance of subnational identities and ethnicity on politics in 
Africa, the literature has become more contextual in its analysis over time. Theorists such as Posner 
(2004b) and Brubaker (2002) emphasise that the importance of subnational identities, and which 
identity labels are mobilised, are dependent on factors such as demography, security and government 
policy.  In Ivory Coast, for example, president Henri Konan Bedie’s policy of excluding and 
electorally disenfranchising northerners allowed Alassane Ouattara – a northern elite – to mobilise 
northern Ivorians to challenge Bedie’s regime (Langer, 2005). The land policies of Kenyatta and Moi 
regimes in Kenya led to antagonistic political competition between Kalenjin, Kikuyu and Luo as each 
group tried to capture the presidency and oversee the allocation of land (Boone, 2012). It is worth 
noting that ‘Kalenjin’ is not a single ethnic group but a linguistic umbrella which includes a number 
of discreet ‘tribes’ (Posner, 2007).2 In Malawi, the Chewa and Tumbuka ethnic groups make up a 
significant percentage of the population and politically compete with each other, while in Zambia the 
two groups often act in concert under the broader category of ‘Easterners’ (Posner, 2004b). The size 
and type of political arena can also change which identities are politically relevant. Groups which 
compete against each other in local politics may act as a unitary political bloc in national elections 
(Carrier and Kochore, 2014).  
Many theorists have argued that the move to multiparty elections would lead to parties and politicians 
representing narrow ethnic interests, causing electoral politics to become a zero-sum game in which 
the victors would capture exclusive rights to the state’s wealth (Nyamnjoh and Rowlands, 1998; Van 
de Walle, 2007; Laakso, 2007), mirroring the arguments made by post-independent dictators to 
defend their autocratic rule. This assumption has been refined by more recent research. Less than a 
third of Sub-Saharan states have an outright ethnic majority with the largest group typically 
accounting for 41% of the population – meaning that it is rare that a party can attain power by relying 
on a single ethnic constituency (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Furthermore, many African states ban the 
                                                          
1 Omar Bongo of Gabon set up an elite presidential guard of Bateke co-ethnics to counter-balance the Fang-
dominated regular army. Eyadema of Togo created a praetorian guard based around his home village of Paya. 
2 The Kalenjin is considered to include the Nandi, Kipsigis, Tugen, Pokot, Elgeyo, Keiyo, Marakwet, Seibi, 
Dorobo, Terik, and Sabaot tribes. 
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creation of parties which explicitly promote narrow ethnic, religious or regional interests (Bogaards et 
al., 2010).  
There are several studies which argue that African voters, much like their western counterparts, are 
primarily concerned with economic performance, development and competence when choosing 
leaders or local representatives (Bratton et al., 2012; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008). Most cross-
national research in Africa, however, shows that subnational identities do matter in guiding voting 
behaviour and political support, though patterns of support vary across different political contexts 
(Basedau et al., 2011). In cases where the ruling party dominates the political landscape without 
credible challenges, the ruling party is likely to be a broad-based coalition which collects votes from a 
wide range of different groups (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Carbone, 2007; Wahman, 2017). In these 
regimes, elites are likely to mobilise their ethnic constituencies during factional conflicts within the 
party or during the nomination stage of elections (Posner, 2007; Kendhammer, 2010; Köllner and 
Basedau, 2005; Egboh and Aniche, 2015). In more competitive political environments where ruling 
regimes retain power through thin electoral margins and opposition parties stand a credible chance of 
displacing the regime, the electorate is more likely to vote in ethnic blocs and elites are likely to 
mobilise their ethnic constituencies during national elections (Posner, 2007; Eifert et al., 2010; 
Langer, 2005; Jockers et al., 2009; Fox, 1997).  
A common feature is that ruling parties tend to derive support from a wider array of identity groups 
than opposition parties, which tend to mobilise a narrow ethnic or regional constituency while making 
populist appeals in urban areas (Wahman, 2017; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). Overall, few electorally 
successful parties draw support from a single ethnic or regional group, although some successful 
parties may have an ethnic base or attain power through short-lived coalitions with other ‘ethnic 
parties’ (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Arriola, 2013). Joireman (1997) succinctly outlines the role 
ethnicity can play in African party politics: 
“Ethnicity can be a viable organising principle for an insurgent group but not for a political 
party which aspires to govern.”  
 
2.4 Balancing elite interests, sharing power and security 
How leaders balance the interests of competing political identities and elites is key to ensuring their 
survival. In the absence of strong institutions, strategies of winning coalition formation and power-
sharing are guided by concerns over security and political survival (Roessler and Ohls, 2018). Leaders 
are under pressure to balance the competing threats of external elites, who can oust or force 
concessions from the regime, and their nominal coalition allies, who can launch a coup from within 
the regime. Roessler describes this dynamic as the coup/civil war trade-off (Roessler and Ohls, 2018; 
Roessler, 2011).  
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In many contemporary African states, leaders are not only threatened by external elites engaging in 
armed rebellion. Since the widespread adoption of multiparty elections in the early 1990s, elites 
outside of the leader’s ruling coalition can attempt to gain power through electoral competition. Many 
long-term leaders and regimes lost power in their country’s founding election.3 Between 1990 and 
2017 approximately 40 percent of elections have resulted in a new leader taking power (Brookings 
Institute, 2015).4 This threat is not spread equally throughout the continent. Appendix figure 1 shows 
that though leader and ruling party tenure are generally lower in 2017 than in 1990, many leaders5 and 
ruling parties6 have managed to survive the adoption of regular elections and hold onto power. 
Leaders also face non-democratic threats from external forces including protests7 and external 
interventions.8  
Though coups have continued to constitute a real threat in the multiparty era, with 25 coups taking 
place since 1990 (Brookings Institute, 2015), leaders also face multiple other internal threats such as 
formal leadership selection mechanisms, opposing factions within the regime or rebellious successors.  
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa was ousted by the decision of the ANC’s National Executive 
Committee to withdraw support. Ian Khama was repeatedly challenged by factional rivals within the 
Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which undercut Khama’s popularity and led to the formation of 
the splinter Botswana Movement for Democracy (Makgalaand and Mac Giollabhuí, 2014). Jose dos 
Santos, president of Angola for 38 years, ceded power to his nominated successor Joao Loureco. 
Lourenco has subsequently cancelled government contracts with companies linked to Dos Santos and 
arrested Dos Santos’ son (Cascais, 2018).  
Though political power in African regimes is assumed to be concentrated within the presidency, there 
have been many cases of leaders being constrained by other government elites. For example, Bakili 
Muluzi of Malawi, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Frederick Chiluba of Zambia attempted to 
amend the constitution to extend their tenure but were blocked by parliament (including many MPs 
from the ruling party) (Posner and Young, 2007). 
                                                          
3 Examples include Benin in 1991, Cape Verde in 1991, Malawi in 1994, and Zambia in 1991 (Cheeseman, 
2010) 
4 Over two thirds of these transitions occurred in an open poll where the incumbent was not competing, and ten 
percent of these changes in leadership were direct successions where the regime’s favoured successor became 
leader (Brookings Institute, 2015). 
5 The following leaders have been in office since the 1990s or earlier: Paul Biya of Cameroon, Idriss Deby of 
Chad, Denis Sassou Nguesso of Congo-Brazzaville, Ismail Omar Guelleh of Djibouti, Teodoro Obiang Nguema 
of Equatorial Guinea, Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda. 
6 The following countries have had the same party in power since the 1990s or earlier, although the leaders have 
changed: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. 
7 Which recently forced out Zine El Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, Blaise Compaore of 
Burkina Faso, Omar al-Bashir of Sudan and Abdelazziz Boutaflika of Algeria. 




Leaders need to create coalitions that minimise both types of threat and create a coalition of elites 
which is resilient to external threats, while ensuring none of the coalition partners has the power or 
motivation to seize power. The existing literature argues that large and inclusive coalitions are an 
effective means of mitigating external threats such as protest, democratic opposition or insurgency, as 
these are motivated by elites who have been deprived of the benefits of state largesse (Choi and Kim, 
2018; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Roessler, 2011). Exclusive ruling coalitions can foster civil 
wars in which excluded groups and their representatives try to depose the incumbent or force their 
inclusion in the ruling coalition via a negotiated settlement (Mehler, 2011; Buhaug et al., 2008; 
Wimmer et al., 2009; De Waal, 2009). In terms of non-violent competition, leaders generally need to 
draw on support from outside their own communities to remain electorally viable and keep the 
opposition from forming inclusive multi-ethnic coalitions of their own (Arriola, 2013; Wahman, 
2013; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). This will likely necessitate a large and inclusive coalition of elites 
(Arriola, 2011; Ash, 2015).  
However, there are arguments that larger coalitions can endanger incumbent survival through making 
leaders more vulnerable to rivals from within the ruling coalition. Increasing the size of the ruling 
coalition limits the amount of spoils available to existing coalition members (De Mesquita et al., 
2005). Continually expanding the coalition can encourage existing members to oust the incumbent in 
order to create a narrow coalition in which all members are better compensated (Choi and Kim, 
2018).9 Inclusive coalitions can pose internal risks to the incumbent through the inclusion of 
potentially disloyal groups who may be tempted to usurp power from within (Roessler, 2011). Lastly, 
sharing power with ethnic groups with a history of antagonism with the regime can incentivise co-
ethnic hardliners to compete with or replace the incumbent rather than face sharing power with other 
groups (Sriram and Zahar, 2009).10 
The contradictory arguments on effective elite power-sharing strategies may be due the gaps in the 
literature on elite power-sharing and political survival strategies in Africa. Though many studies 
examine the various threats facing African leaders and regimes, there are comparatively few studies 
looking at how African leaders create and alter their coalition of elites to minimise threats. Existing 
studies examining elite power-sharing typically focus on individual cases – such as Lindeman’s 
(2011a; 2011b) studies on Zambia and Uganda, Woldense’s (2018) on Ethiopia, and Langer’s (2005) 
work on Ivory Coast – and use the results of the analysis to extrapolate wider relationships at play 
                                                          
9 Arriola (2009) finds that increasing the size of the coalition up to a point actually reduces the chance of a coup. 
However, the effect dampens as the coalition expands and eventually expanding the coalition increases the 
chance of deposition from within. 
10 Notable examples of outbidding include Islamist and northern opposition to Gaafar Nimeiry’s inclusion of 
southerners in the Sudanese government and attempted coups by hardline military Tutsi’s against Pierre 
Buyoya’s inclusive government in Burundi (Kaufmann, 2006; Southall, 2006). Outside of a military context, 
President Diouf offered his electoral rival Abdulaye Wade the position of Vice-President, but was blocked by 
the ruling Socialist Party (Gandhi and Buckles, 2016).  
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throughout the continent. There are few large-N cross-comparative works11 which match the scope of 
studies examining the allocation of formal positions and leader survival strategies in other regions.12  
The studies do not examine in depth how different political factors can change which elite power-
sharing strategies are most effective. Consequently, arguments over optimal strategies of elite power-
sharing persist and the historical variation in strategies shown across Africa remains largely 
unexplained in the literature. 
 
2.5 Political context, political change and elite power-sharing strategies 
Literature on elite dynamics (in Africa and elsewhere) does provide information on some of the 
political variables that can account for the variation in elite power-sharing strategies.  
The existing non-Africanist literature suggests that regime strength is a key factor in determining 
optimal strategies of leadership survival. Quiroz Flores and Smith (2011) argue that leaders who face 
little threat from external challengers will be concerned almost exclusively with managing internal 
threats, unless facing an insurgency or mass movement. This argument is supported by the repeated 
factional conflicts which have threatened leaders in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Ethiopia and South Africa. 
Schedler’s (2013) global study on regime survival strategies in ‘electoral-authoritarian’ regimes 
argues that weaker ‘competitive’ regimes are more likely to engage in defensive concessions to retain 
power during times of uncertainty, while stronger ‘hegemonic regimes’ can instead rely on 
manipulation and repression to hamper the political opposition. Examples of this dynamic include the 
effective repression or exclusion of the opposition in the Tanzanian 2015 election and the Ethiopian 
2015 election (Arriola and Lyons, 2016; Paget, 2017).  
The political strength of opposition parties and movements is another factor dictating optimal 
strategies. A democratic opposition is meant to hold the regime accountable by providing a viable 
alternative coalition to the existing government (Ladd, 2013). The non-institutionalised, fragmented 
or transitory nature of most opposition parties is frequently pointed to as a source of regime longevity 
and unaccountability in Africa (Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; 
Ochieng’Opalo, 2012). This description has merit for some countries at some time periods,  for 
instance the Congo in the early 21st century hadover a hundred registered parties (Rakner and Van de 
Walle, 2009). However, this generalisation does not work for Africa as a whole. The number of 
effective parties varies dramatically (between 1.0 and 8.8) across the continent and within countries at 
                                                          
11 Some, examples include Kroeger’s (2018) study of cabinet reshuffle patterns within 
military/personalist/dominant party regimes, or Roessler’s (2011) study on ethnic purges and civil war or 
Roessler and Ohls’ (2018) work on ethnic power-sharing. 
12 Examples include Martinez-Gallardo’s (2014) work on political/economic crisis and ministerial stability in 
Latin America, Camerlo and Perez-Linan’s (2015) study on how scandals and protests impact portfolio 
allocations in Latin America, or Huber and Martinez-Gallardo’s (2008) study on ministerial stability on Western 
parliamentary democracies.  
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different periods (Bogaards, 2004). These different configurations of regime/non-regime/opposition 
party power will present different levels of threat to the leader13 and will need to be factored into their 
power-sharing strategy. 
Another factor explored in the non-Africanist literature is the country’s economic health. Leaders and 
regimes need sufficient economic resources to nourish their patronage networks in order to retain a 
viable coalition. Schedler (2013) summarises the threat succinctly:  
“When the reservoirs of patronage resources dry up, the reservoirs of ‘instrumental’ regime 
support are bound to do so as well.” 
Poor economic performance can also weaken leader or regime popularity, which in turn makes the 
leader more susceptible to replacement from rivals inside and outside of the regime. Large-N studies 
have associated economic failure with coups, ruling party disintegration and opposition victories 
(Langer, 2005; Alesina et al., 1996; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Reuter and Gandhi, 2009). Beyond 
economic performance, the state’s control (or lack thereof) over the financial landscape can dictate the 
leader’s ability to limit opposition coordination, threaten those inside the regime into compliance and 
respond to public discontent (Arriola, 2013; De Mesquita et al., 2005). 
The above factors are examples of some of the main variables which leaders may consider when 
creating or altering their coalition of elites. These factors explain some of the variation in ruling 
coalitions witnessed in Africa, along with the contradictory arguments over ideal coalition type in the 
Africanist literature.14 These variables are in a continual state of flux. A strong regime can become 
weakened by internal splits or succession crises, which occurred in Kenyan African National Union 
(KANU) and Senegal’s Socialist Party (PS) (Cheeseman, 2010; Arriola, 2013; Kelly, 2018). A 
booming economy can grind to a halt, as shown by the end of the Ivorian miracle due to declining 
cocoa prices (Langer, 2005). A previously fragmented opposition can coalesce around a single 
opposition elite and present a viable threat, as shown in the Tanzanian 2015 election where the regime 
faced a united opposition coalition for the first time since the start of multiparty competition (Paget, 
2017). As the political environment changes so to do the primary threats to the leader’s political 
                                                          
13 Various types of opposition party have proven capable of threatening or deposing the leader. Coalitions of 
convenience between opposition parties managed to win elections against entrenched incumbents in the 2002 
Kenyan elections and the 2011 Ivorian elections. Well-established opposition powers managed to take power 
from the regime in 2000 Senegalese elections and 2015 Nigerian elections, while fledgling opposition parties 
managed to beat the incumbent regime in the 2011 Zambian elections and the 2012 Senegalese elections. 
Countries such as Ghana or Sierra Leone have seen a regular alternation in power between two established 
parties.  
14 Systems of government – such as parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential – are deemed to affect the 
leader’s autonomy and vulnerability to rivals (Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011; Roberts, 2015). However, in an 
African context the key features of a powerful presidency and the comparative weakness of the other branches 




survival and their calculations concerning the optimal coalition. Martinez-Gallardo (2014) studied the 
relationship between political and economic ‘shocks’ and volatility within the cabinet: 
“unexpected events over the course of a government’s life will change these conditions and 
make bargains that were previously “stable” no longer viable. Appointments are an explicit 
political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges. Cabinet changes 
allow presidents to change policy by changing the individuals in charge of making policy, and 
can also help presidents adjust their support coalition by giving them a resource they can use 
in their negotiations with other actors.” 
This research project will provide a large-N comparative study of how different political contexts and 
unexpected crises change what is considered a stable power-sharing bargain. This project will provide 
context and caveats to the competing claims of how African leaders choose to share power, and help 
bring the literature closer to the level of detail and comparability shown in the extant non-Africanist 





















3.0 Methodology and Data: the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset 
(ACPED) 
The ACPED project tracks the presence, position and demographics of ministers within African 
cabinets for each month from 1997 to 2017. ACPED provides two levels of data: information on 
individual ministers for each country-month, and aggregated metrics for cabinets at country-month. 
At the individual level, each minister is associated with several personal, demographic and political 
identifiers: position held, gender, political affiliation, home region and associated ethnic community. 
ACPED also records whether ministers are new additions to the cabinet, have been reappointed to 
another post or have been dismissed from the cabinet. At the aggregate level, ACPED provides 
metrics on the size of the cabinet, what percentage of a country’s relevant ethnic groups are 
represented within the cabinet and how fairly (with respect to demography) the ministerial posts are 
allocated among the various groups. 
ACPED currently covers Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, 
Democratic Republic of Congo15, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and 
Zimbabwe. 
ACPED codes data on all members of the cabinet who have full ministerial rank. This includes 
ministers, ministers of state (when the title does not designate a deputy minister), the Prime Minister, 
Vice Presidents and the President. Consequently, delegate ministers, deputy ministers, the speaker of 
parliament and secretaries of state are not included in the ACPED data. 
 
3.1 Information Included in ACPED 
3.1.1 Name 
This column shows the minister’s name. 
 
3.1.2 Gender 
This column shows a binary variable which is assigned 0 if the minister is male and 1 if the minister is 
female. 
 
                                                          





This column shows the post in the cabinet occupied by the individual minister for each country by 
month. ACPED also separates positions into ‘inner circle’ and ‘outer circle’ based on their 
importance. This enables users to evaluate whether ethnic/regional/political inclusion extends to the 
posts that hold significant administrative power (Lindemann, 2011a; Francois et al., 2015). Posts 
determined to be part of the inner circle typically involve control over the security forces, control over 
the state’s revenue or sources of revenue and the implementation of law. As a result, the following 
posts are typically perceived to be part of the inner circle: vice-president or prime minister, finance, 
foreign affairs, justice, defence, internal security/home affairs and oil/mineral resources (if the country 
is a major exporter). Outer circle posts are generally more concerned with service delivery or cultural 
issues such as education, labour, agriculture or culture/heritage. 
 
3.1.4 Political Affiliation 
A minister’s political affiliation is defined by their membership of a political party. If the minister 
belongs to a party or an electoral coalition (such as the Jubilee Coalition in Kenya or the Rally of 
Houphouëtists for Democracy and Peace in Ivory Coast), the party is coded as their political 
affiliation. Exceptions to this rule are: 
 Military figures who are not explicit members of any party. These are simply coded as 
‘Military’. 
 Politicians who have stood for elected office but not on any party ticket are coded as 
‘Independent’. 
 Individuals unaligned with any party and who were previously employed outside the realm of 
politics (such as business, international institutions or academia) are coded as ‘Civil Society’. 
 Members of rebel groups who either seize the government or are integrated into the 
government without forming registered parties are coded according to the name of their rebel 
group. 
The format used is the acronym of the party/coalition/group in the original language with an English 
translation. So the Front Populaire Ivoirien becomes the FPI: Ivorian Popular Front. 
 
3.1.5 Ethnicity and Politically-Relevant Ethnicity 
A minister’s ethnicity identity is separated into two categories, ethnicity and politically relevant ethnic 
group. The concept of ethnicity is subject to a lot of academic criticism and debate. Though formerly 
interpreted as hard unchanging categories, ethnic groups are now generally interpreted as fluid 
categories whose boundaries soften and harden with political events (Geertz, 1963; Eriksen, 2001; 
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Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Brubaker, 2002). Furthermore, ethnic categories are often multi-level with 
supposed ‘ethnic groups’ consisting of multiple subgroups which can act as a single unit or fracture 
depending on context (Posner, 2004a; Brubaker, 2002). For example, the Fulani of Nigeria can be 
further subdivided into Wodaabe and Fulani associated with the historical caliphates of Kano and 
Sakoto (Scarritt and Mozaffar, 1999). The Dinka and Nuer of South Sudan can be further divided into 
sub-clans which are sometimes at political odds or in outright conflict with each other (Pendle, 2014). 
To deal with these issues, ethnic identity is separated into two categories: Ethnicity and Politically-
Relevant Ethnicity.  The former refers to the most detailed information we can get on the minister’s 
ethno-linguistic identity. This means that the Ethnicity category can often include very small linguistic 
groups, sub-groups or dialects. This information is identified by self-declaration, in-country expert 
opinion and subnational media sources. The second category concerns which politicised ethnic bloc the 
minister belongs to. Often multiple ethnic groups act in concert and adopt a single identity in order to 
leverage their position within the political hierarchy. Examples include the ‘Kalenjin’ category which 
includes several groups indigenous to the Rift Valley, or the Chewa and Tumbuka who group 
themselves under ‘Easterners’ or ‘Nyanja’ in Zambia but retain their own labels in political competition 
in Malawi (Posner, 2004b).  
Politically relevant groups must be relevant in national politics (as opposed to localised politics). 
National political relevance can derive from how ethnicity guides voting practices, the formation of 
factions within the regime or the political rhetoric of regime and opposition elites. Multiple sources 
link a minister’s stated identity to a relevant domestic ethno-political identity group. An ethnic and 
regional macro-roster for each state is composed from several relevant sources including national 
experts, the Scarritt and Mozaffar’s list (1999), Ethnologue, Ethnic Power Relations and Francois, 
Trebbi and Rainer lists. National expert opinion is privileged if a discrepancy between source 
materials arises. A breakdown of primary influence or sources in guiding the categorisation of 
politically relevant ethnic groups is provided in the appendix.16  
 
3.1.6 Regional Background and Administrative Divisions 
Ethnicity is the most common proxy for what Posner (2004b) terms ‘interest group polarization’. 
However, regional background is increasingly perceived as another relevant identity in guiding 
political conflict, coalition formation and the distribution of resources (Østby, 2008; Holder and 
Raschky, 2014). As with ethnicity, the salience of the relevant identity is frequently dependent on the 
size of the political goal (Posner, 2004b; Posner, 2007). When competing for local office, elites 
choose to capitalise on more exclusive identities such as clan or subgroup, but may mobilise a larger 
                                                          
16 See appendix table 1 for breakdown of groups and populations. Appendix passage 1 and appendix table 2 
outline sources/methods used to create macro-groups. 
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and more inclusive identity bloc when competing in national politics (Posner, 2004b; Carrier et al., 
2014).  
In some cases, regional identities may be a more expedient identity for elites to use when seeking to 
build or mobilise their constituencies: diverse African states - such as pre-partition Sudan, Nigeria and 
Ivory Coast - have been split by political conflicts pitching ‘northerners’ against ‘southerners’. The 
importance of region as a source of mobilisation is demonstrated by the fact that most parties banned 
in Sub-Saharan Africa for promoting a particularistic agenda have been regionalist parties (Bogaards 
et al., 2010). 
ACPED uses each country’s primary administrative subdivision to determine the country’s regional 
categories. Each minister is then applied a regional category based on the administrative subdivision 
of their birth. Exceptions to this are cases where a minister who was born abroad or in the capital is 
perceived to come from the region of their parents, in which case ACPED codes their perceived or 
inherited region rather than their birth region as their background. These cases only occur at the 
recommendation of local experts.  
Administrative divisions are used for several reasons. Firstly, administrative units provide solid 
boundaries which are easy to categorise compared to imprecise terms such as ‘north’ or ‘south’. 
Secondly, subnational administrative divisions are engaged in a direct financial relationship with the 
central government, acting as direct contributors to and beneficiaries from the state’s resources. As a 
result constituents and representatives from the same region are likely to have aligned interests in 
terms of resource allocation and development projects (Ukiwo, 2003; Gudina, 2007; Osei and 
Malang, 2016).  
Administrative divisions can be subject to change, as shown by Kenya’s replacement of the old 
provincial system with the 47 counties in 2010 or the continued redistricting in Uganda or South 
Sudan. ACPED aims to apply each state’s most recent administrative division categorisation. ACPED 
also provides each minister’s secondary administrative division of birth (coded as admin2) for a large 
number, but not all, countries included in the ACPED data. This extra level of information is currently 
provided for Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, South Sudan and Zimbabwe. 
3.1.7 Change 






Table 3.1 – ACPED Variable Details 
Change Category Explanation 
Start This category is applied to the first cabinet for each country in the 
data. For all countries except South Sudan, the starting ministers 
are those who were in the cabinet in December 1996. 
Remains Refers to a cabinet minister retaining his or her position for that 
particular month. The vast majority of observations, 93.7%, consist 
of ministers retaining their position. 
Reshuffle Refers to a cabinet minister being shifted from heading one 
ministry to another. This category can also apply to a minister 
retaining their previous post but being assigned additional 
responsibility, either through the merging of ministries or through 
becoming the acting minister of an additional ministry. 
New Refers to a new appointment to the executive arm of government. 
If someone is appointed from a lower level of government (e.g. 
deputy minister, MP, etc.) this is still a new appointment. If a 
minister resigns, is dismissed or dropped from the cabinet, upon 
his or her return, s/he is always coded as New, no matter how brief 
the interim period has been. 
Dismissed Refers to a minister being dropped from the cabinet during a 
reshuffle, reappointed to a non-ministerial position or overtly fired 
from office. 
Dismissed (Arrested) Applied when a minister’s dismissal is accompanied by his or her 
arrest. 
Resigns Refers to a minister voluntarily leaving their position of their own 
volition. 
Deceased Refers to a minister leaving government due to death, both natural 
and unnatural causes. 
Suspended Refers to a minister being temporarily removed from his or her 
duties without an overt statement that this state of affairs is 
permanent. If the government later decides to turn the suspension 
into a permanent dismissal, then the minister in question is later 
coded as dismissed. 
Returns Refers to a minister who has been suspended (not dismissed) 
resuming his or her position. 
Removed This category only applies to leaders or co-leaders (Presidents, 
Commanders in Chief, de facto rulers, Vice-Presidents, Prime 
Ministers, etc.) who are removed from their position by force (e.g. 






3.2 Collection Process 
The data collection is divided into two phases. The first phase creates a monthly catalogue of the 
ministerial appointments, reshuffles and dismissals. The three primary resources for this data were 
Francois, Rainer and Trebbi cabinet data, the Africa South of the Sahara Yearbook, and the monthly 
periodical Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural series. The Africa South of the 
Sahara Yearbook was used to construct an annual list of ministers from 2005 onwards. Researchers 
read through each issue of the Africa Research Bulletin: Political, Social and Cultural series, which 
provides a list of government appointments at the formation of each new cabinet, to identify when 
changes in the cabinet occurred exactly. The annual list is used to deduce which ministers were 
dismissed at the creation of a new cabinet, and to double-check that Africa Research Bulletin has not 
missed any appointments or dismissals. If the annual list indicates a change in the cabinet that was not 
covered in the Africa Research Bulletin, Lexis Nexis database searches were used to find when the 
change occurred. 
The second phase involved gaining information on each minister’s ethno-linguistic, regional and 
political affiliations. This process is still ongoing for several countries First a session of secondary 
research was carried out, using a number of different sources including Wikileaks, the Historical 
Dictionary series, electoral records, Google books, and Google scholar. Wikipedia was also consulted, 
but any information gained from Wikipedia was checked against other sources for corroboration.  
After all secondary resources were exhausted, academics or local researchers with specialist 
knowledge of the respective countries were consulted. This often involved local researchers relying 
on personal knowledge, interviewing personal connections and accessing documents not available 
outside of the country (e.g. such as parliamentary records). To test for accuracy, researchers were also 
assigned to find information that was already confirmed through secondary research.  
 
3.3 Created Metrics 
Below is a brief overview of some of the metrics which will be used in the remainder of this chapter 
and in subsequent chapters of the research project. This list is not exhaustive and different chapters 
will include different and unique metrics.  
 
3.3.1 Cabinet Size 





3.3.2 Ethnic/Regional Representation 
This metric determines how many relevant groups there are in cabinet. Relevant groups are defined as 
either all politically relevant ethnic categories (for ethnic representation), or all primary administrative 
divisions (for regional representation). The number of groups that have at least one representative in 
cabinet is divided by the total number of groups and multiplied by 100.  
If country x has a total of 15 politically relevant ethnic categories, and 12 of these groups have at least 
one representative in cabinet, then the representation score would be 80 percent. This measure can be 
applied to the inner circle and outer circle.  
 
3.3.3 Ethnic/Regional Disproportion 
This metric determines how equitably posts are divided among the different groups within cabinet. 
The measure is adapted from Samuels and Snyder’s (2001) measurement of vote/constituency 
malapportionment.  





Where sigma indicates the summation over all relevant groups, 𝑥𝑖 is the percentage of all cabinet 
positions allocated to group i, and 𝑦𝑖 is the percentage of population belonging to group i. Groups not 
included in cabinet are not considered in the calculation. 
For example, if country x had four relevant groups (all included in the cabinet) and the posts are 
allocated as below: 
 Group 
 A B C D 
Share of population (%) 40 30 20 10 
Share of cabinet (%) 30 10 10 50 
 
Here the disproportion score would be, Disproportion = (1/2)(￨30-40￨+￨10-30￨+￨10-20￨+￨50-10￨) 
= 40 percent. This score means that 40 percent of the cabinet posts are allocated to groups that would 
not receive those positions if posts were allocated in a completely proportional manner. 
 
3.3.4 Representation of Co-Ethnics/Co-Regionalists/Party Members 
There are several instances where the research project aims to quantify the degree to which leaders 
dominate the cabinet with their own ‘core constituency’. This can refer to the proportion of 
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cabinet/inner circle/outer circle posts occupied by ministers from the leader’s politically relevant 
ethnic group, home region or political party. The project also investigates how changes in the political 
landscape impacts the representation of ethnic groups associated with the opposition (chapter 5) or 
regions which are deemed hotspots of protest (chapter 6). 
 
3.4 Improvement over Existing Datasets 
ACPED’s creation follows the academic trend of estimating elite relationships and networks through 
the distribution of official government positions (Lindemann, 2011b; Wimmer et al., 2009; Langer, 
2005; Arriola, 2009; Francois et al., 2015). Currently, two other publicly available academic datasets 
aim to provide similar information to ACPED: Francois, Rainer and Trebbi’s African cabinet data 
(hereafter FRT); and the Ethnic-Power Relations dataset by Wimmer et al. (hereafter EPR). 
 
3.4.1 Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) 
The Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset is widely used to assess the position of ethno-political 
groups within a state’s political hierarchy.17 The relative position of different ethnic groups within the 
state is based on each group’s access to state positions but is estimated through an online survey of 
country-experts. 
“Version 3.0 of the Ethnic Power Relations dataset (EPR3) identifies all politically relevant 
ethnic groups and their access to state power in every country of the world from 1946 to 
2010. It includes annual data for 157 countries and 758 groups and codes the degree to which 
their representatives held executive-level state power—from total control of the government 
to overt political discrimination.” (Wimmer et al., 2009) 
 
ACPED relies on objective data concerning representation in senior government rather than expert 
opinion on the political hierarchy between a state’s competing subgroups. This means that ACPED 
data is likely to capture subtle shifts that orthodox expert opinion may miss. ACPED also does not use 
EPR’s classification system for analysing political power: monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior 
partner, discriminated, powerless and irrelevant. These broad categories can obscure subtle trends of 
regime co-option, exclusion and power sharing. 
To examine the crossover between ACPED and EPR, we take each Politically-Relevant Ethnic 
identity recorded in ACPED, calculate the average number of posts held in the cabinet/inner 
                                                          
17 Studies include Roessler (2011), Wimmer et al. (2009), Wucherpfennig et al. (2012), Choi and Kim (2018) 
and Roessler and Ohls (2018). 
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circle/outer circle for that year, and then fit each bloc into EPR’s seven-point categorisation.18 Figure 
3.1 shows that ACPED largely corroborates with EPR, with Senior Partners holding a large number of 
posts (especially in the inner circle) while powerless/discriminated/irrelevant groups occupy fewer 
posts. 
Figure 3.1 – Ethnic Group Dominance of Cabinet/Inner Circle/Outer Circle by EPR 
Classifications 
 
Each category in EPR, however, shows a high degree of variation. Dominant groups occupy between 
zero and 63.64 percent of the cabinet. Discriminated groups, such as the Hutu under Buyoya or the 
Kikuyu under Moi, can occupy a significant portion of the inner circle posts. These variations can 
occur due to regime attempts at co-option or due to unity governments aimed at ending civil conflict. 
EPR’s categorical methodology means that these subtleties in regime strategy and the balance of 
power are not recorded. 
                                                          
18 Analysis includes all countries apart from DRC, Tanzania, Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. North African 
states are not included due to lack of ethnic diversity. DRC is excluded due to the high presence of missing data 
on minister ethnic backgrounds. Tanzania is excluded due to difficulties marrying EPR and ACPED coding. 
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While ACPED largely mirrors EPR’s categorisation, examining individual countries shows the 
advantages of ACPED over EPR. For example, figure 3.2 shows that ‘Junior Partners’ in Uganda 
have experienced a decrease in cabinet representation since the middle of the 2000s. Conversely 
‘Senior Partners’ have increased their representation both in the cabinet as a whole and in the inner 
circle, while ‘Powerless’ groups are also beginning to occupy more of the cabinet and the outer circle. 
This pattern is driven by Museveni’s side-lining of the Buganda and Basoga, two traditional junior 
allies in his regime. 
Figure 3.2 – ACPED vs EPR Comparison - Uganda 
 
The gradual erosion of the presence of ‘Junior Partners’ within the Ugandan senior government raises 
the question of whether EPR’s broad categorisation accurately reflects the distribution of power 
among Uganda’s ethnic groups. This demonstrates the improvement ACPED offers over EPR’s 
methodology and ACPED’s ability to capture subtle trends others might miss. ACPED also offers 
significantly more measures of inclusion and representation through its Political Affiliation and 
Regional Background metrics. The advantage these additional metrics confer in assessing the division 
of political power is investigated further later in this chapter. 
 
3.4.2 Francois Rainer and Trebbi (FRT) 
Francois, Rainer and Trebbi’s data (FRT) marks an improvement over EPR due to its use of objective 
data on cabinet appointments rather than expert opinion and broad categories to class ethnic groups. 
Though inspired by the FRT data, ACPED offers two important improvements over FRT: providing 
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multiple identity markers for each minister and listing monthly changes in the cabinet. FRT in 
contrast focusses only on ethnicity and only offers an annual record of changes in cabinet.   
Out of the 3928 ministers listed in ACPED, 753 (19.2%) have a sub-annual tenure, meaning that they 
would be missed by FRT. Figure 3.3 shows a histogram of ministerial tenures, binned by twelve-
month blocs. While most ministers last 12-23 months, a significant portion of ministers have tenures 
lasting less than a year.  
Figure 3.3 – Ministerial Tenure (by month)  
 
Furthermore, the occurrence of sub-annual ministerial tenures is not equally distributed across 
countries or time periods. Sub-annual tenures tend to occur during crisis periods such as coups, 
revolutions or short-lived unity governments. Figure 3.4 shows ministers present in the ACPED data 
not present in FRT covering the period 1997-2004 (where the two datasets overlap). FRT misses most 
ministers during crisis periods such as the First Congo War (34 ministers missing), the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council coup in Sierra Leone (9 ministers missing) and General Guei’s coup in Ivory 














Figure 3.5 demonstrates that the 23 countries covered by ACPED support this trend. A much higher 
percentage of ministers have sub-annual tenures in more crisis-prone countries such as CAR, Mali or 
Tunisia. In contrast, more stable countries, such as Botswana or Tanzania, have few or no ministers 
with sub-annual tenures.  
Figure 3.5 – ACPED: Percent of Ministers with Sub-Annual Tenures by Country 
 
Therefore ACPED represents a considerable advantage over FRT’s annual data, which becomes less 
accurate during periods in which regime or leader strategies of survival are at their most volatile. 
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3.4.3 Multiple Forms of Identity 
ACPED also represents an improvement on existing data through including multiple forms of identity 
on top of ethnicity, namely regional background and political affiliation. Previous studies have shown 
that the importance of ethnicity varies across contexts (Bratton et al., 2012; Cheeseman and Ford, 
2007; Wahman, 2017; Basedau et al., 2011). This variation means that other cleavages, such as 
regional background or political party affiliation, can take precedence in the regime’s calculations of 
which elites to include the government.  
Burundi illustrates how different types of cleavage become important over time. The Burundian Civil 
War (1993-2005) pitted a Tutsi-dominated government and military against a collection of competing 
Hutu insurgents (Colombo et al., 2019). During this conflict, the international community and 
reformist Tutsi leaders attempted to end the conflict through incorporating more Hutus into the 
government (Minorities at Risk, 2003). Nevertheless, the Tutsi community continued to occupy nearly 
50 percent of the cabinet in spite of making up only 13.6 percent of the population (see figure 3.6). 
The war ended in late 2005 when Hutu former-rebel, Pierre Nkurunziza, was elected president by the 
two chambers of the Burundian parliament. Figure 6 shows a definite increase in Hutu cabinet 
ministers from 2006 onwards. 
Figure 3.6: Burundi Cabinet 1997-2017 Ethnicity 
 
With the movement to multiparty democracy, the Nkurunziza regime faced electoral competition from 
predominantly Hutu opposition leaders (Colombo et al., 2019). The country was plunged into crisis 
after Nkuruziza argued that he should stand for a third term in the 2015 elections as his first term had 
been decided by parliamentary, as opposed to a popular, vote. Many of the figures opposing 
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Nkurunziza’s decision, including a general who launched an attempted coup against the regime, were 
Hutu (Africa Confidential, 2015). 
Figure 3.7: Burundi Cabinet 2006-2017 Hutu Ministers Regional Background 
 
Faced with an increasing level of political agitation from Hutu co-ethnics, Nkurunziza increasingly 
appointed ministers from his home region of Ngozi, an area of reliable political support (Africa 
Confidential, 2015a). Figure 3.7 shows the percent of Hutu ministers who come from Nkurunziza’s 
home region. A similar situation occurred in Rwanda where president Habyarimana concentrated 
power in the Akazu, an inner circle of Rwandan elites predominantly from his home region (Human 
Rights Watch, 1999). This regional aspect of changes in cabinet make-up would not be revealed by 
the FRT dataset. 
Political party affiliation is another form of relevant identity which is overlooked in current datasets. 
The role of political parties in elite power sharing varies significantly across different countries in 
Africa. In the post-independence era, many African states were run by autocratic single parties which 
acted as a means to integrate an ethnically and ideologically varied elite (Van de Walle, 2007). Some 
of these parties – such as Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) or the Botswana Democratic 
Party (BDP) – have ruled their countries for around half a century. Since the widespread adoption of 
multiparty elections, some parties – both ruling and opposition - have drawn on specific ethnic and 
regional clusters, despite many countries imposing bans on parties which promote an 
ethnic/religious/regionalist agenda (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Wahman, 2017; Bogaards et al., 
2010). The alignment between ethnic identity and political support has been prominent in Kenya, 
45 
 
Ghana, Ivory Coast and Sierra Leone (Langer, 2005; Posner, 2007; Jockers et al., 2009; Kandeh, 
1992). Figure 3.8 illustrates these two different interactions between ethnicity and political party.  
Figure 3.8 - Sierra Leone and Tanzania – Intersection of Political Affiliation and Ethnicity 
 
In Sierra Leone, the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) is perceived as a party representing Mende 
interests while the All People’s Congress (APC) draws support from northern groups such as the 
Temne and Limba (Kandeh, 1992). Both parties have ruled Sierra Leone at different points covered 
by the ACPED data.19 Though neither APC nor SLPP appointed ministers from a single ethnic 
constituency, 40 percent of the minsters when the SLPP was in charge were Mende although the 
group accounts for approximately a third of the national population. Similarly, nearly half of the 
ministers belonging to the APC led regimes are either Temne or Limba compared to 42 percent of the 
population. Conversely, in Tanzania the ruling CCM functions as a broad-based coalition, drawing 
from a wide range of ethnic groups without any particular patterns of ethnic dominance.20 This 
difference in party composition influences the dynamics of etho-political competition within the two 
                                                          
19 An SLPP party member occupied Sierra Leone’s presidency from 1998 to 2007, while an APC candidate 
occupied the presidency from 2007 to 2017. 
20 The exception may be the high representation of Zanzibari ministers in the ruling party, perhaps reflecting the 
fact that the islands have been a consistent stronghold of opposition parties since unification (Myers, 2000). 
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states. While in Sierra Leone ethno-political competition happens during the main elections between 
parties, in Tanzania ethnic competition happens within the party during electoral primaries (Egboh 
and Aniche, 2015; Kandeh, 1992).  
The heterogeneity of political parties in the cabinet can also be used to estimate the ruling party’s 
dominance over the political landscape. While Tanzania and Botswana are politically dominated by a 
single ruling party, states such as Kenya are ruled by multi-party coalitions of convenience liable to 
internal rupture over differences in policy, questions of leadership and disagreements over the 
division of power (Lynch, 2006; Arriola, 2013). In highly contested states - such as Central African 
Republic, Zimbabwe or Sudan - power is divided among regime and opposition parties or armed 
movements either as externally mandated unity governments or strategic alliances formulated by the 
leader (Bariagaber, 2013; Cheeseman, 2011). 
Current datasets rely purely on ethnicity to approximate regime strategies of elite management, 
limiting their capacity to examine how regime survival strategies affect multiple dimensions of 
representation. Consequently, ACPED represents a major improvement on currently available data.   
 
3.4.4 Regime Categorical Data 
The ACPED project also seeks to act as a compliment to existing datasets which classify government 
and regime types. Datasets such as PolityIV and Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) are regularly used 
in research to analyse how patterns of governmental authority affect other types of social 
phenomena.21 The stated aim of these datasets is to measure levels of democratisation in a manner 
which lends itself to comparative or longitudinal study (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Coppedge et al., 
2016). Because democracy is better understood as a collection of different traits which can be ranked 
by degrees, PolityIV and VDEM use a wide range of different variables to measure 
institutionalisation, the balance of formal power between different branches of government and the 
quality of elections (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995; Coppedge et al., 2016). Other datasets or classificatory 
methods, such as Schedler (2013) or Wahman et al.’s (2013) Authoritarian Regime Dataset (ARD), 
aim to provide a means for analysing the comparative political durability of regimes or the rules by 
which political power is maintained. 
In contrast to these existing datasets, ACPED aims to provide a means for assessing how power is 
shared among different relevant political groupings through the representation of elites. Factors such 
as regime type, levels of democratisation and normalised avenues of gaining or retaining power will 
figure within the calculations guiding a leader’s power-sharing or elite management strategy. But it is 
                                                          
21 Examples include Østby’s (2008) study on regional inequalities and conflict, Holder and Raschky’s (2014) on 
regional favouritism and Arriola and Johnson’s (2014) on women’s representation in senior government. 
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unlikely that these factors alone determine the power sharing strategy. The following section provides 
a brief analysis of how much of the variance in ACPED measures are explained by the pre-existing 
datasets of PolityIV , VDEM, Schedler’s regime classification and ARD (Marshall et al., 2002; 
Coppedge et al., 2018; Schedler, 2013; Wahman et al., 2013).  
Figure 9 shows ACPED country-month observations divided into democracies, anocracies and 
autocracies by the Polity Index.22 The majority of observations are classified as anocracies. Figure 9 
shows that all three categories appear to be similar in most ACPED measures and there is much more 
variance within polity than across categories (see appendix table 3). Figures 10 and 11 classify 
ACPED observations by ARD or Schedler’s classification.  
Common themes appear in figures 3.9, 3.10 and 3.11. Regimes which fall short of democracy but 
remain vulnerable (anocracy/limited multiparty/competitive regimes) tend to have cabinets which are 
larger, less dominated by the leader’s party or co-ethnics and highly representative. This pattern 
conforms with the theory that weaker regimes will need to engage in more extensive strategies of 
power sharing than stronger regimes (Roberts, 2015; Schedler, 2013). However there is much more 
variance within these categories than across them. This shows that the classificatory schemes of the 
PolityIV, ARD and Schedler datasets do not adequately explain the variation of elite power-sharing 
strategies. 





                                                          
22 A Polity score of >5 is a democracy, 5:-5 is an anocracy and <-6 is an autocracy.  
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Figure 3.10 - ACPED Metrics by ARD Categories 
 
 
Figure 3.11 - ACPED Metrics by Schedler Categories 
 
Figure 3.12 shows ACPED metrics compared against VDEM’s ordinal metrics (specifically the 
Electoral Component Index). In a similar finding to figures 3.9 and 3.10, regimes which fall short of 
full democratisation but cannot also be classed as autocracies tend to have larger cabinets which are 






Figure 3.12 – ACPED Metrics by VDEM Electoral Component Index 
 
The large amount of variation within each category shows that while existing datasets on regime type 
and level of democratisation go some way to explaining variations in elite-management strategies, 
these datasets are not substitutes for ACPED. Regime type alone does not dictate elite bargains.  
The remaining chapters of this project will examine circumstances which influence leader and regime 










4.0 Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus? Representation and 
Accommodation in African Cabinets 
 
African regimes are frequently accused of engaging in exclusive politics through biased policies and 
distributions of power that mainly benefit the leader’s co-ethnic supporters. Several ‘consequences’, 
including violence, corruption and illegitimacy have been blamed upon this under-evidenced claim 
(Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2014). Recent studies reinforce the idea that African regimes 
cultivate corrupt practices but find little evidence that corruption is exclusive or limited to a regime’s 
base (Albrecht, 2015; Arriola, 2009; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015; Goldsmith, 2010; Osei, 2015; 
Posner and Young, 2007). Far from constituting a homogenous, exclusive bloc, senior elites represent 
a wide range of particularistic interests: political, military, religious, regional, ethnic or other 
communities (Owen, 2014). Integrating politicians from different ethnic groups into their coalitions has 
allowed African leaders to effectively consolidate power (Bayart, 1993; Rothchild, 1995). In modern, 
socially heterogeneous states, how leaders manage diverse and competing political identities and 
interests underlies the success or failure of several significant government functions (Langer, 2005; 
Wimmer, 2012; Burgess et al., 2015; Franck and Rainer, 2012). 
But are African governments inclusive? And what is ‘inclusive’ representation? The perspectives in the 
existing literature on African political representation can be broadly divided into two camps: those that 
emphasize ‘ethnic arithmetic’ based on demography and its consequences; and ‘political calculus’, 
concentrating on a leader’s strategy, management and accommodation of various interests for regime 
maintenance. The former discussion is robust in terms of measurement but misses domestic politics in 
favour of pre-determined, often static relationships. The latter discussion is rich but not systematic 
across states and governments. A bridge between these two can address three outstanding problems that 
plague research on representation and power.  
The ‘Third Wave of Democratization’ that swept Africa in the 1990s heralded an end to one-party states 
and challenged many leaders to integrate a wide array of elites and interests to hold onto power. A 
dramatic increase in ministerial posts during periods of democratization allowed leaders to redistribute 
material and symbolic rents from the centre and strengthen ties with their regional and political 
constituencies (Haass and Ottmann, 2017). Inclusive representation is often framed as an ethnic-
demographic balance, as ascribed identity markers of ethnicity, regional affiliation or language often 
have a strong influence on political support and patronage (Van De Walle, 2003; Bratton and Van De 
Walle, 1994; Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich, 2003; Posner, 2004a). In politically heterogeneous 
societies, the best strategy for leaders to secure a majority or plurality is through cross-group inclusive 
coalition (Muller, 2007).  Inclusion politics underlies regime maintenance strategies which guide 
leaders on minister appointments, dismissals and reshuffles, as demonstrated by studies that focus on 
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the size and composition of African cabinets (Arriola, 2009; Lindemann, 2011b; Francois, Rainer and 
Trebbi, 2015; Kroeger, 2018).  
A ‘political calculus’ literature suggests that regimes practice strategic, transactional and two-level 
game of inclusive representation to consolidate power through co-option. Many regimes integrate 
competitors, opponents, large and small groups. As a result, the general population is represented at 
senior levels, in line with the proportion they represent. Yet, political elites are engaged in hierarchical 
contests for influence beyond their group position. The level of power accorded to elites within cabinets 
is a result of strategic manipulation and change arising from negotiations with leaders. These findings 
question how representation is conceptualized, measured and practiced. 
Existing research lacks a standard measure that considers the political complexity of each state. Relying 
on ethnic group membership as the determinant of power presumes regimes respond automatically to 
ethnic demographics and privilege co-ethnics (Chandra, 2007). Though important, ethno-demographic 
assessments are insufficient at explaining changes in representation over time and the composition of 
group representatives at the senior level. Several African states where ethnicity is not the direct basis 
for political participation are removed from consideration. Further, the present literature largely ignores 
the role of elites as representatives of group interests, and how leaders require elites to bridge voting 
constituencies with senior scales of governance. Within modern African states, elites have multifaceted 
identities and roles they play in regime maintenance; they manoeuvre and consolidate their power base 
through a transactional political system. The result is a constant negotiation between elites and leaders 
and within elite circles.  
The strategies for securing and distributing power are poorly understood in the African context at the 
senior level. It is well acknowledged that the greatest threat to leaders in a ‘hybrid’ system of 
competitive autocracy or transitioning democracy is from internal power holders (Quinlivan, 1999; 
Haber, 2006; Bueno De Mesquita et al., 2005; Egorov and Sonin, 2011), and there are many aspects of 
political survival and rule which require manipulation at the senior scale (Woldense, 2018). Multiple, 
concurrent, practices are at play at the senior level to assure leader dominance, regime maintenance, 
and opponent suppression: strong elites may be integrated but side-lined, cabinet sizes may grow to 
dilute the effect of strong ministers, multiple ministries for the same issue may occur etc. Common 
strategies are coup-proofing, cabinet packing, isolating, turnover, buffering and counterbalancing. 
Coup-proofing is particularly common and involves assigning disproportionate power to ‘competitors’ 
(Albrecht, 2015; Roessler, 2016). Leaders may over-represent competitors when they are dependent on 
the loyalty and co-option of ‘rival’ elites and groups to secure their hold on power23. These elites are 
                                                          
23 Many governments showcase the outcomes of an inclusive elite accommodation, even where the proportion of power acceded to competing 
groups is unbalanced. For example, coalitions designed by Nyerere in Tanzania, Kaunda in Zambia and Houphouet-Boigney in Ivory Coast 
all attest to the dividends of inclusivity and balance (De Waal, 2009; Lindemann, 2011b; Van De Walle, 2007). Additionally, other 
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instrumental to dealing with internal threats, including coups (Roessler, 2011), negotiations (Albrecht 
and Schlumberger, 2004), settlements (Di John and Putzel, 2009), the local consolidation of regime 
power (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1997), seeing off electoral challenges (De Mesquita et al., 2005; 
Chabal and Daloz, 1999) and quelling violent elite competition against the government and between 
elites. This is a central tenet of the power sharing literature and underscores that the selective co-option 
of competing elites requires extensive management by leaders, resulting in significant volatility in 
individual cabinet positions, group representation and cabinet size.  
This article provides a bridge between ethnic arithmetic and political calculus. It introduces and 
examines the African Cabinet and Political Elite Dataset, hereafter ACPED. ACPED is a new project 
that tracks the presence, position and demographics of ministers within African cabinets for each month 
from 1997 to the present. ACPED collects information on all ministers within national cabinets; each 
minister is associated with several demographic and political identifiers, including home region and 
associated ethnic community, political party, gender and position within the cabinet at each month.  
 
The article proceeds in reviewing literature on representation and elite accommodation as 
complementary but distinct interpretations of political inclusion. Using cabinet representation 
measures, we ask and answer the following questions: Are African governments inclusive of their 
ethno-regional political communities? Are groups proportionately represented? Does cabinet size and 
volatility affect representation rates? How stable are elite positions? What does the rate of turnover 
suggest about elite management and a leader’s consolidation strategy? What do different cabinet power 
distributions suggest about the health and stability of governance across states?  
Our examination finds that governments practice strategic inclusion: ethno-regional populations are 
often represented but without fairness, stability or proportional power. Leaders practice a two-level 
game, often representing ethno-political groups broadly, while pursuing transactional, volatile and 
disproportionate distributions of power between elites within the cabinet. Representation of national 
heterogeneity is markedly stable over time, but accommodation of political elites, and the proportion of 
powerful positions assigned to representatives widely across states and time periods. Further, elite 
accommodation and management are central to regime continuity, maintenance and consolidation, 
rather than general political representation and stability. Elite accommodation and power transactions 
by regimes are the main engines of change and instability in African states, but widespread 
representation is a ‘good policy’ and relatively painless. ‘Political calculus’ between elites and the 
leader explains the high rates of change and elite circulation, in contrast to the relatively stable political 
'arithmetic’. We suggest that future research into analysis on the character and consequences of 
                                                          
governments demonstrate the importance of including potential competitors, such as in Uganda and Rwanda, where President Kagame formed 




representation incorporate these data and findings on the composition of regimes and strategies of 
leaders.  
 
4.1 The Logic of Representation 
A large body of research assumes African political systems are exclusive and characterized by active 
marginalization of groups and disproportional authority to a leader’s home group and region (Chabal 
and Daloz, 1999; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Rothchild, 1995; Whitaker, 2005; Geschiere, 2009; 
Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009). This discussion often frames representation as a method to 
quantify exclusion as a proxy for grievance (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008). This perspective has 
stifled inquiry into how representation transcends measures of inclusion and exclusion, and how 
different manifestations of identity are important in different countries.  
Politics in Africa are strongly shaped by ethno-political identities. Ethnic groups provide “a form of 
minimum winning coalition, large enough to secure benefits in the competition for spoils but also small 
enough to maximize the per capita value of these benefits” (Bates, 1983). Identity is difficult to modify 
and acts as a “visual marker” to prevent non-members from participating in the allocation of political 
goods (Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Fearon, 1999). Because voters support parties that represent 
interests of their ethnic group and exclude others (Kasara, 2007), leaders, politically active constituency 
members and elites frame the stakes of political contest in ethnic or regional terms24 that emphasize 
reciprocity (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997; Berman, 1998). Ethnic-based calculations, 
legitimacy of political elites and ‘constituent pay off’ rests on a mutual ability to conform to communal 
obligations where the underlying logic is to act cohesively to allow representatives to get sufficient 
party and government posts. If leaders “do not get sufficient posts, they will not be able to wield 
sufficient power on your behalf in order to make sure that you [...] get your fair share of the jobs and 
development funds going” (Szeftel, 2000).25  Yet, appeals to bloc interests are rarely the sole motivator 
in political support and vary in effectiveness across different contexts; further, the degree of exchange 
between representation and patronage allocation is contested: Rainer and Trebbi (2012) stipulate that 
the presence of an elite from a certain ethnic group in the cabinet does not necessarily guarantee that 
the minister’s co-ethnics will benefit from state patronage. Indeed, resources generally remain in elite 
hands and do not extend out past a small circle of followers (Van de Walle, 2003). Others find that 
despite the material benefits, the attachment communities’ exhibit toward elites is due to symbolic 
representation (Van de Walle, 2009; Randall, 2007).  
                                                          
24 Using survey data from Ghana, Lindberg and Morrison (2008) challenge the concept of voting patterns adhering to obligations of 
communal reciprocity and patronage. 
25 While ethnicity acts as an important indicator of voting behavior in almost all contexts (Basedau et al., 2011), its importance varies across 
political arenas, scales, times and institutions. 
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There is a consensus that identities do matter in guiding political support (Basedau et al., 2011), and are 
most salient during periods of competition (Eifert, Miguel and Posner, 2010).  But ethnic ‘arithmetic’ 
approaches to representation overdetermine the processes and outcomes of African political choices 
and actions. This is in part because ethno-political identity and motivations are neither static nor 
determined solely by demographic size (Posner, 2004b). African regimes adapt ably to their state’s 
social heterogeneity: the lack of absolute ethnic or regional majorities in many African countries means 
that leaders could not rely on their own groups for political support to maintain power (Fearon, 2003; 
Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Basedau et al., 2011; Erdmann, 2007, Bratton, 2008). To acquiesce to co-
ethnic demographic minorities would place leaders in a weak, vulnerable position (Piombo, 2005). 
Instead, regimes consolidate power through co-option and integration. As democratic transitions opened 
the political system to large-scale elite participation and the associated checks and balances, regimes 
are forced to adapt and extend to survive: many parties, particularly ruling parties, are genuinely multi-
ethnic yet feature a dominant group, while a high number of opposition parties are heavily ethnic 
(Cheeseman and Ford, 2007).  Inclusive representation is reinforced by institutional arrangements, 
election alliances and the ability of new elites to participate (Choi and Raleigh, 2015)26, and elites within 
alliances expect representation for their support.  
 
4.2 Political Calculus 
Representation is not an altruistic act: African governments benefit from extensive and ethno-regionally 
inclusive representation that stabilizes and reinforces political alliances where power is shared across 
intermediary elites (Arriola, 2009; Goldsmith, 2001). Leaders accommodate and manage powerful 
elites and communities who leverage their local influence for rewards and recognition by regimes (Van 
De Walle, 2007, Goldsmith, 2001; Svolik, 2009) through political bargaining (Benson and Kugler, 
1998), ‘ethnic balancing’ (Arriola, 2009; Lindemann, 2011a) and the ‘political marketplace’ (De Waal, 
2015). Elite management keeps political elites in positions of authority and alliances, where the 
distribution of resources, rents and power entices and retains clients (Van De Walle, 2003; Lindberg 
and Morrison, 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). To be ‘co-opted’, subnational elites must leverage 
their ethnic, regional, business, financial, religious, international and security associations in their 
negotiations with leaders (De Waal, 2009; Mozaffar et al., 2003).27 Consequentially, elites differ in their 
political weight and regimes must contend with multiple elites of varying power.  
The existing literature asks what type and size of coalition is optimal. Arriola (2009) argues that larger 
coalitions are an effective strategy for facilitating intra-elite accommodation and warding off coups. A 
                                                          
26 Examples include constitutional terms that require that presidential candidates acquire a share of votes in every province for the 
assumption to national office. 
27 See Langer’s (2005) study of elite exclusion in Ivory Coast; Lindemann’s (2011a) study of inclusive elite bargains in Zambia and Uganda; 
and Arriola’s (2009) statistical investigation of the ‘politics of the belly’. Also see Bayart (1989; 1993). 
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narrow ruling coalition with many excluded groups and disaffected elites provides the necessary 
resources for the opposition to form a coalition capable of displacing the government. De Mesquita et 
al. (2005) similarly argue that outside threats to incumbent rule–protests, civil wars and revolutions–
come from those who are deprived access to the resources of the state. Creating ‘oversized’ coalitions 
can mitigate against the threat of defections from within by enabling the ruler to maintain a winning 
coalition even after some insiders’ defect (ibid.). A ‘minimum winning coalition’ may be enlarged as 
the defection of important elites from within the regime presents a severe threat to incumbents presiding 
over small coalitions. Creating an inclusive and expansive coalition which can co-opt potential political 
opponents and their constituents can limit the capabilities of opposition coalitions and further enhance 
the incumbent’s chance of re-election (Gandhi and Buckles, 2016). 
Beyond size, the composition of elite coalitions at senior government levels reflects leader negotiations 
and necessary buy-in. Leaders engage in multiple complex, volatile, unfair and often simultaneous 
strategies. These include ‘coup proofing’ which co-opts potential rivals into government with mutually 
beneficial arrangements (Roessler, 2011), and which are disproportionately advantageous to 
challengers. The degree of coup-proofing through power sharing is often overstated in research 
(Albertus, 2012; Quinvilan, 1994). Ruling coalitions in which power is dispersed among senior 
members, or partners have veto power, can limit the autonomy of the incumbent and lead to political 
gridlock (Le Van, 2011; Roeder, 2005). Regimes can ‘pack’ the cabinet, distorting the power of strong, 
potential challengers by giving positions to elites from many small communities (Arriola, 2011). While 
there is an insufficient political-demographic reason for these appointments, growing the cabinet 
specifically through short-term positions for small groups, enhances a leader’s senior support base 
through ‘useful’ alliances. These appointments reinforce the loyalty principle and allow regimes to 
appear ‘inclusive’. In contrast, ‘starving’ under-represents rival groups. ‘Counterbalancing’ creates 
multiple versions of the same department or positions within government to keep possible competitors 
weak and disorganized while creating new allied recipients of patronage (Haber, 2006).28 Finally, 
cabinet reshuffles suggest concerns over limiting the power of internal rivals, political support and 
possibly appeasing mass discontent (Kroeger, 2018; Indridason and Kam, 2008; Mietzner, 2017; 
Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Woldense, 2018). 
The arrangements reflect a reality: distorted distributions of elite power emerge as it is strategic for 
regimes to recognize and reinforce power differentials to their benefit, and to limit power of challengers, 
or take advantage of intra-elite competition. Cabinets are, therefore, representative of the social 
heterogeneity of the state and elite interests through disproportionate power distributions. These 
strategies often result in an inclusive, unbalanced power system where a skewed distribution of 
positions and material benefits is accrued by the leader and select benefactors. The effect is to stabilize 
                                                          




the regime through leverage balancing (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010), promoting and rewarding 
transactional power politics. Because of a regime’s political calculus, there are multiple possibilities for 
representative and proportional power at any point in time and across cabinets. Countries that are 
ethnically inclusive may have a highly imbalanced government where one, or a few, ethnic groups have 
a “disproportionate” share of cabinet positions or an exclusive government that may distribute power 
well across the few groups within its inner circle. Further, political calculus results in high rates of 
volatility in persons, positions and overall rates of inclusion and proportional power.  
The ‘calculus’ interpretation of representation finds the ‘big tent’ model is a political safety net with 
substantial benefits to anchor elites to the regime. Included elites are wary of jeopardizing their 
privileged position and rarely push for political reform; even opposition politicians frequently accept 
offers for inclusion from the regime. The lack of ideological diversity among political factions and 
positions are frequently seen to enrich oneself and constituents (Bratton and Van De Walle, 1994; Kieh, 
2018; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Arriola, 2009; Arriola and Johnson, 2014). These dynamics enable 
incumbents to create coalitions of convenience to shore up support from multiple elites and 
constituencies. These coalitions can be created and maintained despite antagonisms.29  
 
4.3 Assessing Elite Power and Distributions 
Previous attempts to capture African representation have relied on lists of ethnic communities and their 
demographic size, expert opinion on aggregated group roles in government (see EPR by Wimmer, 
Cederman and Min, 2009), linguistic group numbers (Fearon, 2002) and distinctions on the scale of 
political group identity (Scarritt and Mozaffer, 2003). No data measured representation for a defined 
scale of formal, dynamic power. Recently, scholars amassed cabinet data for consistent, reliable and 
transparent representation information as “a cabinet minister in Africa is considered ‘a kind of super 
representative’ (Zolberg, 1969, p. 283) who is expected to speak for the interests of co-ethnics, as well 
as channel resources to them” (Arriola, 2011). Cabinets are also the locus of policy decision-making 
and patronage opportunities from which the public may gain benefits. Appointments are a public 
commitment, as a minister’s identity is usually open knowledge (Posner, 2004b; Chandra, 2007).  
Cabinets are expected to include a collection of constituency representatives deemed necessary for the 
continuation of the regime (Arriola, 2009). Ministerial positions serve as an important means to forge 
an intra-elite bargain shaped as the leader determines necessary (Roessler, 2011; Bratton and Van De 
Walle, 1994; Lindemann, 2011b). Cabinet positions are key strategic ‘transactions’ (Arriola and 
Johnson, 2014, 495), and are used by incumbents to co-opt ‘big men’, the influential politicians who 
                                                          
29 Examples are alliances between Kenyatta (Kikuyu) and Ruto (Kalenjin) in Kenya’s Jubilee Coalition; the coalition between President 
Ouattara (northerner) and former President Konan Bedie (Baule) in Ivory Coast. During his tenure, Bedie cultivated rhetoric aimed at 
excluding northerners and Ouattara from the electoral process and fostered anti-northern sentiment (Langer, 2005).  
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can ‘activate their own networks’ to recruit supporters or deliver votes for the regime (Bratton and Van 
de Walle, 1994; Diamond, 2008).  
In short, cabinet positions are designated by the leader and serve as a direct, identifiable manifestation 
of accommodation and negotiation politics for elites, who in turn offer a bridge between regimes and 
group support. The composition, size, balance and volatility of cabinet positions reflect the 
heterogeneity of the state and a gauge of relationships between leaders, elites and groups. Positions can 
identify which people and groups acquire inner circle or continuously stable positions, and who are 
assigned peripheral positions of great volatility.  
 
4.4 ACPED 
ACPED tracks the presence, position and demographics of all ministers within African cabinets for 
each month from 1997 to the present. ACPED’s unit of analysis is the cabinet minister, by month and 
country. Each minister is associated with identifiers, a gender, home region and associated ethnic 
community characteristics. Their position, movement and political party membership are recorded for 
each month30. Ministers can change positions and move in and out of cabinet; cabinets can expand and 
contract through the adding or firing of ministers and positions. All data assume that cabinet officers at 
the national level who claim a party membership, group and region are representatives of those 
communities, yet there is no presumed direct effect of ministerial appointments to citizens, nor a 
guaranteed return for cabinet representation. We contend that cabinet coalitions represent regime 
interests and strategies of governance, not group interests. By using individuals and tying their presence 
and position to the locations and groups to which they belong, the level of representation at both group 









                                                          
30 Party affiliation indicates the political party or group of a minister; ministers with no political affiliation are 
recorded as ‘civil society’. Affiliations may vary over the course of tenure. 
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Table 4.1: ACPED Categories for Ministerial Appointments 
 Definition Example 
Name Cabinet Minister’s name Adolphe Muzito 
Date Month from 1997-present October 2007 
Country Country of Cabinet DR-Congo 
Status Whether and which change has occurred between the previous 
month and the last.  
Possible and mutually exclusive categories include: 
New: indicates first month as minister (either new to cabinet 
positions or after a period of leave) 
Dismissed: final month of position 
Reshuffle: month where position is changed 
Remains: in same position as previous month 
October 2007: New 
Position Ministry that minister is responsible for Minister of Budget 




1- Primary; 2- Secondary; 3- Tertiary Primary 
Ethno-regional 
identity 





Political-ethnicity of minister’s stated public association (and size 




Regional background, expert-based and source assessed Bandundu 
Gender Binary for gender of the minister. 
1 – female 
0 – male 
0 
 
Ethnic identity and region are recorded by self-declaration, in-country expert opinion and subnational 
media sources. Ethnic and regional identities are separate, as ministers of the same ethnicity often hail 
from different areas of the country. In turn, each minister has a ‘politically relevant ethnicity’; 
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politicians seeking office represent several identities and interests but their ethnic identity for political 
purposes is often that of the largest community they associate with. For example, if a Nigerian politician 
vying for a national position is from the Berom community, she is unlikely to solely associate with this 
very small group’s power in a political negotiation. She is more likely to cast herself as a ‘Middle Belt’ 
representative (or, if it would increase her leverage, a Christian, Middle Belt representative). The 
‘Middle Belt’ designation is her ethno-political identity, over that of her ethno-regional Berom 
community (Scarritt and Mozaffer, 1999).  
Multiple sources link a minister’s stated identity to a relevant politically-relevant identity group. An 
ethnic and regional macro-roster for each state is composed from several sources including national 
experts and texts, Scarritt and Mozaffar’s list of scaled communities (1999), Ethnologue, Ethnic Power 
Relations (EPR) (Wimmer, Cederman and Min, 2009) and Francois, Trebbi and Rainer (FRT) (2015) 
lists. Multiple sources are used to reflect the variety of subnational identities that may be politically 
relevant in states at different time periods. National expert opinion is privileged if a discrepancy 
between source materials arises. The aggregated lists include information from sources that do not 
emphasize ‘political relevance’ and therefore, identities may differ from typical, aggregated lists 
commonly used. All possible political identities in each state are assigned a population weight generated 
from national (e.g. census) or demographic reports. Regional population weights come from national 
census data. Politically relevant groups are further designated by whether they are ‘very small’ (less 
than 5 percent), small (5 to less than 10 percent), significant (10-25 percent), large (25-50 percent) and 
a plurality/majority (over 50 percent).  
ACPED is a supplement to, and significant expansion of, other data, notably the Ethnic Power Relations 
project (see Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2009), and the African cabinet set by FRT. While the EPR 
data relies on largely static determinants of aggregated, large ethnic group positioning in government, 
and intermittently collected expert opinion, no formal or identifiable positions are compared across 
groups, times or states. As Rainer and Trebbi (2011) note in reference to EPR, ‘hard’ information on 
the participation of groups in government is more objective. Further, the ‘artificial clustering of data 
into course subdivisions’ such as EPR’s seven-point categorical scale, obscures rather than elucidates 
the role, relationships and variability between political groups. The use and objectivity of formal 
positions allows for analysis of subtle shifts in elite bargaining, regime consolidation, representation 
and power sharing.  
ACPED and FRT annual cabinet set are similar: they represent a change in several dimensions of 
identity data, including the primary scale (elite and cabinet, rather than group), the unit of analysis 
(cabinet minister, rather than group or state, and whole cabinets), the tenure of an individual and the 
volatility of the cabinet (i.e. whether a minister has a change in position, and cabinet level representation 
and proportion metrics) and flexible, multiple identity metrics (individual, position, gender, political 
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party, ethnic group and region). FRT data covers 15 countries from 1960-2004; ACPED covers 23 
African states from 1997 to the present. This later period witnessed extreme changes in the structure of 
African governments, as democratic transitions, elections, new political parties and power-sharing 
agreements brought widespread elite inclusion and many more groups into competition for power. 
ACPED’s current data covers other notable points of political instability including the 2011 Ivorian 
Crisis; the 2012 Mali Coup; the 2017 Zimbabwe Coup; the 2008 Guinea Coup; the Tunisian Revolution; 
the DRC 2016-2018 Constitutional Crisis; the changes in the Ethiopian governments after the Oromo 
violence (2014 onwards). Further, a total of 98 ministers included in ACPED are missing from the FRT 
annual data in years and countries during which the projects intersect. 
Furthermore, FRT collect cabinet data annually; ACPED is disaggregated to the month. This is a critical 
improvement because of intra-annual variability: 19.2 percent of ministers have tenures that last twelve 
months or fewer, and during the year, 10 percent of ministers lose their position. Drastic increases and 
decreases in cabinet size are typically short-lived and last under a year, and ministries that are added or 
removed from the cabinet are often short terms.31 New regimes are characterized by an almost total shift 
in ministers within a year. For example, in Congo-Brazzaville, President Pascal Lissouba appointed 23 
ministers in an attempted unity government in September 1997. These ministers were replaced when 
former president and rebel leader, Denis Sassou Nguesso, overthrew the Lissouba regime and installed 
his own cabinet in November 1997. Integrating these crucial sub-annual developments and shifts allows 
for analysis on dynamics at points where the elite bargain and settlement is breaking down. The 
comparative totals of each collection therefore differ: FRT have 16,583 minister-years units, while the 
ACPED 23 state sample here includes 161,402 minister-months and 3,926 individual ministers. The 
sampled ACPED Africa data are ten times that of the FRT set currently, and will double as the dataset 
is complete for at least a twenty-year period.  
 
4.5 Cabinet and Group Measures 
ACPED creates several aggregated cabinet level measures where identified ministers within the cabinet 
are merged with their correspondent ethno-political and regional macro-group characteristics. The 
measures include representation, distortion and malapportionment. All are variations on group inclusion 
metrics: each group can be assessed by ‘how much’ they are incorporated (i.e. are cabinets 
representative of the ethno-political heterogeneity of the state) and how many elites group ‘have’ in 
cabinets (i.e. are the positions of those groups represented in cabinet allocated fairly?) Each of these 
three measures is a disaggregation of ethnic or regional group leverage which can effectively adjudicate 
                                                          
31 For example, Ivory Coast experienced a high degree of sub-annual ministerial turnover in 2000: 27 ministers were appointed and dismissed 
in under a year, with the average sub-annual tenure being just 22 weeks. During the twelve-month period, Ivorian junta leader General Robert 
Guei assembled two separate transitional cabinets and oversaw an election in the latter half of the year. The composition of the Ivorian cabinet– 




between an ‘arithmetic’ strategy of representing groups in various, increasingly formalized, positions; 
while ‘calculus’ suggests the measures should change as the leader composes a regime based on 




Subnational ethnic and regional representation is measured by comparing whether each group in the 
state’s politically ethnic relevant macro-roster has at least one position in cabinet at any given time32. 
Communities who have a representative in one or more cabinet positions, in a given country-month, are 
recorded as ‘represented’ for the period of appointment(s). The aggregated monthly share of included 
group populations33 is the representation score, summarized by the following notation: 
 
𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑡 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖𝑐𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1      (1) 
where ‘Representation’ for state c at time t is computed as the summation across all the represented 
ethnicities or regional groups i of their  presence y. The Representation index varies between 0 and 1; 
where values near 0 denote low representation of the state’s groups and values near 1 indicate at least 
one position for all ethno-political or regional groups in the cabinet. For example, Laurent Gbabo’s 
Ivory Coast cabinet during December 2005 represented all of the ethno-political groups in the country, 
and hence, the ethno-political representation score is ‘1’. In Zimbabwe, Mugabe’s cabinet during 
February 2009 included a representative from each of the country’s regions; therefore, the regional 
representation score is a ‘1’.  
 
4.5.2 Distortion 
Distortion considers only those ministers and associated groups in cabinet, and notes the number of 
seats they hold as a proportion of overall cabinet seats. That proportion is compared to that group or 
region’s proportional size in the state’s overall demography. The ratio of respective seats to size is the 
basis for assessing whether a group position(s) is an over or under allocation. For each month, groups 
are one of the following: 1) High Under Representation (more than -50 percent below expected seats); 
Under Representation (between -49 to -11 percent below expected seats); Proportional (a range of 
between -10 to 10 percent); Over Representation (10-25 percent more seats than equitable); and High 
Over Representation (over 50 percent of proportional levels). 
                                                          
32 The entire list of macro groups is available upon request from ACPED. 




ACPED’s malapportionment score measures how power is allocated in the cabinet. The proportional 
power distribution measure is based on methods from electoral studies (Duncan and Duncan, 1955; 
Samuels and Snyder, 2001) which employ ‘disproportionality’ measures to describe deviations between 
party votes share and party seats share (Gallagher, 1991; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003; Lijphart, 1994; 
Tageepera and Grofman, 2003; Vatter, 2009). A modified version of the ‘disproportion’ index 
popularized by Loosemore and Hanby (1971: 469) and Gallagher (1991)34 is employed to determine 
the discrepancy between the shares of cabinet positions and the shares of population held by included 







                      (2) 
 
The allocated/proportional power measure for state c at time t is computed as the summation of absolute 
values across all the ethnicities or regional groups of the difference between x, which is the share of the 
cabinet positions allocated to group i, and y, which is the share of the population of group i in the total 
population. The above index ranges between 0 and 1. 0 denotes highly proportional power, where one 
or more groups hold the number of positions than their relative demographic weight suggests they 
should. 1 denotes highly disproportional power, where one or more groups holds more or fewer seats 











                                                          
34 In his study on the disproportionality of electoral outcome, Gallagher (1991) use a least squared version of the Loosemore and Hanby index 
to compare vote received and seat allocated to parties. 
35 This assumption may overlook historically unequal power relations and thus in the robustness section we report a set of alternative 
definitions, substituting the geographical dimension to the ethnic one or with other alternative measures. 
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Table 4.2: ACPED Indices 




The size of the ethnic 
population represented by the 
cabinet.  
Repeated for regional 
representation. 
Between 0 and 1;1 indicates highest representation.  
0: cabinet has no ethno-political groups or regions.  




The distribution of cabinet 
seats among group with at 
least one seat. 
Between 0 and 1; 0 indicates perfect correspondence between 
demographic group weight and number of cabinet positions. 1 
recorded when no relationship between cabinet positions and 
demographic weight of ethno-political group 
Group  
Distortion 
The difference between the 
ethnic population (as a 
proportion) and their share of 
cabinet positions. Groups are 
divided into whether they 
represent a majority (over 
50%); large (25-49%); 
significant (11-24%); small 
(5-10%) and very small (1-
4%) 
Indicates how under-allocated or over allocated the seats are by 
group. Results are initially recorded as a percentage of under- or 
over- allocation by each group and then translated into  
High Under (more than -50%); Under (-49 to -11%); 





A selection of 23 African states and their entire cabinets from 1997-2017 form the ACPED data sample 
to investigate cabinet size, composition and representation. These states include: Algeria, Botswana, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South 
Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe (Table 4.3). These states have autocratic, 
transitioning, democratizing, democratic institutions, open and closed participation, varying levels of 
ethnic heterogeneity, active conflicts, persistent disorder and general peace. This sample exposes 
similar patterns to other ACPED covered states. 
 
4.6.1 Size 
The average size of African cabinets ranges from 24 ministers in 1997 to 34 in 2017 (see Figure 4.1). 
This is significantly larger than the average cabinet size in the developed world: the US cabinet includes 
the President, Vice President and 15 department heads; the UK cabinet is composed of the Prime 
Minister and 21 cabinet positions, but is similar to other developing states (the Indian cabinet is 32 
positions). Size and volatility are suggestive of a state’s political health: Van de Walle (2001) notes that 
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“African states have long been notorious for their large cabinets, with ministerial appointments that 
often have little relevance to policy-making priorities or the size of actual budgets”. Further to this 
point: “cabinet size represents the number of elite clients sustained by a regime’s leader, whether a 
democratically elected president or a coup-installed dictator. An increase in the number of cabinet 
ministers is interpreted as an attempt to expand the leader’s base of political support—for example, 
buying off critics of the government or bringing in representatives from particular ethno-regional 
groups” (Arriola, 2011). 36  
Table 4.3: Inclusion and Accommodation Metrics across Sample States 
 
The calculus and strategies evident in size is clear: governments create dual ministries or distinct 
ministries when trying to pack a cabinet. While there are common positions (standard ministries such 
as ‘Foreign Affairs’, ‘Security’, ‘Finance’, ‘Health’, etc.), often several co-occurring ministries have an 
agricultural or environmental remit, gender or youth, etc. These additional and esoteric ministries exist 
for a short time period but display little to no evidence of a bureaucracy behind them, including a budget, 
staff, agenda, or targets. 
 
 
                                                          
36 Indeed, being included does not suggest great leverage: Le Van and Assenov’s (2016) study of the effect of cabinet size on budgetary 








The increase over time has not led to greater representation, which is relatively stable despite significant 
differences in average size. As expected, the number of distinct groups in cabinet is stable.  
 
4.6.2 Volatility 
For each month in ACPED, each minister is recorded as either remaining in position; changing post 
through reallocation, promotion or demotion; dismissed; or appointed. Promotions and demotions are 
based on an assessment of the ministerial position’s significance (e.g. primary, secondary and tertiary 
positions). Using just reshuffles and firings, the average rates of change over the twenty-year period 
across countries is 20 percent by year. Therefore, over a five-year period, every cabinet can expect to 
have been completely replaced. Significantly, larger rates of change are recorded in Nigeria (33 
percent), Central African Republic (39 percent) and DR-Congo (38 percent). All three states are the 
sites of significant political disorder.  
African cabinets are characterized by short, sharp common spikes in ministers indicating that many are 
hired at once and fired shortly thereafter. These are ‘disposable’ positions used solely to reward or pack 
the cabinet for a key vote. It creates a higher number of average positions in the inter-annual cabinet 
size than the inter-month rate. Figure 4.2 is country comparison of inter-annual dismissal and inter-
annual reshuffles rates. High rates of dismissal are a sign of high elite instability. High rates of reshuffles 
in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe indicate a leader destabilizing the power of individual 
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power makers in cabinets. Dismissals indicate a more serious overhaul to the political equilibrium and 
are highest in states that are unstable in other ways: Central African Republic, DR-Congo and Nigeria.37  
Figure 4.2: Volatility rates by Removal and Reshuffling 
 
                                                          





Figure 4.3: Differences in Cabinet Size across Selected States
 
In figure 4.3, four cases of cabinet size variation by month shows the differences that occur across the 
twenty-year period. In the case of Mali below, the average inter-month size of a cabinet is 28, while the 
inter-annual rate is 38 members. 
 
4.6.3 Representation 
The more pressing African governance questions concern whether political communities are 
proportionately represented in regimes. Are African regimes broad-based coalitions which co-opt 
potential ethnic and political rivals through the allocation of government posts and access to state 
resources (Dollbaum, 2017; Lindemann, 2011b; Van de Walle, 2007)? Or are African regimes 
exclusive, favouring their core constituency – such as party supporters or affiliated ethno-regional 
populations – to the detriment of other citizens especially those groups associated with the political 
opposition (Langer, 2005; Posner and Young, 2007; Ndegwa, 1997)? Based on formal positions, there 
is clear and overwhelming evidence of large-scale inclusion across African cabinets. The rate of ethno-
political representation across sampled African cabinets from 1997-2017 is 75 percent of a state’s total 
68 
 
number of relevant groups. Regional representation is 73 percent. On average, three quarters of all 
politically relevant groups are integrated into the cabinet at any time (see Figure 4.4 and Table 4.3). 
Figure 4.4: Levels of Representation and Malapportionment 
 
The rate of overall national representation in cabinet is relatively stable: while some temporary 
deviations occur, all countries show low overall deviations. Ethno-political inclusion varies by 
approximately 10 percent (between 70-80 percent) across the twenty-year period. Drastic changes are 
‘corrected’ and mitigated over the course of months, resulting in more stable annual patterns. Much of 
the concern with the consequences of exclusion is directed towards large groups which can organized 
against the government (see Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, 2014). However, when tallied by group, 
there is no clear or consistent indication of lower representation rates for large group. Majority groups 
are most consistently represented (at 85 percent), large groups are placed in 80 percent of all cabinets, 
significant groups 75 percent, small groups 71 percent and very small groups at 68 percent. When 
Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia are removed as mono-ethnic outliers, this distribution is stable as 
majority groups have a similar presence in cabinet as the other group types (at 68 percent).  
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4.6.4 Seat Allocation in Cabinet and Distortion across Groups 
Perfectly proportional representation occurs when seat allocation levels for groups match the relative 
size of a group within in politically relevant population census. Cabinets exhibit more misallocation, or 
imbalance, than exclusion. The average rate of misallocated seats is 16 percent of all cabinet positions: 
84 percent of all positions are allocated proportionally based on the group size of representatives. 
Allocation has a maximum of 69 percent and a minimum of 6 percent, both extremes are present for a 
minimal number of months. These average measures can suggest many different power arrangements. 
For example, a country with an 84 percent apportionment rate in cabinet and three groups could have 
two groups underrepresented with a difference between their share of national population and their 
share of cabinet positions equal to 8 percent, or a third group could be overrepresented by 16 percent. 
However, this value could also be obtained by a different distribution of power: overrepresentation 
could characterize more groups, and the result would be equal. As demonstrated in Figure 4.4, the level 
of misallocation in cabinets has been above the average consistently since October 2008, and the 
average malapportionment rate of recent cabinets at 21 percent, and continues to rise.  
The annual correlation between cabinet level representation and allocation is limited; overall patterns 
suggest that when representation is high—and many if not all the politically relevant groups within a 
country are included—misallocation is neither low nor high. It is shaped by an entirely different logic 
of internal strategy. The choices that dictate representation are different from the choices that determine 
allocation of seats.  
There are some common types of disproportional power that are evident in this sample of 23 states. In 
terms of under or over representation, all group sizes experience a range of representation types, across 
countries and across time within countries. Based on the overall seats that are assigned to political elites 
from each type of demographic group, large and majority groups are most commonly characterized by 
proportional or under-allocated seats (see Table 4.4). Significant, small and very small are all 
characterized by highly over allocated seats or proportional. Elite representatives of significantly sized 
groups garner most positions (a total of 787 distinct ministerial positions) and the highest number of 
minister months across all cabinets (at 32 percent). However, significant groups are not the most 
common form of politically relevant ethnic group (39 distinct significant group are recorded in this 
sample). There are 53 distinct ‘small’ groups and 92 very small groups; both are typically given far 
more seats for their size.  Small groups can be ‘kingmakers’, cabinet packers, useful for short term 
appointments, etc. The most egregious disparity is for ‘very small’ groups which are overwhelmingly 
given seats that are far more than they should garner for their size. Even a single seat can cause 
distortions due to the average size of these communities and the limits of possible cabinet seats. But 
many times, very small groups have more than a single seat (in 2005 Central African Republic, 5 
positions were assigned to politicians from the Ngbaka community;  in 2007 Nigeria, seven positions 




This indicates that, contrary to perceptions that the ‘big three’ (large groups, a leader’s own community 
and strong competitors) are over-represented, very small groups can also be politically relevant despite 
their small size. Governments are much more likely to supress the demographic leverage of majority 
and large communities, and to emphasize the presence and positions of political elites from significant 
and smaller ethnic communities. This leads to highly distorted allocations, and allows leaders to 
accommodate more groups by simply growing the cabinet. 
Table 4.4: Level of Group Level Distortion 
Group Type 









Over Proportional Under High 
Under 
Majority (4) 656 16%   39% 35% 27% 
Large (16) 616 14%  19% 17% 34% 30% 
Significant 
(39) 
1118 32% 26% 37% 15% 10% 11% 
Small (53) 785 18% 43% 32% 8% 8% 9% 
Very Small 
(92) 
760 20% 76% 18% 3% 3% 1% 
 
But not only are there clear variations in seat allocation, power distributions and groups that occupy the 
senior levels of government, there is also considerable change in both the groups, and the group types, 
that occupy seats. Consider Table 4.5, where each type of group in a country is noted by how frequently, 
as a percentage of overall monthly seats, it is over or under represented. By breaking down each of the 
administrations for four periods (January in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017) we mean to illustrate some key 
attributes of regime calculus: countries like Cameroon show no change in distortion patterns, but also 
display a severe unbalanced pattern of high over and high under/under proportion. When examined by 
the size of group, the distortion is equally distributed amongst significant, small and very small groups.  
Again, when examined by exact group, the Beti, Bassa-Bakoko-Douala alliance, Kanuri and South West 
are allocated seats far above their normalized weight by demography, while the Kirdi, Fulani, Far North 
and North West group representatives are under allocated seats (while these communities continue to 
suffer significant cross border violence during this period). But Central African Republic demonstrates 
great variation across four years of severe instability: the large Banda and Gbaya communities are 
allocated seats totals over and under their weight at different periods, as are the 
Riverene/Sango/Banzeri,  Mbaka, Ngbaka, Sara and Northerner community representatives. Only the 
Fulani and Yakoma (very small groups in CAR) are consistently allocated more seats than they should 
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be, when they are in cabinet. As a reflection of varying dynamics, consider Zimbabwe, where those 
communities that the President is dependent upon for coalitions are steadily allocated more than 
proportional seats (Zezuru, and as a distant second, the Ndebele), while the community from where a 
strong faction is associated was marginalized (Karanga). As the cabinets increase in size, the same 
number of seats can distort the level of proportional power and leverage each representative has; in this 
way, leaders can suppress or heighten the influence of any community through relative seat allocation 
calculus. President Mugabe was removed in late 2017, and the composition of the cabinet subsequently 
returned to a more balanced state.  
Table 4.5: Distortion of Group Representation over Time 
 
 
This analysis is a view into how leader’s co-opt or suppress groups and elites, but also how elite 
representatives from all types of communities become politically salient. Interpretations of power that 
rely on group size fail to appreciate the calculations of power distributions that confront regimes and 
leaders. Further, there are few ‘one size fits all’ policies when it comes to governing states as different 
as South Sudan and Zimbabwe. Each period, state and leader balance their collective and individual 
interests, abilities and capacity relative to those of other political elites. This means that coup-proofing 
may be useful one month, but dangerous the next. Further, a group’s representative elite may be given 
a very senior post (e.g. Foreign Minister) but be presented with a range of problems that lessens their 
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public appeal. A minister may get a position but no budget, staff or agenda38. But these patterns mainly 
suggest that there should be great volatility–even over short periods of time–in the composition and size 
of the cabinet if they are evidence of transactional politics.  
The general lessons of cabinet representation and allocation is that understanding a regime’s choices 
requires knowledge of the domestic politics of the state, and the threats and opportunities available to 
leaders and senior elites to leverage their authority.  Certainly, large and growing cabinets indicate a 
leader beholden to more subnational interests over time, often around key junctures like elections. 
Whether the cabinet size stabilizes is an indication of how consolidated and widespread the overall 
influence of the regime is, relative to subnational elites. A large cabinet of decreasing sizes--such as 
those in Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Tunisia-- indicate some attempts at retaining centralized power after 
a large-scale political crisis; these can also be due to a crisis that limits the patronage of the leader. 
Small cabinets with high change rates indicate a leader trying to keep elites in a state of disorder and 
‘musical chairs’ to buy loyalty at low rates, or a country in which leadership is contested and changes 
hands frequently. Small, stable cabinets are states where the central authority is narrow and 
consolidated. But the conclusion of volatility, the transactional nature of senior positions, and the 
tactical advantages sought by counterbalancing, cabinet packing, distorted allocations and division are 
the main conclusions of disaggregated cabinet data. These cabinets are indicative of health and stability 
of regimes, and the fault lines present in a state’s domestic politics.  
 
4.7 Conclusions 
African governments are often understood as appendages of the leader. To that end, they are variably 
described as “corrupt”, “weak”, and “failed”. But attention is rarely paid to the composition of senior 
government ranks, and the tactics therein to secure senior regime elites. When researchers do consider 
senior elites and their positions, they discover that this scale of government is crucial to understanding 
clientelism, balancing, co-option, leverage (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008), longevity and 
survival (Magaloni, 2006), stability and security of governments (Laver, 2003; Fischer, Dowding and 
Dumont, 2012). We argue that research into senior government ranks and relationships has often 
avoided African investigations, instead concentrating on cabinets in Europe, or senior political scales 
in Latin America, to name a few. But the conclusions from African-based cabinet research are 
illuminating.  
                                                          
38 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6260930.stm where Kenyan ministers complained of boredom. 
We find that several positions, especially those of extremely short-term appointments, have no discernable 
infrastructure (e.g. Minister of Public Functions, or Zimbabwe’s Minister of Psychomotor Activities) or are very 
closely associated with another ministry that has official standing (e.g. multiple youth related ministries are 
simultaneously assigned ministers).  
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Here, we argue for greater consideration of two substantial shifts in how African power and 
governments are conceptualized and measured. We suggest that the political environment within 
African states has fundamentally shifted as countries began to build and reform institutions which made 
regimes more open to elite competition. These changes have made the ‘ethno-demographic’ arithmetic 
of typical representation measures obsolete in many ways: it is inaccurate as a voting metric or predictor, 
as a political identity in urban areas, or as reliable club vote. Instead, power distributions across African 
states are based on regimes and elites seeking to accommodate, co-opt and balance at senior levels of 
government through inclusivity and manipulation. This ‘regime management’ demands that researchers 
know the composition, size and change at senior levels of government to understand how regimes and 
leaders survive, why senior scales of government are volatile, governance is territorially uneven, and 
groups emerge is surprising coalitions.  
What is the influence of these calculations for the distribution of power? As African regime leaders 
often stay in power for long periods of time, this indicates that they have often mastered the transactions 
necessary for short-term, loyalty exchanges. These dynamics enable incumbents to create coalitions of 
convenience to shore up support from multiple elites and constituencies. These coalitions can be created 
and maintained despite historical antagonisms. African political elites rarely push for political reform 
and corruption investigations because of the calculations of power calculus that leads to co-option or 
suppression, rather than a viable alternative programmatic appeal. 
ACPED underscores how ethno-political and regional group representatives are critical features of the 
African political environment. Information on the presence, position and demographics of ministers 
within African cabinets, for each month from 1997 to the present, allows for unique interpretations of 
political identity at the individual (minister), group and regional scale. When aggregated, they create 
information on representation, proportional power and unity across a state’s government. ACPED 
collects information on all ministers within national cabinets. Their position, movement and political 
party membership is recorded for each month and will be extended throughout Africa and updated in 
near real-time. Initial conclusions from ACPED overturn many preconceptions about African 
governance and representation. Rather than exclusive and co-ethnic favouritism, African states are 
inclusive; although the level of representation and balance of power between groups is volatile. As 
regimes have different priorities and crises to attend to, relying on co-ethnics is a poor strategic choice 
and may lead to the emergence of ‘replacement’ politics rather than accommodation options for 
opponents and competitors.  
ACPED data can be used to study how regimes balance or bias in the formation of governments, how 
levels of representation, proportion, and party unity vary and the role of elite-regime relationships in 
generating or curtailing economic development, resource distribution and systems of political 
competition. Metrics can also be employed to see the impact of different balancing strategies on popular 
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areas of study, including leadership survival, devolution or recentralization of political power, voting 
patterns and political violence. The new public data represents a significant step in moving towards 
































An enduring theme in African politics is that, in spite of the presence of personalised rule, leaders do 
not rule alone (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Langer, 2005). Rather leaders retain 
or extend their political power through the forging of an intra-elite coalition which minimises threats to 
their continued rule (Arriola, 2009; Van de Walle, 2007). These coalitions are maintained through the 
distribution of state resources and senior government positions, creating webs of dependence in which 
patronage is traded for political support, linking African leaders to the elites within the ruling coalition 
and the communities they represent (ibid.). Existing research on the political fortunes of leaders within 
Africa frequently ties leadership survival or downfall to how rulers compose their ruling coalitions to 
ward off threats such as civil war, coups or electoral defeat (Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 2011b; 
Roessler, 2011; Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Arriola, 2009; Choi and Kim, 2018).  
However, the existing literature is far from unanimous over what size and composition of ruling 
coalition is ideal to ensure the leader’s political survival. As political competition and conflict within 
Africa is commonly interpreted as a means through which excluded elites force their inclusion into 
government or capture power, some scholars have argued that large inclusive coalitions are optimal 
(Lindemann, 2011b; Arriola, 2009; Wimmer et al., 2009). Conversely, others have argued that sharing 
power increases the chance of infighting among elites and limits the amount of resources available to 
nourish the leader’s patronage network, raising the risk of the leader being deposed by insiders (LeVan, 
2011; Roeder, 2005; De Mesquita et al., 2005). Increasingly, the optimal configuration for the ruling 
coalition is seen as being dependent on political context with threats minimised by a large, inclusive 
ruling coalition in some cases and small, exclusive ruling coalitions in others (Roessler and Ohls, 2018; 
Choi and Kim, 2018; Roberts, 2015). Different ruling configurations such as inclusive ‘big-tent’ ruling 
parties, exclusionary military or political regimes, and multi-ethnic coalitions are all examples of 
different strategies leaders use to counteract threats to their rule. These strategies also reflect the 
differing levels of power the regime and leader have against external political rivals.  
This paper aims to expand upon the current literature by examining how changes in the political 
environment prompt leaders to re-evaluate the configuration of the ruling coalition and make changes 
to minimise threats to their rule. This paper theorises that optimal coalitions are decided by the nature 
of the threats facing the regime and the strength of the regime’s hold on political power. This 
relationship is tested using data on ministerial appointments and reshuffles from eighteen African states 
between 1997 and 2017. The cabinet is used as a proxy to estimate the size and ethnic composition of 
the leader’s ruling coalition. Cabinet reshuffles are used to approximate the volatility within the ruling 
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coalition and determine whether leaders make changes to their ruling coalition in response to a change 
in the political environment. The study will focus specifically on how two threats affect the 
characteristics of the ruling coalition: upcoming elections and economic downturns. These threats will 
be assessed for both competitive regimes, which are vulnerable to the political opposition, and 
hegemonic regimes, which do not face an immediate threat of replacement (Schedler, 2013). 
This paper makes two original contributions to the understanding of regime and leadership strategies of 
survival. Firstly, the characteristics of ruling coalitions are not static but undergo significant change 
when the regime is facing threat. Enduring claims in academia concerning the large size or ethnic 
inclusivity/exclusivity of African regimes fail to take into account the high degree of volatility that 
occurs within the senior levels of government. This paper shows that changes in the ruling coalition can 
occur outside of political transitions when used as strategies by the incumbent leader to hold onto power. 
Secondly, different types of regimes adopt different tactics when facing different threats. The threat 
posed by opposition parties to competitive regimes means that leaders increase the size and inclusivity 
of their cabinets in the pre-electoral period, while the irrelevance of the opposition to hegemonic 
regimes means that they do not engage in this strategy of expansion. 
Consequently, ruling coalitions in Africa should not be perceived as static entities with fixed attributes 
concerning size and composition. Rather, the ruling coalition is a reflection of current threats within the 
political landscape and the resources or capacity the regime has at its disposal to mitigate these threats.   
 
5.2 Literature review 
5.2.1 The benefits of leadership and risks of losing power 
Occupying the highest political office in Africa can bring substantial material benefits, while losing 
control of the presidency can pose significant risks. As a result, leaders in Africa are generally classed 
as being primarily concerned with political survival and the retention of power (Goldsmith, 2001; 
Roessler, 2011; Roessler and Ohls, 2018). The ‘imperial’ nature of Africa’s presidencies enables leaders 
to enjoy significant material gains during their tenure, and many long-time rulers have managed to 
amass significant fortunes (Kieh, 2018; Prempeh, 2008; Felter, 2017).  
Leaders in Africa can lose their incumbency via a number of democratic and non-democratic threats. 
From independence to 2015, 95 leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa lost power due to a coup executed by 
state actors, twelve have been removed by rebellions and four by popular protest (Goemans et al., 2009). 
Since the widespread adoption of multi-party elections in the 1990s, leaders are increasingly losing 
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power to opposition parties and elites (Cheeseman, 2010; Bell, 2016).39 To counter these threats to their 
rule, leaders need to create a ruling coalition which will protect them (De Mesquita et al., 2005).  
 
5.2.2 Political survival and its application within Africa 
De Mesquita et al. (2005) identified two key concepts on how the creation of ruling coalitions translates 
to the political survival of leaders. Coalitions are picked from the ‘selectorate’ which comprises all 
individuals who can potentially engage in the decision over who leads the government. The winning 
coalition is the subset of the selectorate whose support is sufficient to confer political leadership. Within 
electoral democracies, the winning coalition can vary from a third to half of the voting population, 
whereas in a military dictatorship, the winning coalition may just include a few senior military officers. 
Under De Mesquita’s theory, leaders lose their position when they fail to create a coalition of the correct 
size and composition to insulate them from internal and external rivals.  
Within Africa, the characteristics of the selectorate and winning coalition are affected by the links 
between political elites and the populations they represent. Politicians often link their political fortunes 
to the welfare of their co-ethnics (Langer, 2005; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Berman, 1998; Arriola, 2009; 
Szeftel, 2000). Groups with co-ethnics included within the senior government benefit 
disproportionately from government policies, giving voters an incentive to vote along ethnic lines 
(Franck and Rainer, 2012; Kramon and Posner, 2016; Burgess et al., 2015; Holder and Raschky, 2014). 
Consequently, political elites can be bought into the ruling coalition as ‘bloc leaders’ to deliver the 
support of their co-ethnics (De Mesquita et al., 2005).40 Another key dynamic of coalition systems in 
Africa is that political positions are perceived as a means to enrich oneself and one’s network of clients 
(Szeftel, 2000; Van de Walle, 2007). The political system in Africa is noted for its lack of ideological 
diversity with parties or political movements often functioning as the personal tools of political elites 
(Carbone, 2007; Mehler, 2007). A system in which ‘a seat at the table’ is the primary concern of political 
actors enables leaders to readily co-opt opponents and create coalitions of convenience to shore up 
support (Kieh, 2018; Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  
 
                                                          
39 The loss of leadership also carries considerable risk including assassination, exile or arrest (Goldsmith, 2001). 
Of the 285 leader exits in post-independence Sub-Saharan Africa, 93 resulted in the exile or imprisonment of the 
former leader while 27 resulted in execution (Goemans et al., 2009). 
40 There is controversy over the degree to which ethnic considerations guide voting behaviour in Africa. 
Although appeals to bloc interests are rarely the sole motivator in political support and vary in effectiveness 
across different contexts, the majority of literature argues that ethnic identities do matter in guiding political 




5.2.3 Winning coalitions and strategies of survival 
There is ongoing debate and disagreement over what size and composition of coalition is optimal for 
ensuring political survival and whether strategies of accommodating or excluding potential rivals are 
more effective. A large body of literature argues that leaders increase the security of their regime 
through creating a large and inclusive ruling coalition.  Rebellion, opposition politics and mass protest 
can be interpreted as forms of political competition in which excluded elites and constituents try to 
either take over the government or force their inclusion in the ruling coalition (Choi and Kim, 2018). 
Consequently, a narrow ruling coalition with a large number of excluded groups and disaffected elites 
provides the necessary conditions for the opposition to form a coalition capable of displacing the 
government. Excluded elites can pose a risk to the leader through forming opposition parties, organising 
protests or openly rebelling against the government (Mehler, 2011; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; 
Raleigh and Dowd, 2018). 
Conversely, there are arguments that larger coalitions can increase leaders’ vulnerability to rivals from 
within the ruling coalition. Increasing the size of the ruling coalition limits the amount of spoils 
available to existing coalition members (De Mesquita et al., 2005). Continually expanding the coalition 
can encourage existing members to oust the leader in order to create a narrow coalition in which the 
remaining members are better compensated (Choi and Kim, 2018).41 Larger ruling coalitions, such as 
‘big-tent parties’ or governments of national unity, are frequently beset with factions which compete 
over issues of patronage and policy (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; Sriram and Zahar, 2009; LeVan, 2011).  
The ongoing debate over the ideal ruling coalition raises the possibility that the optimal coalition is 
conditional on contextual political factors. A growing body of research argues that the optimal coalition 
is dictated by factors such as the strength of the regime, internal cohesion, strength of the opposition, 
whether the regime faces a threat to its rule and the nature of that threat (Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Choi 
and Kim, 2018; Lindemann, 2011a; Roessler, 2011; Raleigh and Dowd, 2018). Consequently, changes 
in any of these factors will lead to volatility in the ruling coalition as leaders reassess what form of 
coalition is optimal. Martinez-Gallardo (2014) summaries the process in her paper on shocks and 
reshuffles in Latin America:  
"Unexpected events over the course of a government’s life will change these conditions and 
make bargains that were previously ‘stable’ no longer viable. Appointments are an explicit 
political strategy that presidents will use to face these unexpected challenges." 
Two threats are chosen to test this theory: firstly, pre-electoral periods in which the leader’s rule is 
threatened by a democratic opposition; secondly, economic downturns which reduce the resources 
available for patronage for the coalition and weaken the leader’s legitimacy. Both threats have the 
                                                          
41 Arriola (2009) finds that increasing the size of the coalition up to a point actually reduces the chance of a 
coup. However, the effect dampens as the coalition expands and eventually expanding the coalition increases the 
chance of deposition from within. 
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potential to destabilise the existing intra-elite bargain and to prompt the leader to make changes to their 
coalition.  
In this paper the cabinet is considered a proxy for the leader’s coalition. The leader’s coalition is 
approximated by examining volatility within the cabinet and changes in attributes such as size, ethnic 
inclusivity and the predominance of the leader’s co-ethnics. The cabinet and senior government posts 
are well established as a proxy for which elites and subnational groups are included in the ruling 
coalition. Arriola (2009) used the size of the cabinet as an approximation for the number of elite clients 
sustained by the regime, while the ethnic composition of the cabinet has formed the basis of Francois, 
Rainer and Trebbi’s (2015) dataset and been an important guiding factor for the Ethnic Power Relations 
dataset (Wimmer et al., 2009). Political appoints and reshuffles are frequently treated as a tool of 
political survival within the existing literature. Leaders may make changes to the cabinet to limit the 
power of internal rivals, shore up political support or appease mass discontent (Indridason and Kam, 
2008; Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011; Lust-Okar, 2004).  
Consequently, this paper hypothesises that as elections or economic crises destabilise formerly stable 
elite configurations, cabinets experience volatility as leaders reshuffle their senior government to create 
a new more stable coalition.  
Hypothesis 1a: Cabinets will exhibit more volatility in the pre-electoral period 
Hypothesis 1b: Cabinets will experience more volatility during times of economic stress 
 
5.2.4 Competitive and hegemonic regimes 
Since the third wave of democratisation in the 1990s, elections have become commonplace in Africa.42 
Yet the level of democratisation, in terms of the ability of the political opposition to gain power through 
elections, varies significantly across the continent. Countries such as Kenya, Ghana or Sierra Leone 
have witnessed multiple democratic transitions in power with elections won by slim electoral margins, 
while countries such as Tanzania or Ethiopia have had a single party in power for multiple decades. The 
former are classed as competitive regimes which face a legitimate threat of replacement from the 
political opposition, while the latter are considered hegemonic regimes and are deemed unlikely to 
suffer an electoral loss (Schedler, 2013).43 This distinction dramatically affects calculations regimes 
make to retain power. Competitive regimes frequently needing to find ways to outmanoeuvre or bargain 
with the opposition, while hegemonic regimes are more concerned with preventing defections from 
                                                          
42 Currently only two countries on the continent, Eritrea and South Sudan, do not hold national elections with 
the stated aim of selecting the leadership of the country. 
43 Instead hegemonic regimes are at risk of weakening and losing their hegemonic status. Only once this status is 
lost do the regimes risk replacement by the political opposition. Examples include the PRI in Mexico, KANU in 
Kenya and PS in Senegal. 
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within the regime or countering opposing factions within the regime (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; 
Reuter and Gandhi, 2011). 
The primary factors used to distinguish hegemonic from competitive regimes are control of seats in the 
legislature and regime-longevity (Morse, 2012; Schedler, 2013; Bogaards, 2004). Control of the 
legislature indicates the ability of the regime to dictate legislation, the degree of threat posed by the 
opposition and guide electoral outcomes through legitimate support or manipulation (Ochieng'Opalo, 
2012; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2013). Regime longevity is indicative of its ability to hold on 
to power and the degree to which the ruling party or leader is perceived as the status quo by the public 
and elites (Magaloni, 2006; Posner and Young, 2007; Greene, 2007). 
 
5.2.5 The threat of elections 
Elections are a source of uncertainty for leaders. Leaders in Africa frequently use their power over the 
resources of the state to minimise the risk posed by electoral competition (Levitsky and Way, 2002). In 
spite of the advantages of incumbency, seventeen leaders standing for re-election have been voted out 
of office between 1990 and 2016, and many more open-seat contests have resulted in the incumbent 
party losing power (Cheeseman, 2010; Bell, 2016).  
Leaders can instigate changes to the ruling coalition to widen its electoral base. Expanding the size of 
the ruling coalition will reduce the number of excluded elites who could aid the opposition. Pursuing a 
strategy of co-option through expansion can fragment the opposition and prevent the formation of 
opposition coalitions (Ash, 2015; Schedler, 2010; Wahman, 2013). Opposition parties in Africa 
frequently rely on a narrow, often ethnically determined, base of support (Wahman, 2017; Cheeseman 
and Ford, 2007). Ethnicised opposition parties are of little threat electorally, but if they form coalitions 
with other opposition parties, they can become a severe threat (Arriola 2013; Wahman, 2013). Creating 
a more ethnically inclusive coalition may widen the regime’s electoral base, limit the appeal of 
ethnically focussed opposition parties and foster splits in the opposition. Existing studies have 
demonstrated that in the run-up to elections, leaders frequently focus on securing votes from unaligned 
or ‘swing’ groups, while co-ethnics are deemed a captured constituency (Hassan, 2017; Baldwin, 2014; 
Wahman and Boone, 2018).  
However, the threat to leaders posed by elections is not equally distributed throughout the continent. 
The need to create a larger and more inclusive coalition will be heavily dependent on the strength of 
the regime. Leaders will only need to expand the ruling coalition pre-elections if the regime faces a real 
threat of replacement.  
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Many states in Africa have been ruled by a single leader or party for multiple decades44 who have 
retained power through mobilisation of the voting public, the lack of viable opposition parties or 
electoral manipulation and repression (Hassan, 2017; Schedler, 2010; Magaloni, 2006). A defining 
feature of these hegemonic regimes is that they face no immediate threat from the democratic 
opposition, and voters face little choice but to vote for the incumbent, the opposition in protest or abstain 
from voting (Schedler, 2013; Bratton et al., 2012). Any pre-electoral volatility in the cabinets of 
hegemonic regimes is more likely due to factionalism and intra-party divisions stoked by the primary 
elections than attempts to counter the democratic opposition (Köllner and Basedau, 2005). Competitive 
regimes, in contrast, face a real risk of losing to the opposition, even if they engage in electoral 
manipulation (Schedler, 2013). Consequently, the need to expand the coalition in response to external 
threats may be limited to competitive regimes, while stronger regimes may not opt to expand the 
coalition in the run up to elections. This will be reflected by cabinets in competitive regimes being 
larger and more inclusive in the pre-electoral period than at other times.  
Hypothesis 2: Leaders in competitive regimes will increase the size and inclusivity of the cabinet before 
elections. This relationship will not occur in hegemonic regimes. 
 
5.2.6 Threat of economic downturn 
Poor economic performance and low or negative economic growth presents a two-fold threat to the 
leader: restriction of resources available for patronage for included coalition members and loss of 
legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Patronage resources are crucial in the formation of an intra-elite 
bargain and for retaining the support of insiders who secure the leader’s incumbency (Arriola, 2009; 
Van de Walle, 2003; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Lindemann, 2011b). Threats to the supply well 
of patronage will weaken ‘instrumental’ support for the regime from elites and stability of the coalition 
securing the leader (Schedler, 2013).  
For voters, economic performance is a key metric used to decide whether or not to support the 
incumbent regime, and it typically overrides other concerns about ethnicity and patronage (Bratton et 
al., 2012). Rulers who have lost legitimacy in the eyes of the public are more at risk of being displaced 
by rivals, as a new regime will likely be welcomed by the public at large (Lindemann, 2011b; Langer, 
2005; Alesina et al., 1996; De Mesquita et al., 2005).  
The threat posed to leaders by economic crises, like the threat of elections, is affected by the strength 
of the regime. In hegemonic regimes, longer tenures and the lack of a threatening opposition means that 
rulers have more opportunity to accumulate ‘slack resources’ which can be used to maintain their 
                                                          
44 As of the beginning of 2018, eighteen countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are run by parties which were in power 
in the 1990s and nine countries are run by leaders who were in power during the 1990s 
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coalition during crisis periods (De Mesquita, 2005). In contrast, rulers in competitive regimes have less 
opportunities to create reserves of resources for patronage (ibid.). Schedler (2013) succinctly outlines 
the contrast between the vulnerability of competitive and hegemonic regimes to economic shocks: 
“Less dependent on their medium-term performance, competitive regimes earn the fruits of 
current bonanzas and fall victims of present crises. Less dependent on short-term success, 
hegemonic regimes earn the fruits of past achievements and fall victims of medium-term 
failure.” 
In cases where economic crises are an immediate threat to the leader’s patronage resources, expanding 
the coalition can exacerbate the existing problem of reduced patronage to coalition members and 
increase the chance of defection or rebellion by disenchanted insiders. A narrowing of the ruling 
coalition can allow the leader to distribute more to those who remain inside of the ruling coalition and 
enhance their loyalty (De Mesquita et al., 2005). In competitive regimes, this may take the form of 
leaders jettisoning elites and ethnic groups deemed unnecessary to their political survival from the 
cabinet while increasing the representation of their co-ethnics in an effort to retain the support of their 
core-constituency. Conversely, good economic performance should enable leaders in competitive 
regimes to use the ‘bonanza’ to create larger and more inclusive coalitions. 
Hegemonic regimes, which have a higher capacity to hoard resources, should be able to maintain the 
size of the coalition. Poor economic performance may encourage insiders to leave the party while 
capitalising on popular discontent and can precipitate the loss of the regime’s hegemonic status (Reuter 
and Gandhi, 2011; Schedler, 2013). Leaders in hegemonic regimes may counter this threat by creating 
a larger and more representative cabinet.  
Hypothesis 3a: Leaders in competitive regimes will shrink the size and the inclusivity of the cabinet 
during times of economic stress, compared to periods of high growth. Leaders in competitive regimes 
will increase the size and inclusivity of the cabinet during times of high economic growth. 
Hypothesis 3b: Leaders in hegemonic regimes will maintain or expand the size and inclusivity of their 
cabinet during times of economic stress. 
 
5.3 Data and methodology 
The hypotheses are tested using the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED), a dataset of 
cabinet members and positions by month across African states. ACPED’s unit of analysis is the cabinet 
minister by month. Each minister is included with the associated information: gender, political 
affiliation, ethnicity and regional background. ACPED represents an improvement on existing elite 
datasets by offering multiple cleavages—party, ethnic and regional—and providing a monthly record 
of cabinet shifts. Cabinets in Africa routinely experience multiple reshuffles a year. Out of the eighteen 
countries included in this study, approximately 14 percent of country-years had more than one major 
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reshuffle and 29 percent had more than one minor change within the cabinet. Similarly, 19.2 percent of 
ministers recorded in the ACPED data have a tenure lasting less than a year, meaning that these 
ministers could be missed altogether by an annual recording. Consequently, annual recording of 
cabinets would miss a large degree of volatility within the cabinet.  
ACPED also assigns posts different levels of importance, as certain posts belong to the ‘inner circle’. 
The concept of the inner circle is used in the existing literature to evaluate whether leaders implement 
a policy of inclusion or exclusion to the posts that hold significant political or administrative power 
(Lindemann, 2011a; Francois et al., 2015). Posts determined to be part of the inner circle typically 
involve control over the security forces, the state’s revenue or its sources and the implementation of 
law. As a result, the following posts are typically perceived to be part of the inner circle: vice-president 
or prime minister, finance, foreign affairs, justice, defence, internal security/home affairs and 
oil/mineral resources (if the country is a major exporter) (ibid.).  In contrast the ‘outer circle’ typically 
involves portfolios tied to service provision or cultural issues such as education, infrastructure, labour 
and culture/heritage. These positions are not without influence and can provide important avenues of 
patronage or enrichment but are less able to constrain or threaten the leader (Indridason and Kam, 2008; 
Burgess et al., 2015; Thomson, 2010). Separating posts into inner and outer circle allows us to see 
whether changes and volatility within the cabinet in the run up to elections or during economic 
downturns affects only the most important posts of the cabinet or is limited to the more cosmetic posts. 
Eighteen countries are included in the analysis: Cameroon, Burundi, Botswana, Central African 
Republic, Ethiopia, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The unit of analysis is each cabinet-month for each 
country. The following measures are derived from the ACPED data. 
There are a total of 4032 observations. The analyses will exclude observations which take place in the 
immediate aftermath of a change in leadership or during a unity government. Cabinets formed after 
changes in leadership are excluded because the focus of this study is on how leaders adapt their ruling 
coalitions to deal with political threats. Unity governments, which are enforced by internationally 
brokered peace settlements, typically assign the type and number of ministries occupied by the different 
parties, meaning that the composition of the cabinet is not entirely dictated by the political calculations 







Table 5.1 - Variables derived from ACPED 
Variable Description 
Cabinet/Inner Circle/Outer Circle Size 
This variable captures the total size of the cabinet, inner circle and outer 
circle for each month. 
Remains/Reshuffled/Entering/Leaving 
Cabinet 
These variables capture the number of ministers who entered the 
cabinet, left the cabinet, were reshuffled to another post or retained their 
post during a reshuffle. 
Representation 
Government ‘representation’ is assessed by calculating the share of 
total national ethno-political populations who have an associated elite 
in the cabinet. The aggregated total for groups and regions in cabinet is 
divided by the total number of relevant ethno-political groups within 
the country. The index assumes a value between 0 and 100, where 100 
means total representation of all groups in the population. This variable 
is applied to the whole cabinet, the inner circle and the outer circle. 
Disproportion 
The disproportion measure calculates whether representatives in a 
cabinet have a share of the seats that reflects their ethno-political or 
regional population.  The measure is an indication of whether power in 
a cabinet is balanced between included groups and adapted from studies 
by Samuels and Snyder (2001).45  
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Sigma indicates the summation over all provinces i, xi is the percentage 
of all cabinet positions allocated to province i, and yi is the percentage 
of population living in province i. This measure is applied only to 
identity groups occupying at least one post within the cabinet 
 
New Ethnic Group/New Ethnic Group 
Inner Circle 
This dummy variable takes a 1 if a new ethnic group is included in the 
cabinet during a reshuffle and a 0 if no new groups are included. The 
variable is also applied to the inner circle. Groups can be counted as 
entering the inner circle from being reshuffled in from the outer circle. 
Exit Ethnic Group/Exit Ethnic Group 
Inner Circle 
This dummy variable takes a 1 if a previously included ethnic group is 
removed from the cabinet during a reshuffle and a 0 if all previously 
included groups remain after the reshuffle. The variable is also applied 
to the inner circle. Groups can be counted as exiting the inner circle 
from being reshuffled to the outer circle. 
Leader’s Co-Ethnic Representation 
Captures the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by 
ministers from the same ethnic group as the current president. 
Major Reshuffle/Minor Reshuffle/Any 
Reshuffle 
Assigns a dummy variable for a cabinet-month in which there is a 
reshuffle. A major reshuffle is defined as one involving six or more 
changes in the form of appointments, dismissals or resignations and 
reappointments. Minor reshuffles involve between one and five such 
changes. The Any Reshuffle variable assigns a dummy in the case of a 
major or a minor reshuffle. 
 
 
                                                          
45 A score of 10 would indicate that 10 percent of cabinet posts are allocated to groups that would not receive 
them if posts were distributed purely on population. 
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5.3.1 Determining regime strength 
Regime strength can be measured through a number of metrics such as repressive capacity, sources of 
finance or popularity. A common measure for regime strength in countries that run at least nominal 
elections, as all countries in our sample do, is how many seats in the legislature are occupied by the 
regime (Morse, 2012; Raleigh and Dowd, 2018; Schedler, 2013).  
This study opts to use Schedler’s (2013) classification in which a hegemonic regime must hold over 
two-thirds of the seats in parliament (lower house if bicameral legislature) and have held power for at 
least 10 years. This classification has two advantages. Firstly, it classifies based on two sources of 
power: dominance of the legislature and regime longevity. Secondly, many theorists disagree about the 
thresholds used to define hegemonic regimes with suggested thresholds varying between 50 percent 
and 75 percent (Morse, 2012; Bogaards, 2004). This classification results in 3097 cabinet-month 




















                                                          
46 When observations taking place after a change in leader or a unity government are excluded, this number is 
reduced to 2625 observations for competitive regimes and 1362 for hegemonic regimes. 
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5.3.2 Independent variables 
There are two main variables of interest: economic performance and the presence of upcoming 
elections. 
5.3.2.1 Political 
Variables indicating the various contexts of the political landscape are implemented as dummy variables 
attached to the relevant monthly cabinet observations. These dummy variables are explained in table 
5.2 below. 
Table 5.2 – Political Context Dummy Variables 




Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the year before an 




Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after an 
election, including the month of the election. Separate dummies for 
presidential and parliamentary elections. 
After Election – No Change in 
Leadership  
Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after an 
election, including the month of the election, in which the incumbent leader 
retained the presidency. 
After Election – Change in 
Leadership 
Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after an 
election, including the month of the election, in which there was a change in 
leader. This includes observations in which the incumbent party retains power 
but is headed by a different leader. 
Change in leader 
Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after a 
new person occupies the presidency (or highest executive office). This 
includes any change in leader including replacement through election, coup, 
party succession or the implementation of a transitional government. 
Democratic Change in Power 
Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after a 
new person occupies the presidency (or highest executive office) through 
electoral victory. This includes observations in which the ruling party remains 
the same but with a different individual as president.  
Non-Democratic Change in 
Power 
Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after a 
new person occupies the presidency (or highest executive office) through non-
democratic means such as a coup or rebellion. 
Unity government 
Assigns a dummy to the cabinet-months that occur in the 12 months after the 
implementation of a unity government. A unity government is defined as a 
power-sharing arrangement in which cabinet posts are shared as part of an 
internationally brokered peace deal. It does not include instances in which the 




Data on economic performance is taken from the World Bank Development Indicators, specifically the 
annual GDP growth per capita. Growth is chosen in place of aggregate GDP or GDP per capita, as 
growth is more commonly used as a measure to indicate the economic health of a country with 
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recessions and slumps being defined as poor or negative growth rather than low GDP (Thomas and 
Dimsdale, 2010). The following variables are derived from the economic data. 
Table 5.3 – Economic Variables 
Variable Description 
GDP Growth The annual growth in GDP for that year 
Low Growth Year A dummy marking the five lowest years of growth for each country  




Table 5.4 shows the means, standard deviations and standard deviation in country means for the main 
variables. Cabinets show a high degree of volatility in size varying from 0 when the leader dissolves 
the cabinet and leaves all posts vacant to 47. This volatility is mainly driven by expansion and 
contraction within the outer circle. The average cabinet size also varies significantly across the eighteen 
countries, with Cameroon having an average cabinet size of 37.44 and Liberia an average of 22.04. The 
mean level of representation in the data is 75.64 with a standard deviation of 15.25, demonstrating that 
African cabinets generally represent the majority of relevant ethnic categories within the cabinet and 
exclusionary governments are rare. The inner circle is generally less representative than the outer circle. 
The leader’s co-ethnics typically occupy approximately a quarter of the cabinet. The higher average 
representation of the leader’s co-ethnics within the inner circle reflects the importance of controlling 
these posts.  
The economic data shows a high degree of volatility in terms of GDP growth and changes in growth 
year on year. There is also a wide variance between countries, with Zimbabwe experiencing an average 
growth rate of -0.17 percent and Uganda averaging 6.23 percent growth. Economic growth is more 
volatile in competitive regimes, which have a standard deviation of 7.85 percent, as compared to 
hegemonic regimes, which have a standard deviation of 3.23 percent. All countries experience positive 
and negative changes in GDP. Even if certain countries under study escape severe recessions, the 
volatility in the growth rate means that countries, and their leaders, face varying economic 









Table 5.4 – Descriptive statistics of main variables 
Variable Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Across Countries 
Total Cabinet Size 26.523 1 47 6.773 5.159 
Inner Circle Size 7.168 1 13 2.040 1.762 
Outer Circle Size 19.352 0 36 6.444 4.996 
Representation 75.640 6.250 100 15.254 13.047 
Inner Circle Representation 45.708 6.250 100 19.146 17.299 
Outer Circle Representation 68.643 0 100 18.490 16.212 
Disproportion Cabinet 24.920 7.850 51.167 7.893 5.637 
Disproportion Inner Circle 27.765 1.167 67.933 8.986 5.802 
Disproportion Outer Circle 25.610 7.074 100 8.264 5.340 
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation 25.947 0 64.706 15.282 13.499 
Leader Co-Ethnic Inner Circle Representation 27.102 0 83.333 20.369 15.090 
Leader Co-Ethnic Outer Circle Representation 25.547 0 75 16.228 13.507 
GDP Growth 4.993 -36.700 106.280 6.667 2.273 
Change in GDP Growth -0.173 -76.072 94.159 7.475 0.630 
Low Growth Year 0.213 0 1 0.410 0.042 
High Growth Year 0.247 0 1 0.431 0.021 
Below Mean Level Growth 0.488 0 1 0.500 0.139 
Below Median Level Growth 0.468 0 1 0.499 0.037 
Before Any Election 0.238 0 1 0.426 0.044 
Before Presidential Election 0.192 0 1 0.394 0.047 
Before Parliamentary Election 0.196 0 1 0.397 0.055 
Any Reshuffle 0.146 0 1 0.353 0.048 
Major Reshuffle 0.056 0 1 0.229 0.019 
Minor Reshuffle 0.091 0 1 0.287 0.036 
 
Pre-electoral cabinets represent approximately a quarter of observations but are slightly more common 
in competitive regimes. General elections, including both parliamentary and presidential elections 
typically, form 56.72 percent of observations.   
Approximately 15 percent of observations involve a major or minor reshuffle, showing that ruling 
coalitions are reviewed regularly by the leader. Minor reshuffles are more common with major 
reshuffles occurring less frequently. Competitive regimes engage in minor reshuffles more regularly 
than hegemonic regimes, perhaps reflecting their greater vulnerability. 
 
5.3.3 Statistical Methodology 
The relationships between the ACPED and explanatory variables will be largely explored through a 
mixture of descriptive statistics, simple regressions and permutation tests. Many of the continuous 
variables in the data violate the assumption of the normal distribution, equal sample sizes and 
homogeneity of variance (see appendix table 2). Though Welch’s test is deemed robust against these 
assumptions and recommended as the default test for comparing two samples, permutations offer a 
more robust method of testing (Kohr and Games, 1974; Erikson et al., 2010). Permutation tests entail 
taking an observed test statistic, such as a difference in means between two categories, and repeatedly 
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randomising the allocation of the categories and resampling the statistic. A distribution of test statistics 
is constructed from the resampling procedure along with the likelihood of getting the observed statistic 
through random chance.  
Permutation tests are a robust method, as the randomisation process accounts for issues arising from 
clustering or non-normalities in the data (Erikson et al., 2010). Though frequently used in biology and 
economics, permutation tests are beginning to be used in the humanities to examine elections, regime 
capacity and parliaments (Erikson et al., 2010; Wilkins, 2012; Eck, 2018). Permutation tests will be run 
firstly on the difference in means between variables observed during ‘crisis periods’ and other 
observations and then rerun using t-statistics derived from Welch’s two-sample test (figures 1 to 4 in 
appendix). The former test shows not just the significance but also the magnitude of the crisis period’s 
effect on cabinet composition. The latter test is less illustrative but more robust (Erikson et al., 2010). 
 
5.4 Results and discussion 
5.4.1 Volatility 
The first hypothesis tested is whether the chosen crisis periods—pre-electoral periods and periods of 
low growth—prompt leaders to dramatically reconfigure their ruling coalitions. Table 5.5 shows a series 
of logistics regressions testing whether reshuffles are more common during the chosen crisis periods, 
result in a greater turnover of personnel and result in a change in ethnic composition. The models were 
run using fixed effects on country and time to account for geographical and temporal variance. The 
independent variables show no evidence of strong correlation (see appendix table 3).  
The models 1 and 2 include all observations, and the dependent variable is the occurrence of a major or 
minor reshuffle. The dependent variable for model 3 restricts the observations to just reshuffles; the 
dependent variable is the occurrence reshuffles in which under two thirds of the ministers maintain their 
position (the 25th percentile of all observations containing a reshuffle). This is to capture the volatility 
of the reshuffles in terms of personnel. Likewise, models 4 to 7 restrict observations to reshuffles, and 
the dependent variable indicates whether the reshuffle resulted in ethnic groups entering/exiting the 
cabinet or inner circle. 
The models show elections to be a stabilising, rather than destabilising, influence with cabinets 
experiencing less change in pre-electoral periods. Models 1 and 2 show that cabinets are not 
significantly more likely to experience a reshuffle during the run up to elections. Model 3 indicates that 
any reshuffles that do occur before elections involve less change in personnel. Models 4 to 7 show that 
these reshuffles are not more likely to involve the incorporation of new ethnic groups or the exclusion 
of previously included ethnic groups. Consequently, there is no support for the hypothesis that the 
cabinet experiences more volatility in the pre-electoral period. 
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The reduced volatility in the pre-electoral period may be because leaders opt not to introduce change 
during periods in which ruling coalition unity is important (Cheeseman, 2010; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011; 
Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992). Ministerial reshuffles create winners and losers which can raise 
political tensions within the incumbent’s support network (Chabal and Daloz, 1999).  
Table 5.5 – Volatility by political binaries and economic growth 
Full model fixed effects – all regimes 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Before Any Election -0.278 -0.007 -0.777** -0.162 -0.039 -0.116 -0.151 
 (0.166) (0.130) (0.289) (0.294) (0.257) (0.304) (0.261) 
Growth Category - 
Low Growth 
0.231 0.204 -0.185 0.273 0.536 0.082 0.498 
 (0.198) (0.171) (0.313) (0.334) (0.308) (0.354) (0.305) 
Growth Category - 
High Growth 
0.145 0.058 0.097 0.119 0.184 0.358 0.091 
 (0.164) (0.139) (0.268) (0.298) (0.267) (0.304) (0.266) 
After Election – No 
Change in Leader 
0.576*** -0.285 1.570*** 1.075*** 0.743** 0.879** 0.464 
 (0.162) (0.163) (0.257) (0.290) (0.271) (0.300) (0.270) 
After Election – 
Change in Leader  
0.773*** -0.057 1.506*** 1.006** 1.131*** 1.280*** 1.161*** 
 (0.220) (0.226) (0.330) (0.351) (0.318) (0.348) (0.317) 
Non-Democratic 
Change in Power 
1.450*** 0.304 1.892*** 1.206* 0.943 1.531** 0.645 
 (0.335) (0.396) (0.509) (0.554) (0.483) (0.581) (0.477) 
Unity Government 0.599* -0.342 0.914 0.701 0.573 0.372 0.203 
 (0.298) (0.354) (0.489) (0.563) (0.503) (0.630) (0.504) 
Months Since Last 
Reshuffle 
0.044*** 0.002      
 (0.011) (0.011)      
Constant -3.781*** -3.056*** -1.091 -0.929 -0.399 -2.072** -1.079 
 (0.545) (0.484) (0.710) (0.729) (0.656) (0.795) (0.693) 
Observations 4,411 4,411 708 712 712 712 712 
Log Likelihood -1,014.117 -1,299.134 -336.153 -286.638 -347.079 -269.339 -345.422 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 2,120.234 2,690.269 762.307 663.276 784.158 628.677 780.844 
Note: *p**p***p<0.001 
 
Similarly, low growth does not result in a higher incidence of reshuffles. This is surprising given the 
wealth of evidence that poor growth weakens an incumbent’s hold on power (Alesina et al., 1996; 
Reuter and Gandhi, 2011). Given the importance of economic performance to African voters and the 
degree to which government waste figures in opposition rhetoric, it would be expected that poor growth 
would lead to more regular and volatile change within the ruling coalition as leaders try to mollify 
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public discontent while minimising internal threats. The models in table 5.5 show that there is little 
support for H1A or H1B. 
Instead, most of the volatility occurs during changes in leadership, either through election or a non-
democratic change, or in the aftermath of elections in which the incumbent retained the presidency. It 
would be expected that changes in leadership result in volatile cabinet reshuffles, but the volatile change 
that follows an election in which the leader retains power indicates that leaders use electoral results as 
a signal on how to best change their coalition to ensure political survival (Van De Walle, 2007; Gandhi 
and Lust-Okar, 2009). This effect is present for both competitive and hegemonic regimes and presents 
an avenue for future research.   
 
5.4.2 Pre-election vs other observations 
A comparison of the means between cabinets in the 12 months before an election and other observations 
suggests that there is support for hypothesis 2 (see table 5.6). The observed differences in means are 
then compared against 10000 permutations in which the assignment of pre-electoral cabinets is 
randomised. The resulting histogram of randomised results is then used to determine whether the 
observed differences in means are significant. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show the observed test statistic—the 
difference in means between non-pre-electoral observations and pre-electoral observations, shown by a 
red line—against 10000 randomised simulated results which are shown by the histogram. 
In competitive regimes, cabinets tend to be larger and more proportionate during pre-electoral periods. 
The differences in means are typically small, but permutation tests show the differences in cabinet size, 
disproportion and presence of the leader’s co-ethnics in the outer circle to be significant.47 The inner 
circle, however, becomes significantly less representative suggesting leaders restrict the inner circle to 
core allies. Overall, the cabinet is not significantly more representative in the run-up to elections, but 
the leader’s co-ethnics have less of a presence in the cabinet. This suggests leaders in competitive 
regimes may not seek to widen their electoral base by representing more distinct groups but rather foster 
a more equitable relationship with key allied groups to retain their loyalty. However, the small 
magnitude of the differences between pre-electoral periods and other observations shows that overall 
competitive regimes avoid making seismic changes to their ruling coalition in the run-up to elections 
(supporting the findings in table 5.5). 
 
 
                                                          
47 It is expected that any differences would be small as mass reshuffles are significantly less likely in pre-
electoral periods (see table 5.5). This is especially true for competitive regimes (see appendix table 5). 
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Table 5.6 – Cabinet Variable Means Pre-Election vs Other Observations – Hegemonic and 
Competitive Observations 












   
Cabinet Size 26.54 25.83 27.11 27.64 
Inner Circle Size 7.02 6.85 7.51 7.76 
Outer Circle Size 19.52 18.98 19.61 19.87 
Representation Cabinet 76.3 76.99 74.23 73.12 
Representation Inner Circle 44.12 45.96 47.49 45.72 
Representation Outer Circle 69.58 70.58 65.78 65.27 
Disproportion Cabinet 24.53 25.26 26.11 24.2 
Disproportion Inner Circle 27.21 27.88 30.18 27.21 
Disproportion Outer Circle 25.13 25.63 26.12 25.72 
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation 24.93 26.58 27.36 25 
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation 
Inner Circle 
27.78 27.22 28.57 26.05 
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation 
Outer Circle 
24.03 26.43 26.91 24.46 
   
 
In contrast, leaders in hegemonic regimes do not create larger and more inclusive cabinets during pre-
electoral periods. While cabinets do not shift in size, they do become more disproportionate and the 
leader’s co-ethnics appear to gain representation in the inner circle. These changes reflect the lack of 
immediate threat elections pose to the leader or regime (Schedler, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2002).  The 
lack of viable alternatives to the incumbent leader or regime means that hegemonic regimes do not feel 
the pressure to entice voters or elites with larger, more inclusive or more balanced cabinets.  
The pre-electoral increase in disproportion and leader co-ethnics in the inner circle could reflect the 
threats leaders in hegemonic regimes face from rival elites or factions within the ruling party (Reuter 
and Gandhi, 2011; Köllner and Basedau, 2005). Factionalism within the ruling party is frequently 
heighted during electoral primaries in which regime candidates are chosen (Köllner and Basedau, 2005; 
Lodge, 2005). The increase in leader co-ethnics within the inner circle and the cabinet-wide increase in 
disproportion in the allocation of posts in the run up to elections could show attempts by leaders to 
elevate their own network within the regime and to ward off internal rivals. The fact that these 
differences in means can be quite substantial (with inner circle disproportion increasing by 3 percent 
and the representation leader’s co-ethnics increasing by approximately 2.5 percent) shows that in 
contrast to competitive regimes, leaders in hegemonic regimes have the latitude to make more dramatic 
changes pre-election.48 
                                                          
48 Unlike competitive regimes, hegemonic regimes are not less likely to have mass reshuffles in the 12 months 
before an election. 
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There is limited support for H2 as competitive regimes, though they do on average have slightly larger 
and more proportionately allocated cabinets, appear to prioritise stability in pre-electoral periods over 
drastic changes to the cabinet. Hegemonic regimes, contrary to expectation, appear comparatively more 
volatile. This volatility, however, is related to within-regime competition rather than attempts to 
enhance the regime’s appeal to outside elites or the electorate.49
                                                          




















5.4.3 Economic performance 
A cross-country analysis shows that GDP growth has a weak correlation with all cabinet variables (see 
figure 5.3). Countries with low or negative growth are able to maintain a large or representative cabinet 
in spite of economic restrictions. Africa is notable for having many long-serving leaders or ruling parties 
who have managed to retain power and maintain extensive patronage networks in spite of economic 
constraints and poor economic growth (Green, 2010; Felter, 2017). 
Figure 5.3 – Cabinet Variables Against GDP Growth 
 
 
Though the effect is slight, there is a negative correlation (-.0.02) between cabinet size and GDP growth 
with poorer economies sustaining larger cabinets. Representation, disproportion and leader co-ethnic 
representation all have correlations of less than 0.1, showing that economic forces do not guide cabinet 
composition when examining across countries. In contrast, if economic performance is categorised in 
relative terms of high and low growth within each country, and observations are split between 
hegemonic and competitive regimes a clearer pattern emerges. Table 5.7 shows that competitive 
regimes, in accordance with H3A, create smaller, less representative cabinets during periods of low 
growth and larger, more inclusive cabinets during periods of high growth. The cabinet contracts on 
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average by three spaces and experiences a four percent decrease in representation when the economy 
moves from high to low growth. 
Table 5.7 - Cabinet Variable Means by Growth Category 
    


















    
Cabinet Size 24.53 25.78 27.95 26.92 28.24 26.55 
Inner Circle Size 7.11 6.69 7.16 7.47 7.67 7.93 
Outer Circle Size 17.43 19.09 20.79 19.45 20.55 18.62 
Representation Cabinet 74.79 76.74 78.96 72.77 73.77 72.99 
Representation Inner Circle 47.79 44.12 46.5 45.62 47.03 44.62 
Representation Outer Circle 65.7 70.8 73.72 63.23 66.71 64.27 
Disproportion Cabinet 25.91 25.52 23.25 26.92 24.4 23.43 
Disproportion Inner Circle 28.14 27.5 27.78 31.25 28.12 25 
Disproportion Outer Circle 25.15 26.13 24.4 27.11 25.25 26.01 
Leader Co-Ethnic 
Representation 
25.23 25.61 28.37 26.8 25.7 24.27 
Leader Co-Ethnic 
Representation Inner Circle 
28 26.2 29.43 29.8 28.12 21.42 
Leader Co-Ethnic 
Representation Outer Circle 
23.81 25.64 28.22 25.99 25 24.29 
    
 
Permutation tests were run, randomly reassigning the categories of low growth years from high growth 
years and comparing the observed difference in means between high and low growth years against the 
simulated runs. Figure 5.4 shows that in competitive regimes, cabinets are significantly smaller, less 
representative and more disproportionate during low growth years. These differences are largely driven 
by changes to the outer circle. Politics in competitive regimes is often more polarised around ethnicity, 
with regimes and parties appealing to a particular selection of ethnic groups (Wahman, 2017; Eifert et 
al., 2010; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007). As a regime can rarely secure an electoral victory by relying on 
the support of a single group, many regimes are formed as ethnic-congress parties or multi-ethnic 
coalitions of ethnically-based parties (Carbone, 2007; Arriola, 2013). As a result, leaders in competitive 
regimes may need to figure which ethnic constituencies within the ruling coalition are not necessary for 
political survival when patronage resources become scarce. This contraction does not extend to the 
inner circle, suggesting that leaders do not want to alienate important allied ethnic groups. Conversely, 
leaders take advantage of the large amount of patronage generated by high growth to expand the ruling 
coalition by increasing the cabinet’s size and ethnic representation while reducing disproportion. This 
expansion coincides with a significant increase in the leader’s co-ethnics in the outer circle, suggesting 
that high growth enables leaders to expand their network to include new groups and elites while 




















In contrast, hegemonic regimes do not significantly change cabinet size or representation during periods 
of poor economic performance. This provides partial support for H3B, but the cabinet does not 
significantly increase in terms of size or ethnic representation.50 Authoritarian regimes frequently rely 
on ‘performance legitimacy’ to maintain their control over the state and may avoid further eroding their 
legitimacy through narrowing their coalition (Schedler, 2013; Morse, 2012). Hegemonic regimes are 
particularly vulnerable to defections and internal rifts; leaders in hegemonic regimes are incentivised to 
minimise internal dissatisfaction. If hegemonic regimes are more able to accumulate slack resources 
necessary to maintain the cabinet without restricting patronage, narrowing the coalition would not be 
an optimal strategy as former insiders can gain new significance as opposition candidates when 
economic crisis damages the regime’s legitimacy (Reuter and Gandhi, 2011). The reluctance to 
significantly expand the coalition may reflect that ‘oversizing’ a ruling coalition can also cause internal 
disatisfaction (Choi and Kim, 2018; De Mesquita et al., 2005).  Table 5.7 and figure 5.5 show that 
hegemonic regimes combine the matinenance of the cabinet with creating unbalanced inner circles 
dominated by their co-ethnics, rewarding their core supporters without narrowing the coalition.  
These findings support the theory that when resources become scarce, leaders opt to narrow the coalition 
to keep core supporters on side (Choi and Kim, 2018; De Mesquita et al., 2005) but adds the caveat that 
this dynamic is restricted to competitive regimes where leaders are more dependent on their immediate 
economic circumstances for legitimacy and resources (Schedler, 2013).51 
Lastly, this difference may be due to the fact that competitive regimes appear to have more volatile 
growth rates than hegemonic regimes, with more extreme low and high growth years.52 As a result, in 
competitive regimes, years of poor economic performance represent a more drastic cut to the leader’s 
resources and the capacity to maintain the coalition. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
In demonstrating the different changes experienced by the cabinet in differing contexts, this study 
further adds to the growing pool of research which focusses on the importance of senior government 
positions in forging an intra-elite bargain (Arriola, 2009; Van de Walle, 2007; Roessler and Ohls, 2018; 
De Mesquita et al., 2005). The existing understanding is that leaders do not rule alone but rather survive 
through alliances and networks with other elites. Consequently, it is important to find metrics which 
can be used to empirically examine leaders’ strategies of survival. Yet much of this research is 
                                                          
50 Although hegemonic regimes are more likely to include a new ethnic group during reshuffles that occur 
during low growth years (see appendix table 6). 
51 These findings are identical when the permutation tests are rerun with Welch’s t-test (see appendix figures 3 
and 4). 
52 The mean low and high growth years for competitive regimes are -1.75 and 11.21 percent respectively, 
compared to 2.82 and 8.54 percent for hegemonic regimes. 
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synchronic and focuses on concepts of political survival without taking into consideration the variance 
in regime types and threats leaders face throughout the continent. Increasingly, research is coming to 
understand that political coalitions are not static but are subject to consistent change (Martinez-
Gallardo, 2014). The nature of these changes in turn reflect the nature of the threats facing the leader 
and the capacity of the ruling regime to ward off these challenges (Roessler and Ohls, 2018; Roberts, 
2015; Lindemann, 2011b). This study contributes to this growing body of research through examining 
how leaders change their coalition in response to two different crises and how these responses vary in 
accordance with their regime’s strength.   
The following conclusions can be drawn from the results. Firstly, leaders pursue different strategies in 
the allocation of cabinet posts depending on the nature of the threat. Leaders may pursue a strategy of 
co-option in some cases and exclusion in others. Secondly, leaders pursue different strategies based on 
the strength of the regime vis-à-vis other political actors. Leaders vulnerable to the electoral opposition 
will need to balance their coalition in a way which does not aid the opposition, while leaders in 
hegemonic regimes lack the impetus to employ this strategy. Leaders in competitive regimes are more 
likely to have to make difficult choices about who to oust and retain when the economy slows. Leaders 
in hegemonic regimes can rely on accumulated resources to maintain the size of the ruling coalition or 
reward co-ethnics to maintain order and unity when vulnerability is heightened. These findings raise 
the question about what other contexts cause a divergence in regime survival strategies and power 



















The existing literature on African governance holds two contrary positions on how regimes deal with 
rivals for power and opposition forces. Some theorists describe African regimes as broad-based 
coalitions which co-opt potential ethnic and political rivals by allocating government posts and access 
to state resources to survive (Dollbaum, 2017; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lindemann, 2011b; Van de 
Walle, 2007). In contrast, others describe African regimes as exclusionary; core constituencies – such 
as party supporters or affiliated ethno-regional populations – are favoured to the detriment of other 
citizens, and groups associated with the political opposition are punished (Langer, 2005; Posner, 2007; 
Ndegwa, 1997). The wealth of literature on co-option, punishment regimes and exclusion demonstrates 
that these multiple strategies are regularly employed by African regimes, but the contexts in which one 
strategy is favoured over the other have yet to be examined.  
Leaders do not rule alone or enjoy unbridled power. Rather leaders face constraints and threats from on 
their own support network and opposing elites (De Mesquita et al., 2005). An increasing body of 
research on electoral autocracies or hybrid regimes is examining how different constraints and threats 
– typified approximated by different subclasses of regime – result in different strategies of political 
survival (Schedler, 2013; Morse, 2012; Kroeger, 2018; Lust-Okar, 2004).  
A key method for regimes to assess their strength, and that of rivals, is through elections. Incumbent 
regimes that retain power gain information regarding the regime’s popular support, the strength of the 
opposition and which elites or subnational groups can bolster or challenge the ruling coalition (Miller, 
2015; Gandhi and Lust-Oksar, 2009). Previous studies show that regimes use electoral results to guide 
their strategies in allocating public goods, rewarding loyal voters, punishing areas of opposition support, 
and seeking to co-opt the opposition’s support base (Jablonski, 2014; Magaloni, 2006; Masaki, 2018).  
This study argues that electoral information can also be used to guide the regime’s strategy of elite 
management and power sharing. In a number of African states, the regime’s elite coalition strategy is 
estimated through changes in the size, political composition and ethnic composition of the executive. 
Regimes in Africa vary in terms of strength, popular support and control over institutions. Some states 
– such as Tanzania, Uganda or Equatorial Guinea – have had sustained rule for multiple decades under 
a single individual or party which exerts tight control over all organs of the state (Cheeseman, 2010; 
Van de Walle, 2003; Ochieng'Opalo, 2012). Other states – such as Kenya, Sierra Leone or Senegal – 
have experienced multiple transitions of power and the executive maintaining tenuous control over 
other branches of government (Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; D’Arcy and Cornell, 2016; Posner and Young, 
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2007). These variations in regime strength govern what tactics are available to secure continued rule 
(Schedler, 2013).  
Opposition parties in Africa also exhibit significant variation, ranging from institutionalised, 
longstanding parties to short-lived ‘satellite parties’ or coalitions of convenience (Chabal and Daloz, 
1999; Carbone, 2007; Van de Walle, 2007; Arriola, 2013). Accordingly, the comparative strength and 
unity of the opposition is considered a key variable in determining the longevity and accountability of 
the regime and the tactics used to ensure its survival (Arriola, 2013; Ladd, 2013; Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; 
Roberts, 2015; Rakner and Van de Walle, 2009). 
This study fills the gap in the literature on African governance by expanding on regime strategies of 
survival and exploring how variations in regime and opposition strength influence which strategy is 
chosen. This paper theorises that variations in the political strength of the regime and the opposition 
influence whether regimes favour the strategies of co-option, punishment or exclusion post-election.  
 
6.2 Electoral Autocracies; Hegemonic and Competitive Regimes 
Since the third wave of democratisation in the 1990s, elections have become commonplace in Africa.53 
In spite of the widespread adoption of elections, the majority of regimes in Africa cannot be considered 
consolidated democracies. Out of the 262 elections recorded in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 2017, 
236 contained some evidence of fraud or irregularity (Coppedge et al., 2017). In 87 of these cases, these 
irregularities significantly affected the outcome of the election (ibid.). Instead, the majority of regimes 
are considered ‘electoral autocracies’ in which the manipulation of institutions and the electoral process 
fail to qualify it as a consolidated democracy (Schedler, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2002). 
Electoral autocracies can be further subdivided into different classifications based on the regime’s 
longevity and its vulnerability to opposition parties or elites. The most common distinction is between 
competitive and hegemonic electoral autocracies. In competitive electoral autocracies the outcome of 
any election is uncertain, while in hegemonic electoral autocracies the victory of a regime is guaranteed 
(Schedler, 2013). The primary factors used to distinguish hegemonic from competitive electoral 
autocracies are control of seats in the legislature and the duration of the regime (Morse, 2012; Schedler, 
2013; Bogaards, 2004). However, many theorists disagree about the thresholds used to define 
hegemonic regimes (see table 6.1). 
 
                                                          
53 Currently only two countries on the continent, Eritrea and South Sudan, do not hold national elections with 
the stated aim of selecting the leadership of the country. 
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Table 6.1: Thresholds on classifying hegemonic regimes54 
 Magaloni Levitsky and Way Howard and 
Roessler 
Brownlee Schedler 
Legislative control N/A >70% >70% >75% >66.66% 
Duration 20 years N/A N/A N/A 10 years 
 
Control of legislative seats indicates that the regime can dictate the creation of laws without needing to 
bargain with other parties. Regimes which dominate a pliant legislature are able to draft laws which 
perpetuate their power, such as changes in constitutionally allowed term limits or electoral laws 
(Ochieng’Opalo, 2012; Posner and Young, 2007). The longevity of the regime is important in 
determining the public’s perception of the regime as the status quo and the incumbent’s invincibility to 
challengers (Greene, 2007). Schedler (2013) argues that a hegemonic regime’s “strength feeds their 
longevity and their longevity feeds their continual strength.”  
The historical record of African regimes shows that regimes require both longevity and dominance of 
the parliament to be invulnerable to challengers. For example, the Kenyan African National Union 
(KANU) and Senegal’s Socialist Party (PS) lost hegemonic control over the legislature and the ability 
to contain the opposition, which weakened throughout the 1990s. Both parties would be further 
weakened by succession crises which triggered defections from long-standing party elites, which in turn 
hastened the decline of the regime’s hegemony and added to the ranks of the opposition (Cheeseman, 
2010; Arriola, 2013; Kelly, 2018). Therefore the primary concern of hegemonic regimes is losing 
hegemonic status and becoming weakened over time. 
Similarly, control of the legislature without longevity does not result in regime hegemony. This is 
shown by the brief legislative dominance of the Zambian Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) 
in the 1990s after winning power from the former single-party ruler Kenneth Kaunda. The MMD won 
with a legislative seat share of 83 percent, which increased to 87 percent in 1996 (Ochieng’Opalo, 
2012). As a new party, the MMD was not seen as the only potential regime by government elites or 
voters. By 2001, the MMD’s dominance had been eroded by defections – who frequently ran as 
independents – and the emergence of popular opposition parties to 32.6 percent (ibid.). The party 
eventually lost to the rival Patriotic Front in 2011 after a succession of weak electoral victories. Less 
established regimes, even those which dominate the legislature, are vulnerable to a quick reversal of 
electoral fortunes. This difference in electoral vulnerability results in hegemonic and competitive 
regimes – and their opposition counter parts – engaging in different electoral strategies. 
 
                                                          
54 From Morse (2012). 
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6.3 Hybrid Regimes and Elections in Africa 
Since elections became the norm in Sub-Saharan Africa, an increasing number of regimes have lost 
power to opposition parties through electoral defeat (Goldsmith, 2001). However, not only do elections 
present a threat to regimes, but also act as a mechanism for the regime (if they retain power) to gain key 
information about support for opposition parties, the distribution of opposition votes and which 
subnational groups are loyal to the regime and the opposition, respectively (Cassani, 2017).55  
Elections in Africa are commonly framed as one of the methods by which elites compete over access 
to state resources (Choi and Kim, 2018; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Van de Walle, 2007). Elites 
outside the regime can gain access by getting co-opted into the incumbent regime or replacing it. 
Consequently, electoral contests in Africa frequently feature ‘recycled elites’ – long-standing 
opposition politicians, disgruntled former government insiders or members of previous regimes – which 
compete for the presidency or leading parliamentary parties (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005; Bratton and 
Van de Walle, 1992). The importance of elites to galvanise support for or against the regime is 
demonstrated by the key role elite defections have played in the electoral downfall of regimes (Bratton 
and Van de Walle, 1992; Arriola, 2013; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011).  
The political importance of elites in elections is partly due to their role as key representatives of 
subnational groups, which are either incorporated into or excluded from the regime (De Mesquita et al., 
2005). In the immediate post-independence period, many ruling parties were broad-based alliances 
which governed through accommodating a coalition of elites that represented different subgroups within 
the country (Van de Walle, 2007). With the emergence of regular elections, regimes have engaged in 
different strategies of representation regarding the elite representatives of different ethno-regional 
groups.  
Hegemonic regimes that face little threat of electoral loss continue to incorporate a wide array of 
subnational elites within their structures and draw support from many sections of society (Cheeseman 
and Ford, 2007; Carbone, 2007; Wahman, 2017). Examples include Tanzania’s Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM), South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) and the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPDRF). Voters in hegemonic regimes typically have no choice but to vote for the 
incumbent, protest through voting for an opposition party or abstain (Bratton et al., 2012). In cases 
where the opposition has no chance to dislodge the regime, nominal opposition parties may act as 
satellites of the dominant party: non-regime elites may compete in elections to signal potential utility 
to the regime as vote suppliers in the hope of being co-opted into the government (Magaloni, 2006; Van 
                                                          
55 This remains the case in spite of regimes frequently attempting to distort the vote. Regimes and leaders are 
generally unable to create completely fraudulent voting outcomes without suffering a destabilising crisis of 
legitimacy (Levistky and Way, 2002). The tactics used by regimes to tilt elections in their favour include violating 
the impartiality of electoral management bodies, gerrymandering, ballot stuffing, repression or the annulment of 
unfavourable results (Ochieng'Opalo, 2012; Resnick, 2017; Hassan, 2017; Fox, 1997; Ikpe, 2014). 
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de Walle, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Mozaffar et al., 2003). Parties and elites not seeking 
incorporation will be resigned to the role of ‘perpetual opposition’56 and adopt a confrontational stance 
against the regime without posing a serious political threat.  
In cases where the regime faces a real possibility of losing power through elections – such as Ghana, 
Kenya and Ivory Coast – competing parties typically seek to align their electoral fortunes with a 
particular constellation of ethnic and regional groups (Langer, 2005; Laakso, 2007; Wahman, 2017). In 
these competitive political and electoral environments, voters are faced with a real choice and are more 
likely to vote in ethnic blocs (Posner, 2007; Eifert et al., 2010). Consequently, in competitive regimes, 
non-regime elites can form parties or coalitions with the intention of replacing the incumbent and 
granting fellow supporters – voters and elites – ‘their turn to eat’ (Langer, 2005; Ndegwa, 1997).  
A major factor governing the efficacy of the opposition, apart from the status of the regime, is the unity 
or cohesion of opposition parties and elites. Existing research has shown that opposition coalitions or a 
monopolised opposition arena significantly increases the probability of a democratic transfer in power 
(Arriola, 2013; Wahman, 2013; Ladd, 2013). Competitive regimes have managed to retain power 
through encouraging the fragmentation of the opposition but have fallen when facing a dominant 
opposition party or coalition.57 Formerly hegemonic regimes have similarly witnessed their electoral 
dominance eroded by a strong opposition candidate, and formerly ‘perpetual opposition’ candidates 
have come to power after the incumbent regime’s status shifted from hegemonic to competitive.58  
The electoral results enable regimes to estimate whether they can be classed as electorally vulnerable 
or hegemonic and the cohesion of the opposition. Existing research has demonstrated how the results 
of elections allow regimes to calibrate policies and the distribution of state resources to reward 
supporters and sway or punish potential opposition supporters (Magaloni, 2006; Jablonski, 2014; 
Miller, 2015; Masaki, 2018). However, the study of the relationship between electoral results and 
regime strategies of survival has not been applied to a leader’s strategy of elite power sharing. No leader 
rules alone but instead relies on a coalition of elites to ensure political survival (De Mesquita et al., 
2005). Elections provide a key instance in which leaders and regimes can assess the political threat 
posed by the opposition and remake the ruling coalition to diffuse threats through co-option, capitalising 
on opportunities by feeding the regime’s core base or deterring opposition through punishment. These 
                                                          
56 Examples include Kizza Besigye of Uganda, John Fru Ndi of Cameroon and Etienne Tshisekedi of Congo-
Kinshasa.  
57 Illustrative of this dynamic is the KANU regime’s retention of power in Kenya when facing a divided opposition 
in 1992 and 1997, only to fall to a coalition of opposition parties in 2002. 
58 Examples include the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front regime (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe, 
the PS regime in Senegal and the Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) in Ivory Coast. Examples of perpetual 
opposition candidates who subsequently became leaders include Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, Alpha Conde of 
Guinea, Laurent Gbagbo of Ivory Coast and Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria. 
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various strategies, along with how they would visibly affect the ruling coalition, are outlined below as 
the politics of co-option, politics of the belly and the politics of punishment. 
 
6.4 Politics of Co-Option, the ‘Politics of the Belly’ and the Politics of Punishment 
Co-option is the process of tying relevant, often opposing, political actors to the regime. It is identified 
as an important tool by which regimes secure power and mitigate political threats (Gerschewski, 2013; 
Dollbaum, 2017; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lindemann, 2011b; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Co-option 
can target mass voters through the allocation of public funds to opposition areas or increased social 
spending (Masaki, 2018; Miller, 2015; Jablonski, 2014). On the elite level, co-option can involve 
multiple strategies, such as allowing opposition parties a presence within state structures, granting 
regional powers and autonomy or offering non-regime elites positions within the senior government 
(Boix and Svolik, 2013; Roberts, 2015; Dollbaum, 2017).  
The ‘politics of the belly’ represents the inverse of the politics of co-option, though the use of one 
strategy does not exclude the use of the other. It refers to the distribution of wealth or benefits by elites 
to a network of loyal backers which typically includes members of family, party or, in many cases, co-
ethnics (Berman, 1998; Jablonski, 2014; Burgess et al., 2015). Studies show that particular groups 
disproportionately benefit, in terms of infrastructure and public goods, when a co-ethnic or co-
regionalist is the president or in the cabinet (Burgess et al., 2015; Franck and Rainer, 2012; Kramon 
and Posner, 2013). Similarly, leaders may choose to over-represent their co-ethnics in senior 
government or military positions (Francois et al., 2015; Lindemann, 2011a; Roessler, 2011).  
The ‘politics of punishment’ involves deterring the electorate from voting against the regime and 
political elites from either defecting from the ruling party or launching opposition parties (Magaloni, 
2006; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014). It is frequently examined through a regime’s use of repression or 
violence against opposition voters and elites (Ash, 2015; Hafner-Burton et al., 2014; Bhasin and 
Gandhi, 2013). It can also refer to the exclusion of individuals and groups from benefiting from state 
patronage. For the population at large, this can manifest as the denial of public services to opposition 
voters (Magaloni, 2006; Miller, 2015; Horne, 2016).  On the elite-level, leaders can exclude elites 
deemed suspect or those representing groups perceived as disloyal to the regime (Roessler, 2011; 
Langer, 2005; Boggero, 2009). 
If elections act as a ‘pricing mechanism’ for rival political elites and parties, then variations in electoral 
outcomes, specifically in terms of opposition and regime strength, should cause different types of elite 
settlement post-election.  
In competitive regimes, leaders face a real threat of replacement and may have to engage in power 
sharing with non-regime elites and ethnic groups outside of their core constituency (Roberts, 2015). 
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The degree to which co-option is necessary will depend on the cohesion of non-regime elites and parties. 
Regimes which already have a tenuous hold on power may have to engage in significant co-option if 
the election results indicate a potential defeat to a competent opposition in the future. Co-opting elites 
from the opposition can drive a wedge between hardliners and others, fracturing the opposition 
movement and reducing its effectiveness (Lust-Okar, 2004). Creating larger and more inclusive ruling 
coalitions can reduce the appeal of ethnically-based opposition parties, broaden the regime’s support 
base and bring new constituencies or elites into the regime’s patronage network (Cheeseman, 2011; 
Miller, 2015). The logic of using co-option when facing a strong opponent is demonstrated by the 
prevalence of post-electoral coalitions in closely fought run-off elections (Resnick, 2014). Post-election 
unity governments are an extreme example of this strategy. After close and violently contested 
elections, leaders and outside elites form a bargain which allows the incumbent to retain power while 
offering the opposition a stake in government (LeVan, 2011; Cheeseman, 2011).   
In contrast, hegemonic regimes do not face an imminent threat of replacement and the same pressure to 
co-opt a cohesive opposition (Schedler, 2013). Furthermore, allowing opposition parties or elites to 
compete with the regime on equal or antagonistic terms brings the regime’s hegemonic status into 
question (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Magaloni, 2006; Schedler, 2013). 
H1: Competitive regimes will adjust their coalition post-election to engage in co-option if the opposition 
is cohesive. This will not apply to hegemonic regimes. 
Political competition in Africa is frequently described as a case of ‘winner takes all’ (Langer, 2005; 
Laakso, 2007). This is particularly true in competitive regimes where certain constituencies or elites 
believe that they will receive fewer benefits from the state if the regime falls and is then replaced by the 
opposition, while groups supporting the opposition see regime change as a chance for their group to 
benefit from state resources (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; D’Arcy and Cornell, 2016). When competitive 
regimes face a fragmented opposition, there is an incentive to capitalise on the opportunity provided by 
the lack of an effective electoral rival and tailor the ruling coalition to ensure that closely aligned elites, 
ethnic groups and core supporters have their ‘turn to eat’ (Wrong, 2009). For example, during the 1997 
Kenyan elections President Moi faced a fragmented opposition with the opposition vote split between 
the Kikuyu-led Democratic Party and Luo-led National Development Party. Moi won the 1997 elections 
due to splits in the opposition and used his victory to elevate loyalists and co-ethnics within his regime 
(Africa Confidential, 20 Feb 1998; Elischer, 2008). The ineffectiveness of the divided opposition 
allowed gave Moi and KANU the opportunity to reward its core base. 
In hegemonic regimes, pro-regime elites or voters are unlikely to lose their ‘turn to eat’ regardless of 
opposition strength. Consequently, the leader and the regime do not need to capitalise on opposition 
fragmentation to feed its constituency. A strategy of elevating co-ethnics or close supporters may 
endanger the regime and the leader. Hegemonic regimes are more likely to draw elite or mass support 
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from a large subsection of ethno-regional groups with interethnic competition happening within the 
regime (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Van de Walle, 2007; Mehler, 2007; Köllner and Basedau, 2005; 
Egboh and Aniche, 2015). Prioritising certain ethnic groups within the broad-based coalitions could 
exacerbate factionalism within the regime and the risk of internal party ruptures (Köllner and Basedau, 
2005; Reuter and Gandhi, 2011). 
H2: Competitive regimes adjust their coalition post-election to engage in ‘politics of the belly’ if the 
opposition is fragmented. This will not apply to hegemonic regimes. 
Existing literature shows that hegemonic regimes rely on ‘punishment regimes’ and punitive actions, 
rather than co-option, to reduce the threat of the opposition. This can include imprisoning opposition 
elites, limiting voting in opposition areas or depriving opposition voters of vital public services 
(Magaloni, 2006; Miller, 2015; Horne, 2016; Ash, 2015; Ochieng’Opalo, 2012). The historical record 
shows that hegemonic regimes are particularly prone to internal cleavages. Factionalism and defections 
have proven crucial in stripping regimes of their hegemonic status (Reuter and Gandhi, 2011; Köllner 
and Basedau, 2005). Accordingly, hegemonic regimes need to convince political elites that allegiance 
to the regime is preferable to joining the opposition or operating outside the regime.  This can be done 
through repression of opposition elites when the regime’s dominance over the political landscape is in 
question (Schedler, 2013; Ash, 2015; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). Similarly, punishment and 
deterrence can be done through ousting the elite representatives of politically disloyal communities. 
Within many African countries, the administrative state is the locus of the country’s wealth  –  including 
money gained from taxation, aid, resources and business licenses – so cutting elites and communities 
out of the regime’s patronage network is a serious deterrent (Prempeh, 2007; De Waal 2009; Szeftel, 
2000; Lindemann, 2008). 
The behaviour of Tanzania’s ruling CCM regime in the aftermath of the 2015 elections  –  in which the 
regime won by its narrowest margin against an opposition coalition led by former CCM insider Edward 
Lowassa  –  illustrates how hegemonic regimes move to punish cohesive opposition elites rather than 
accommodate them. Rather than accommodating the opposition, the CCM shrunk the cabinet and 
refused to integrate any opposition parties in the national government. The regime then used its 
diminished majority in parliament to pass restrictive measures on public assembly and the press while 
using government funds to stoke factionalism within the opposition (Paget, 2017). Previous co-option 
deals struck with the opposition Civic United Front (CUF) – in which the regional government shared 
posts – also broke down in the aftermath of the polls (Africa Confidential, 2016a; Pallotti, 2017). 
H3: Hegemonic regimes will adjust their coalition post-election to become more exclusionary and 




6.5 Data and Methodology 
6.5.1 Data 
Even when an incumbent retains power, each election is followed by a reshuffle in the cabinet indicating 
that the regime is adapting its ruling coalition in response to the electoral results. To measure whether 
regimes engage in co-option, the politics of the belly or the politics of punishment post-election, this 
paper examines the composition of the post-election cabinet. Because the research is interested in 
regime/incumbent strategies, observations are restricted to elections where the regime retained power, 
resulting in 55 elections across the eighteen countries in the period of 1997-2017. 
Information on the cabinet is provided by the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset (ACPED), a dataset 
of cabinet members and positions by month across African states. Each minister is coded with the 
following information: name, position, gender, political affiliation, ethnicity and regional background. 
Because ACPED’s unit of analysis is the cabinet minister by month, it captures a significant amount of 
volatility within the cabinet that is missed by annual cabinet lists.59 Prior studies on cabinet 
compositions agree that different posts hold different degrees of importance (Lindemann, 2011b; 
Francois et al., 2015). Consequently posts in the cabinet are further separated into the inner/outer 












                                                          
59 Out of the countries included in this study, approximately 16 percent of country-years had more than one 
major reshuffle and over a quarter had more than one minor change within the cabinet. Approximately 20 
percent of ministers recorded in the ACPED data have a tenure lasting less than a year.  
60 Inner circle posts typically include vice-president or prime minister, finance, foreign affairs, justice, defence, 
internal security/home affairs and oil/mineral resources (if the country is a major exporter) 
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This variable captures the aggregate change in the total size of the cabinet, inner circle and 
outer circle for the 12 months following an election. 
Change in 
Representation 
Government ‘representation’ is assessed by calculating the share of total, national ethno-
political populations who have an associated elite in the cabinet. The aggregated total for 
groups and regions in cabinet is divided by the composition of the population at large. The 
index assumes a value between 0 and 100, where 100 means total representation of all 
politically relevant ethnic groups in the population. This variable can represent the 
aggregate change in representation to whole cabinet, the inner circle and the outer circle 
in the 12 months following an election. 
Change in Leader’s 
Co-Ethnic 
Representation 
Captures the aggregate change in percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied 
by ministers from the same ethnic group as the current president in the 12 months 
following an election. The index takes a value between 0 and 100.  
  




Captures the aggregate change in the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle 
occupied by ministers from the same ethnic group as the opposition candidate/opposition 
party leader who secured the most non-regime votes in the 12 months following an 
election. The index takes a value between 0 and 100. In the case of general elections, the 
main opposition candidate is determined by votes secured in the presidential election. In 
the cases of just parliamentary elections, we use the ethnicity of the leaders of the top 
opposition party in terms of seats.61  
Change in Regime 
Party Representation 
Captures the change in the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by 
ministers belonging to the regime party (the party of the president or most senior executive) 




Captures the change in the percent of the cabinet/inner circle/outer circle occupied by 
ministers belonging to opposition parties in the 12 months following an election. To be 
counted as an opposition party, the party must have fielded a candidate in a presidential 
election against the regime or competed in legislative elections without belonging to a 
multi-party coalition with the regime party. 
  
 
The ACPED data will then be used to examine the post-electoral changes in the cabinet and classify the 
leader’s post-electoral strategy. 
1. The following will be considered evidence of politics of the belly: lower ethnic representation, 
higher representation of leader co-ethnics and the ruling party of the leader.  
2. The following will be considered evidence of politics of co-option: higher ethnic representation, 
higher representation of opposition co-ethnics or opposition parties.  
3. Post-electoral settlements which decrease the representation of opposition co-ethnics and 
parties will be considered as evidence of the regime engaging in the politics of punishment. 
 
                                                          




6.5.2 Classifying Elections 
This study opts to use Schedler’s (2013) regime classification, in which a hegemonic regime must hold 
over two-thirds of the seats62 in parliament (lower house if bicameral legislature) and have held power 
for at least 10 years. The cohesion of the opposition is classified by applying Laakso–Taagepera’s 
(1979) fragmentation index63 to the share of opposition votes. This index has been used by multiple 
studies in determining the ‘effective number of parties’ in a legislature or candidates in an election 
(Schedler, 2013; Bogaards, 2004). Overall, systems which have a fragmentation score of under 2 are 
considered dominant party systems, while those with a score of over 2 are considered two-party or 
multiparty and thus indicative of a divided opposition (Bogaards, 2004). The resulting data covers 55 
elections in 17 countries. Over two-thirds of the countries included in the data have elections that fit 
into more than one category, demonstrating that the political environment varies across with time as 
well as space. A list of the elections included in the data and their position within the classification 














                                                          
62 This is typically the amount of seats needed for a constitutional majority (Schedler, 2013). 
63 1/ ∑ 𝑠𝑖2 where si is the vote/seat share of the ith candidate/party, depending on whether the election is 
legislative or presidential. In the case of concurrent presidential and legislative elections, the mean of opposition 
presidential and legislative fragmentation is used. 
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Botswana 2009 Legislative 
Election 
Burundi 2015 General 
Election 






CAR 1998 General 
Election 






CAR 2011 General 
Election 




























South Africa 2009 
Legislative Election 
Kenya 2007 General 
Election 




Uganda 2006 General 
Election 
Mali 2007 General 
Election 
Kenya 1997 General 
Election 
Uganda 2016 General 
Election 
Uganda 2011 General 
Election 
Malawi 1999 General 
Election 




Tanzania 2000 General 
Election 
Malawi 2009 General 
Election 




Tanzania 2005 General 
Election 
Nigeria 2003 General 
Election 
South Africa 1999 
Legislative Election 
 Tanzania 2010 General 
Election 
Rwanda 2003 General 
Election 
South Africa 2014 
Legislative Election 
  
Sierra Leone 2002 
General Election 
   
Sierra Leone 2012 
General Election 
   
Zimbabwe 2000 
Legislative Election 
   
Zimbabwe 2002 
Presidential Election 
   
Zimbabwe 2005 
Legislative Election 
   
Zimbabwe 2008 
General Election 
   
Total: 19 Total: 13 Total: 11 Total: 12 
 
The above data will be used in the next section to visualise whether different regime-opposition 
configurations lead to different patterns in post-election reshuffles. The significance of observed 
patterns will then be tested by using a K-Nearest Neighbour algorithm, which will assess the degree to 






6.6 Descriptive Statistics and Discussion 
6.6.1 Change in Post-Electoral Cabinet Size and Ethnic Representation 
On average, regimes of all types tend to increase the size and representation of the cabinet post-election; 
the cabinet expands by 1.5 places and increases in representation by 2.5 percent on average. Most of 
this change occurs within the outer circle suggesting that regimes are primarily using the less important 
posts in the cabinet as a resource in co-opting or leveraging core support. 
However, figure 6.1 shows that this trend towards expansion and inclusivity varies across categories. 
Though competitive regimes tend to increase the size of their cabinets regardless of opposition 
cohesion, the expansion of the cabinet is greater when the opposition is unified. Competitive regimes 
also generally increase the representation of the post-election cabinet when facing a united opposition. 
When competitive regimes face a divided opposition, the increase in the cabinet size is, on average, 
not accompanied by a boost in representation in the outer circle. Overall, it appears that competitive 
regimes are more likely to engage in exclusionary behaviour when feeling insulated from the political 
opposition; this will only affect the less important posts within the cabinet, supporting hypothesis 1 
and 2. 
Hegemonic regimes, in contrast to competitive regimes, appear to engage in limited co-option when 
facing a fragmented opposition. The cabinet tends to expand across the inner and outer circle, with 
both generally experiencing a boost in representation. Given that the hegemonic status of regimes is 
safest when confronted with a fragmented opposition, regimes would take the opportunity to avoid 
punitive action which could unite the opposition (Schedler, 2013; Ladd, 2013).  
In contrast, some hegemonic regimes which have faced a cohesive opposition engaged in the politics 
of punishment through cutting the size of the cabinet and the inner circle. This is reflective in the 
tendency of hegemonic regimes to engage in repression and institute ‘punishment regimes’ when 
there is a perceived threat to the hegemony under threat (Schedler, 2013; Magaloni, 2006). But, this 
reaction is not consistent. Hegemonic regimes facing a cohesive opposition frequently increase the 
representation of the outer circle, and the decrease in cabinet size is biased by outliers, such as the 













6.6.2 Change in Post-Electoral Representation of Leader and Opposition Co-Ethnics 
There is an academic consensus that leaders commonly use control over state resources to benefit co-
ethnics,64 but there little research on how this phenomenon is tied to regime and opposition status. 
In the competitive regimes studied, ethnicity is a strong mobilising factor in electoral contests and many 
voters decide ‘their candidate’ based on ethnic identity (Eifert et al., 2010; Posner, 2007; Bratton et al., 
2012). Figure 6.2 illustrates that competitive regimes generally forgo satisfying co-ethnics to pursue a 
strategy of co-option when the opposition is united, supporting H1. In contrast, when the opposition is 
fragmented, competitive regimes are more likely to appease the ‘core constituency’ by boosting the 
representation of the leader’s co-ethnics, supporting hypothesis 2. In competitive regimes, the outer 
circle of the cabinet experiences the largest average increase in leader co-ethnics when facing a 
fragmented opposition, but the inner circle has the largest decrease in leader co-ethnics when facing a 
cohesive opposition, indicating that competitive regimes frequently need to extend the strategy of co-
option to the important posts.  
This relationship is reversed for opposition co-ethnics. On average, there is a decrease in cabinet 
representation when the opposition is fragmented and an increase in representation when the opposition 
is cohesive. Opposition parties across Africa often draw support from particular ethno-regional groups 
(Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Wahman, 2017), and incorporating elites from these communities can sap 
opposition support (Masaki, 2018). This suggests that leaders in competitive regimes generally face a 
balance between satisfying core support and sapping or co-opting opposition constituencies. The 
optimal strategy is determined by the electoral strength of the opposition. 
In hegemonic regimes, the status of the opposition cohesion appears to result in comparatively marginal 
differences in the representation of the leader’s co-ethnics. This indicates that hegemonic regimes do 
not use the opportunity of an ineffective opposition to satisfy a core ethnic constituency. This finding 
could reflect a number of different dynamics. Firstly, it could suggest that hegemonic regimes are 
generally more likely to draw support from a wide range of groups rather than putting electoral stock 
within the leader’s co-ethnics (Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; Van de Walle, 2007). This is reflected by 
the fact that, in our sample, there are cases where the leaders of the regime and the opposition come 
from the same ethnic group (e.g. Uganda and Botswana). Hegemonic regimes generally win by margins 
which would be unachievable if they relied on a narrow constellation of ethnic groups for electoral 
support (Wahman, 2017). Secondly, the lack of effect of opposition cohesion on leader co-ethnics could 
reflect that ‘politics of the belly’ within hegemonic regimes is not tied to electoral results but other 
unobserved crises, such as factional contests and internal struggles within the regime (Köllner and 
Basedau, 2005).  
                                                          
64 Existing research has shown that the leader’s co-ethnics benefit in terms of public service provisions and are 
typically overrepresented in the cabinet (Jablonski, 2014; Francois et al., 2015; Franck and Rainer, 2012). 
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In the case of South Africa, factional struggles within the ANC overlap with the electoral calendar. The 
nomination procedures in the run-up to the 2004 elections exposed rivalry between incumbent Mbeki 
and deputy president Jacob Zuma (Lodge, 2005). When the ANC won the 2004 elections, Mbeki 
boosted the representation of his Xhosa co-ethnics. Zuma later succeeded in removing Mbeki via 
internal ANC structures, putting himself next in line to lead the ANC should it win the national 
elections. After the ANC won the 2009 election, Zuma heavily increased the presence of his Zulu co-
ethnics within the cabinet.   
Hegemonic regimes cut the representation of opposition co-ethnics most drastically when facing a 
cohesive opposition. This provides support for hypothesis 3 and the role of ‘punishment regimes’ in 
deterring subnational groups and elites from supporting the opposition (Langer, 2005; Boggero, 2009; 
Miller, 2015; Jablonski, 2014). This reflects that opposition co-operation poses a serious threat to the 
incumbent regime’s hegemony as compared to fragmented and easily contained ‘satellite’ opposition 
parties (Ladd, 2013; Van de Walle, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). These findings corroborate with 
Schedler’s (2013) argument that hegemonic regimes under pressure resort to more punishing measures 
pressure, while competitive regimes generally resort to concessions. 
 
6.6.3 Change in Post-Electoral Representation of Regime and Opposition Parties 
The inclusion or exclusion of ministers belonging to opposition parties in post-election cabinets appear 
heavily related to both regime strength and opposition cohesion. When the opposition is cohesive, 58 
percent of competitive regimes grant representation to opposition parties. This figure drops to 46 













Figure 6.3 – Presence of Opposition Party Members in Post-Election Cabinets 
 
Hegemonic regimes show the reverse relationship; when the opposition is cohesive, only 45.5 percent 
of cabinets have at least one opposition ministers. This figure rises to 58 percent if the opposition is 
fragmented. This finding supports the theory that hegemonic regimes thrive by incorporating small, 
volatile ‘satellite’ parties (Magaloni, 2006; Van de Walle, 2007). A fragmented opposition provides 
hegemonic regimes with a large pool of prospective clients to be co-opted, while a cohesive opposition 
set on attaining power is both harder to co-opt and less willing to act as a subordinate to the regime 
from within (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Schedler, 2013). However, figure 6.4 shows that different 
regime-opposition configurations do not have a definitive effect on the change in representation of 















In contrast to expectations, competitive regimes further boost the representation of the ruling party in 
the post-election when facing a cohesive opposition than a fragmented opposition. The most drastic 
declines in ruling party presence occur during unity governments (such as Kenya 2007 and Zimbabwe 
2008). This finding could reflect that competitive regimes are unwilling to give up control of ministries 
to other parties unless absolutely necessary and would incorporate ministers from the opposition’s 
ethnic base rather than the opposition party. It is worth noting that the sample covers only incumbent 
elections, where the regime is generally more likely to hold onto power. Most electoral changes in 
regime occur in open-seat elections (Cheeseman, 2010). A boost in regime party presence occurs in 
hegemonic regimes facing a cohesive opposition. This is accompanied with the largest drop in 
opposition party presence showing that hegemonic regimes resort to defensive measures and forgo co-
option when facing a cohesive opposition. This finding supports hypothesis 3 but again is driven by few 
observations so does not appear robust. 
A visual analysis of the data broadly supports hypotheses 1 and 2 but with the caveat that strategies of 
co-option and politics of the belly mostly appear to occur within the balance of leader and opposition 
co-ethnics (as opposed to political parties). There is evidence for hypothesis 3, but this generally appears 
to be limited to the exclusion of opposition co-ethnics. The next section tests whether the variations 
between configurations visualised in figures 6.1 to 6.4 can be used to accurately predict the type of 
opposition faced by a competitive or hegemonic regime. 
 
6.7 Predicting Opposition Status by Post-Electoral Elite Change 
6.7.1 Methodology 
The relationship between post-electoral shifts in the cabinet and the status of the regime and opposition 
will be explored through a K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN) algorithm. KNN is a conceptually simple 
method of classification in which a test observation takes the class of the majority of its nearest 
neighbouring observations from the training dataset. The distance between points is determined by a 
set of continuous independent variables. Figure 6.5 provides a visual example of how the algorithm 
works using Fisher’s Iris dataset. Using the KNN algorithm, the two black test points would be classed 








Figure 6.5 – KNN algorithm example 
 
KNN is popular due to its conceptual simplicity and good predictive performance. KNN algorithms 
have been applied to a variety of classification problems in diverse fields, such as predicting gene 
functions and the composition of political state organs (Wu et al., 2008; Shih and Lee, 2017).  
The post-election data are split into observations containing hegemonic regimes (23 observations) and 
competitive regimes (32 observations). Firstly, KNN tests are run on the data on competitive and 
hegemonic regimes using all variables on post-electoral change, with each variable scaled between 0 
and 1 to prevent distance measures from being dominated by one of the attributes (Wu et al., 2008). 
The two top predictors in terms of importance are picked, and then, the tests are run again to assess the 
predictive accuracy of the model. Under hypotheses 1 and 2, post-electoral changes should be strong 
predictors for whether a competitive regime faced a cohesive or fragmented opposition party. For 
hegemonic regimes, the type of opposition faced should be discernible based on whether the regime 
punished the opposition through cutting co-ethnics or party presence, as per hypothesis 3. 
The reliability of the predictive capacity of the KNN model is tested using three different resampling 
methods: bootstrapping, bootstrapping with Efron’s bias correction and repeated k-fold validation. 
Bootstrapping is often used to calculate confidence intervals around parameters, which in this case is 
mean accuracy (LaFleur and Greevy, 2009). However, the bootstrap can also give pessimistic estimates, 
so the test is also using Efron’s bias correction (Raschka, 2016). Finally, the tests are run using 4-fold 
repeated validation in which the datasets are split into four samples, with three folds acting as training 
data and one fold acting as the test sample. All resampling methods are repeated 1000 times to 




6.7.2 Results and Discussion 
6.7.2.1 Post-Electoral Cabinet Change  
Figures 6.1 to 6.4 show that different configurations of regime and opposition status result in different 
patterns of volatility - on average - in the post-election cabinet. However, there is also a large amount 
of variance in each category which raises the following questions. What changes in the post-election 
cabinet best-fit different configurations of regime and opposition status? Are post-electoral cabinet 
changes sufficient for out of sample prediction?  
Figure 6.6 ranks the importance of different post-electoral cabinet changes in predicting opposition 
cohesion for both competitive and hegemonic regimes.65 Table 6.4, shows the predictive accuracy of 
the models using all post-election changes as predictors and the models with only the two most 
important variables included, respectively. 
Figure 6.6 shows that for competitive regimes, predictors concerning post-electoral changes in leader 
and opposition co-ethnic representation in the cabinet are the most important, corroborating the findings 
from the descriptive statistics and visualisations, while changes concerning political party 
representation, general ethnic representation or cabinet size are less important. When post-electoral 
changes in leader and opposition co-ethnics are used as the only predictors, the model correctly predicts 
opposition status between 65 and 78 percent of the time depending on resampling method. This 
accuracy is a significant improvement over the null model66 in all three resampling methods. In contrast, 
the most important predictors for hegemonic regime observations cover the cabinet’s size, and even the 
strongest predictors are less effective at correctly classifying opposition status in hegemonic regimes. 
These predictors provide a significant improvement in only one of the resampling cases and improve 
the accuracy over the null model by less than 10 percent (in one case actually making the model less 
accurate than the null model). 
                                                          
65 Ranking is done using Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. 
66 The null model always predicts based on the largest proportion of the observed classes. The null rate for 
competitive regimes is approximately 0.59 and 0.52 for hegemonic regimes.  
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Figure 6.6 – KNN ranked variable importance
 
Table 6.4 - KNN Cabinet Change by Regime Type67 
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  0.573 0.051***    
   
Note: p**p***p<0.001 
                                                          
67 The results of all KNN test iterations can be found in appendix tables 2 to 4. More information on KNN model 




Figure 6.7 provides an illustration of how post-electoral changes are a better predictor of opposition 
type for competitive regimes than hegemonic regimes. Please note that the clustering algorithm used 
in the illustration is an unsupervised K-Means algorithm which differs from the KNN algorithm used 
in the tests. However, K-Means clustering is much better suited to visualisation. Though there is 
significant overlap between competitive regimes, the clustering algorithm does a better job of 
separation than for hegemonic regimes. 
Figure 6.7 – KNN best predictor k-means 
 
The results support hypotheses 1 and 2. Competitive regimes alter cabinets in response to the threat 
posed by the opposition, engaging in the politics of the belly when in a comparative position of 
strength and co-opting when operating from a position of weakness. Figure 6.6 and table 6.4 show 
that these two strategies are primarily implemented through rewarding leader co-ethnics or integrating 
opposition co-ethnics. This finding conforms to De Waal’s (2009) concept of the ‘political 
marketplace’ in which politics functions as a marketplace of loyalties between the regime, outside 
elites and the general population. When the opposition is fragmented and weak, the party and its ethnic 
constituency command a lower price and may not be able to secure a place in the post-electoral 




opposition, competitive regimes are incentivised to offer ‘defensive concessions’ rather than rely on 
manipulation, repression or exclusion (Schedler, 2013). 
In contrast, the strongest predictors of opposition status in hegemonic regimes are less accurate, and 
post-electoral cabinet volatility provides less information on the type of opposition faced for 
hegemonic regimes. This reflects that hegemonic regimes do not face an immediate threat from the 
opposition nor do they need to instantly restructure their ruling coalition to counter the opposition 
(Schedler, 2013). The main threats to leaders in hegemonic regimes come from within the ruling 
coalition with the democratic opposition presenting a secondary concern. Some hegemonic regime 
configurations, particularly party-based hegemonic regimes, place explicit limits on the ability of the 
leader to restructure the ruling coalition as the party functions on the basis of elite power sharing 
(Kroeger, 2018). In other hegemonic configurations, such as personalist or military regimes, demoting 
key allies carries a serious risk of stoking factionalism or provoking a coup (Roessler, 2011; Kroeger, 
2018).  
This finding also weakens hypothesis 3 as post-electoral changes in the presence opposition parties or 
co-ethnics do not function as good predictors of the type of opposition faced by hegemonic regimes. 
In spite of the wealth of evidence of hegemonic regimes ensuring voter and elite compliance through 
‘punishment regimes’ (Magaloni, 2006; Miller, 2015; Arriola and Lyons, 2015), hegemonic regimes 
do not seem to apply this strategy to the post-election cabinet reliably.  
 
6.7.2.2 Post-Electoral Cabinet Status 
Although post-electoral reshuffles in hegemonic regimes do not provide reliable information on 
opposition cohesion, the composition of hegemonic post-electoral cabinets does show evidence of 
regimes pursuing different strategies in response to opposition status. The KNN tests were rerun 
looking at the general cabinet traits (size, representation, etc.) at the end of the 12 months after an 
election, as opposed to the change which occurred over the same period. Though hegemonic regimes 
may not significantly alter opposition co-ethnic presence after facing a cohesive electoral opposition, 
it tends to have a much higher presence in the cabinet.68 Appendix figures 1 to 3 show that hegemonic 
regimes also have more representative cabinets and inner circles which are less dominated by the 
ruling party when facing a cohesive opposition. This finding further weakens hypothesis 3 and 
suggests that hegemonic regimes do engage in co-option when facing a strong opposition, but this 
strategy is not demonstrated by immediate change in the cabinet post-election. Instead, this co-option 
                                                          
68 This could be an artefact of the data as the leader and primary opposition candidate share the same ethnicity 




is revealed by inclusive cabinets of hegemonic regimes when facing cohesive opposition outside of 
the post-electoral period (in spite of the slight decrease in opposition co-ethnics shown in figure 6.2). 
When the KNN tests are run on the general traits of the post-election cabinet, as opposed to the change 
they undergo, another key difference between hegemonic and competitive regimes is revealed. Table 
6.5 shows that the predictive accuracy of post-election cabinet status is much stronger than that of the 
post-election cabinet change for hegemonic regimes. Meanwhile, for competitive regimes post-
cabinet change is a slightly stronger predictor.69 This shows that while competitive regimes change 
coalition strategies in direct response to elections, hegemonic regimes – whilst engaging in different 
survival strategies – do not immediately reformulate their survival strategy in response to electoral 
results.  
Table 6.5 - KNN Cabinet Status by Regime Type 
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Cabinet Representation of Leader 
Co-Ethnics and Inner Circle 
Representation of Opposition Co-
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Cabinet Representation of 
Opposition Co-Ethnics and 
Leader Party Inner Circle 
Presence70 










  0.796 0.274***   
   
Note: p**p***p<0.001 
 
In analysing the different responses to economic shocks, Schedler (2013) argues that competitive 
regimes fall victim to short-term crises or earn the fruits of short-term opportunities, while hegemonic 
regimes are more vulnerable to medium-term threats. The results of the KNN tests suggest the same 
                                                          
69 Appendix figure 4 shows that when all variables – post cabinet change and post-cabinet status – are 
included as predictors, competitive regimes have more post-electoral changes as strong predictors and 
hegemonic regimes have more post-electoral cabinet status variables as strong predictors. 
70 Leader Party Inner Circle Presence is the second most important variable that is not strongly correlated with 
the Opposition Co-Ethnics Cabinet Representation, the most important variable. See a full breakdown of 




is true with the crises posed by the political opposition, with competitive regimes instigating dramatic 
changes to the cabinet to reap the opportunity posed by a weak opposition or mitigate the threat of a 
unified opposition. Hegemonic regimes adopt long-term strategies but also appear more 
accommodative when facing a cohesive opposition, perhaps with the aim of fragmenting it and 
ensuring the regime’s future hegemony, and less accommodative when facing a fragmented 
opposition.  
This finding adds a notable caveat to hypothesis 1 and 2 by showing that hegemonic regimes do 
engage in strategies of co-option and the politics of the belly but on different timescales. A hegemonic 
regime which immediately attempts co-option after ceding votes to a cohesive opposition could 
endanger the regime’s image of invulnerability, a prime asset in retaining its hegemony (Schedler, 
2013; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009). This finding also counters the literature on hegemonic 
punishment regimes and hypothesis 3. In spite of figure 6.2 showing evidence of hegemonic regimes 
engaging in the politics of punishment by excluding opposition co-ethnics in post-election reshuffles, 
the threat posed by a united opposition needs to be addressed with a (more long-term) strategy of co-
option. This corroborates with the literature on the role co-option has on fostering a ‘loyal opposition’ 
and fragmenting threats to the regime (Magaloni, 2006; Arriola and Lyons, 2015; Dollbaum, 2017; 
Lust-Okar, 2004). Nevertheless, hegemonic regimes do not drastically change the cabinet to adopt 
different survival strategies in the post-electoral period. 
 
6.8 Conclusion 
This study has sought to address a gap in current African literature which describes African regimes 
often in contradictory terms: co-optative, broad-based, exclusionary or based on ethnic and familial 
ties. Though existing research shows that these strategies are frequently used, sometimes concurrently 
by various regimes within Africa, it has yet to systematically investigate the contexts in which 
different strategies are used. This study explains the variations in regime strategy through examining 
changes in the cabinet in the post-electoral period, a unique situation in which the regime is granted 
an estimation of its political strength along with the threat posed by the democratic opposition. 
Descriptive statistics and repeated out-of-sample, non-parametric tests shows that competitive and 
hegemonic regimes react differently when facing a weak or strong opposition. Competitive regimes, 
with reduced control over the political sphere and increased vulnerability, have to instantly negotiate 
with a cohesive opposition or co-opt its ethnic base. Conversely, this vulnerability means that leaders 
have to capitalise on the opportunity presented by a fragmented, weak opposition to reward their base. 
Hegemonic regimes have comparatively high security and perceive a united opposition as a long-term 




in post-election reshuffles regardless of opposition status. Rather, they share more power with 
opposition co-ethnics and parties when facing a united opposition, but this is not reflected in the 
immediate volatility in the post-electoral cabinet which suggests that hegemonic regimes can engage 
in long-term strategies of opposition containment. The findings from this study broadly support the 
conclusions of the existing literature on political bargaining, the marketplace of loyalties and power 
sharing in hybrid regimes (De Waal, 2009; Roberts, 2015; LeVan, 2011; Cheeseman, 2011; Schedler, 
2013). The various strategies of co-option and exclusion witnessed across African regimes are a 

























Cabinets are the locus of government policy decision-making and state patronage opportunities, and 
cabinet changes are an important tool for sharing power and managing competing elites, groups and 
interests (Francois et al., 2015; Quiroz-Flores and Smith, 2011). An increasing body of literature 
interprets the appointment, reshuffling and dismissal of senior government officials as a tool of 
political survival (Kroeger, 2018; Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Arriola, 
2009; Quiroz-Flores and Smith, 2011; Francois et al., 2015). 
However, this logic is often focused only on internal machinations within the regime and party. But 
events – such as political crises, disasters or elections – can mean previously effective elite power-
sharing strategies become ineffective at ensuring political survival. Regimes and leaders across the 
world find themselves in positions where the composition of the elite within the government becomes 
unstable and threatens the political survival of either the leader or the regime. Governments in western 
democracies frequently fall due to internal competition between parties or rival figures within the 
government, and leaders may apply drastic changes to their governments to retain the confidence of 
either the public or their party (Saalfeld, 2008; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Indridadson and 
Kam, 2008). Other studies in non-western contexts have examined how volatility in the ruling elite 
has emerged from political crises such as scandals, intra-elite conflict, drops in popularity and 
economic stress (Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Roessler, 2011).  
This study introduces the notion of ‘crisis cabinets’, defined as instances in which regimes drastically 
reorganises ruling coalition in response to political crises, outside of the routine cabinet changes 
caused by elections or democratic regime change.  This study seeks to contribute to the existing 
literature that explores the composition and functioning of executives within and across African states, 
as well as their interaction with political crises.  Existing studies which examine how regimes alter 
their coalitions in response to crises focus on European and Latin American governments (Saalfeld, 
2008; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo, 2008; Indridadson and Kam, 2008; Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; 
Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015). This study examines crisis cabinets in African states. 
Specifically, this study examines the effect of a specific form of crisis that is occurring more frequently 
across Africa. Recent events such as the 2011 Arab Spring means that there is growing international 
interest in mass protest movements as a force for change, echoing the academic interest which 
followed the Third Wave of Democratisation in Africa and former Soviet Republics in the 1990s 
(Carothers and Youngs, 2015).  Protest movements involving large parts of the civilian population for 




the composition and direction of national, senior government. We investigate the effects and efficacy 
of protest movements on the formation of crisis cabinets, and specifically inquire how regimes change 
the composition of ruling elites to address the threat posed by mass protests.  
Recent events in Africa have increased this interest and suggested protest movements do impact 
senior, national government composition. April 2019 saw the toppling of two of Africa’s longest 
serving autocrats – Algeria’s Abdelaziz Bouteflika and Sudan’s Omar al-Bashir – following weeks of 
sweeping popular protests that brought millions of people to the streets (Kushkush, 2019). Both 
leaders attempted to placate protesters through the mass dismissal of senior government officials, 
including cabinet ministers and local governors but were ultimately unsuccessful in securing their 
own leadership (Africa Confidential, 2019a; Abdelaziz, 2019). Subsequently, segments of the wider 
regime elite debated and competed over what form a successor government should take to address the 
crisis (Africa Confidential, 2019a; Africa Confidential, 2019b).  
Examples like these may seem to suggest that protest movements do cause changes within the elite, 
but there is little firm evidence about whether this is the exception or the norm, and what kind of 
changes protests force on the regime. While there have been studies examining mass protests in Africa 
(Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; Carey, 2002) and others analysing cabinet instability (Arriola, 2009; 
Francois et al., 2015; Kroeger, 2018), existing studies have not examined the relationship between the 
two. Cross-national studies of African protests have tended to focus on the composition of collective 
movements (De Waal and Ibreck, 2013), the urban-rural divide (Isaacman, 1990) or the links between 
different forms of contestation (Branch and Mampilly, 2015), but have failed to systematically 
account for the impact of protest movements on cabinet instability, government composition and the 
regime’s use of elite accommodation strategies. Through an exploratory study of a selected number 
of African executives, this study aims to provide a better understanding of how regimes tailor their 
ruling coalitions to mitigate political crises and try to ensure their survival. 
This study proceeds by reviewing the literature on cabinets as tools of coalition building and 
mitigation mechanisms for political crises. Using quantitative data on African cabinets and protests, 
we examine whether there is a strong correlation between public protest and cabinet volatility, and 
whether protests are a common trigger for ‘crisis cabinets’. We then investigate whether protest-
motivated crisis cabinets differ from other forms of crisis cabinet and, if so, what unique features they 
possess. Finally, we examine how the protests studied succeeded in forcing the regime to significantly 
change their coalition and how the cabinet changed in response to protester demands.  
Overall the study finds that protests are not robustly correlated with cabinet volatility and are 
responsible for only a sixth of the crisis cabinets studied. It does suggest however that when, in rare 
cases,  protests do spur the creation of crisis cabinets, regimes create cabinets specifically designed to 




cabinets are those where the nature of the protests causes a split within the ruling elite, making the 
leader vulnerable to internal threats and the regime liable to disintegration.  
 
7.2 Cabinets as coalition building and crisis mitigation 
Existing literature describes the process of cabinet formation and ministerial appointment as 
transactional. Studies on cabinet composition in Western democracies highlight that leaders appoint 
ministers who can provide loyalty or ideological cohesion to strengthen cohesion of their 
governments, or expertise to improve performance (Indridason and Kam 2008). In other cases, 
ministers from outside parties can be brought into the government to allow the leader to form a viable 
government (Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008). 
In Africa, cabinet appointments are often explained as key positions in the regime’s web of patronage. 
Ministerial appointments are used strategically to counter external threats by bringing political elites 
and ‘big men’ into the regime’s patronage network, while the newly incorporated elites deliver votes 
or political support from their network (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1994; Arriola, 2009; Francois et 
al., 2015). The composition of the cabinet therefore provides insight into which groups and 
constituencies the regime considers integral to their coalition and political survival.  
The composition of the cabinet also reflects the threat posed by potential allies within the ruling 
coalition. Included elites can use the state’s resources to cultivate a base to rival the leader or can try 
to depose the leader (Choi and Kim, 2018). Consequently, African leaders attempt to coup-proof their 
regimes by creating arrangements that raise the costs of elite coordination and hinder elite threats 
(Casper and Tyson, 2014). Examples include purges (violent and non-violent) and the rotation of elites 
among different positions to prevent the cultivation of separate powerbases (Jackson and Rosberg, 
1992; Roessler, 2011; Albertus, 2012; Geddes, 2003; Powell, 2012; Woldense, 2018).  
Elite volatility within the cabinet which happens outside ‘expected periods’, such as post-electoral 
cabinet changes or democratic alternations in power, is therefore indicative of the regime 
reconfiguring itself to mitigate against internal and external threats. Political crises or upheavals will 
necessitate changes to the ruling coalition when changes in the demands and political strength of 
different subgroups or elites cause changes to what constitutes a ‘stable bargain’. Former allies may 
begin to become a threat to the leader, necessitating their removal (Roessler, 2011). Rent-seeking 
elites, ideological movements at odds with the regime and dissatisfied ethno-regional communities 
may engage in protests or political violence to coerce the regime into granting them more state 
resources or more positions in government (Roessler, 2011; De Waal, 2009). A drop in public support 
may weaken the leader’s legitimacy, making them vulnerable to being ousted by either the opposition 
or rivals within government (Alesina et al., 1996; De Mesquita et al., 2005). In her study on the effects 




Gallardo describes the relationship between senior government composition and the political 
environment outlining how: 
“[u]nexpected events over the course of a government’s life will change these 
conditions and make bargains that were previously “stable” no longer viable. 
Appointments are an explicit political strategy that presidents will use to face these 
unexpected challenges.” (Martinez-Gallardo 2014: 5). 
Economic crises, scandals, internal factionalism or mass protest all exert pressure on regimes to 
redistribute the balance of power among elites inside and outside of government (Martinez-Gallardo 
2014; Camerlo and Pérez-Liñán 2015; Köllner and Basedau, 2005). Leaders managing divided or 
unruly governments, or who are under siege from opposition forces and widespread popular 
disapproval, are more likely to dismiss ministers who pose an obstacle to their hegemony, making 
changes to the ruling coalition to secure their political survival (Martinez-Gallardo, 2014). Regimes 
which have become fractured or lost public confidence may need to implement a ‘changing of the 
guard’ to demonstrate a willingness to reform (Rivera, 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle, 1992; 
Albertus, 2012) 
The notion of ‘crisis cabinets’ developed here identifies those instances in which leaders or regimes 
which are confronted with an existential political crisis are forced to operate non-routine cabinet 
reshuffles involving mass ministerial turnover. Crisis cabinets occur outside periods in which a large-
scale change in personnel would be instituted as a formal government procedure, such as the 
resignation of the cabinet during electoral periods or the democratic transition from one regime to the 
next. 
 
7.2.1 The dangers of protests 
Politics in Africa is frequently portrayed as a process of continual bargaining between the leader and 
rival elites within and outside the government (Bagayoko et al, 2016; Francois et al., 2015; De Waal, 
2009). In contrast, the non-elite masses are ascribed secondary importance as resources to be 
mobilised by elites hoping to enhance their place within the political hierarchy (Quiroz Flores and 
Smith, 2011; Langer, 2005; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997). However, demonstrations of 
discontent among a large section of the non-elite can damage a regime’s legitimacy and can embolden 
rival elites. Historically large-scale protests have provided elites within the government the 
opportunity to use the regime’s weakened legitimacy to launch a coup or extract concessions (Casper 
and Tyson, 2014; Volpe, 2013). During the early 1990s, opposition politicians or former insiders 
returning from exile sought to co-opt the pro-democracy movements that spread across the continent 




It is well established in the literature that regimes rarely rely on repression or force alone to quash 
protests as these strategies may in fact cause escalation (Levitsky and Way, 2002; Josua and Edel, 
2015; Sambanis and Zinn, 2006). As a result, regimes employ a range of accommodation strategies 
when dealing with threatening protests, including national dialogues, constitutional changes or 
important changes to the senior elite through crisis cabinets (Josua and Edel, 2015; Bratton and Van 
de Walle, 1992; Thurston 2018).  
The recent large-scale cabinet reshuffles in Sudan and Algeria are both examples of the regime 
instituting crisis cabinets to mollify popular discontent. In Algeria, President Bouteflika dissolved his 
cabinet in March in a last effort to contain the protests, and appointed a technocratic and inclusive 
caretaker government (Africa Confidential, 2019a). Similarly, President Al-Bashir of Sudan fired his 
government and all his regional governors after declaring a one-year state emergency in February, 
two months after demonstrations against the rising cost of bread had erupted across the country 
(Abdelaziz, 2019). After the two leaders fell, a faction within their respective regimes tried to 
reorganise the ruling coalition into a stable bargain which would ensure at least part of the regime’s 
political survival. In Algeria Lieutenant General Ahmed Gaid Salah, previously a Deputy Minister of 
Defence, became the main power and ousted Bouteflika’s le pouvoir faction while retaining key allies 
in the old guard (Africa Confidential, 2019a; Africa Confidential, 2019c). In Sudan, a segment of the 
military ousted most political elements loyal to Al-Bashir, including members of his National 
Congress Party, and eventually agreed to a transition timetable with the protesters (Africa 
Confidential, 2019a; Africa Confidential, 2019d). Other examples include Mubarak dismissing claims 
that his son would succeed him and firing the government led by long-standing Prime Minister Ahmed 
Nazif in an attempt to appease the Tahrir Square protester, or King Hassan of Morocco’s dismissal of 
his unpopular Prime Minister as a concession to opposition parties (Josua and Edel 2015; Lust-Okar 
2004). 
These examples show that regime’s will offer change in the senior government and turnover in the 
elite as a concession in return for peace.  Existing large-N studies have attempted to approximate 
regime accommodation strategies through conciliatory rhetoric (Bhasin and Gandhi, 2013; Carey, 
2006), while country-specific investigations have looked at how individual regimes have attempted 
to mollify protest through legal reform, policies and a change in the elite (Josua and Edel 2015; Lust-
Okar 2004; Bogaert, 2015; Volpi, 2013). But there are no comparative studies examining the 
relationship between public unrest and volatility within the ruling elite.  
We aim to address this gap in the research through isolating ‘crisis cabinets’ and determining which 
are preceded by popular protests. Through this process, we aim to determine whether protests are a 
common cause of crisis cabinets, and whether these crisis cabinets are distinctly tailored to address 





7.3 Crisis cabinets in Africa, 2007-2018 
7.3.1. Protest, Cabinet Volatility and Crisis Cabinets 
The above section ties the concept of ‘crisis cabinets’ to both the level of turnover in the cabinet, and 
the non-routine nature of the reshuffle. We therefore define a crisis cabinet as any reshuffle which 
results in the dismissal of over half of the cabinet and occurs outside of the post-electoral period 
(where large-scale reshuffles are routine).  
The first step is to assess whether protest is related to ministerial volatility. To explore this proposed 
relationship, we use the African Cabinet and Political Elite Dataset, hereafter ACPED (Raleigh, 
Wigmore-Shepherd and Maggio, 2018). ACPED includes a monthly list of cabinet ministers in 22 
African states from 1997-2018. Each entry includes every minister’s name, position, ethnicity, home 
region and affiliated political party, along with their respective status in the cabinet.  This is compared 
against protest data provided by the Armed Conflict Location Event Dataset, hereafter ACLED 
(Raleigh et al. 2010). ACLED records disaggregated information on conflict and protest events across 
Africa, with data available from 1997 to the present. Available information includes the precise 
geographical coordinates of the event, the identity of actors and the type of event, and the outcome of 
the conflict. These features are ideal for the study, enabling accurate analysis of the geography of the 
protests.  
ACLED data are used to create multiple metrics to assess the intensity and geography of protest. There 
are multiple ways in which a regime may interpret protests to constitute a ‘crisis’. Regimes may be 
most concerned by the escalation in protest – and the potential ‘snowball’ effect than aggregate protest 
numbers (Yin, 1998). Alternatively, regimes may be more concerned with protester deaths due to their 
potential to cause a crisis of domestic and international legitimacy (Josua and Edel, 2015). 
Consequently, we use multiple metrics to capture these various methods by which a regime may assess 
whether protests represent a serious threat. 
1. The number of demonstrations in the previous six months 
2. The number of fatalities arising from the protests 
3. The percent change in the number of protests 
4. The percentage of demonstrations involving state forces 
5. The percentage of all conflict events demonstrations account for 
6. The number of distinct geographical clusters of protest71  
                                                          




Combining these two datasets, we surveyed cabinet changes in 20 African states between 2007 and 
2018.72 Figure 7.1 shows the relationship between change in the cabinet (calculated as the number of 
dropped ministers as a percentage of the previous cabinet’s size) against ACLED’s various protest 
measures. Figure 7.1 also highlights crisis in blue.  
Figure 7.1: Protest Correlated against Ministerial Volatility 
 
Overall, there is a weak correlation in all measures apart from percent change in the number of protests 
and the number of protest-related fatalities, where a seemingly strong relationship is driven by only a 
few extreme observations. Reshuffles which occur within a context of intense, escalating or 
geographically dispersed protest are not guaranteed to involve more turnover in personnel. 
Furthermore, crisis cabinets are frequently created during times of low-protest.  
Overall, the data suggests that regimes do not reliably engage in a drastic reshaping of the cabinet 
when facing large-scale protests. Although this finding seems to contradict recent events in Algeria 
                                                          
72 Rwanda is excluded due to the high percentage of ministers who were born in Uganda and so have no 
home region, while South Sudan is excluded due to gaining independence mid-way through the period 
under study. Despite the data covering a larger timespan, the period of 2007 to 2017 is used to control 




and Sudan, both countries had weathered previous large-scale protests – Algeria in 2011 and Sudan 
in 2013 – through a mixture of repression, bolstering the loyalty of regime elites and enacting 
superficial reforms (Volpe, 2013; Berridge, 2019). Figure 7.1 shows that events such as the recent 
protests in Algeria and Sudan or the crisis cabinets during the Arab Spring are the exception rather 
than the norm. 
These exceptional events are studied by isolating episodes of severe elite volatility. This will allow us 
to examine what factors led to the success of the protests in these select instances, how regimes 
implement crisis cabinets to mitigate the unrest and how the changes witnessed in protest-motivated 
crisis cabinets differ from other types of crisis cabinet.   
 
7.3.2 Variations in Crises and Crisis Cabinets 
A total of eighteen cabinet reshuffles were found which matched the criteria for a crisis cabinet. The 
details of the sixteen crisis cabinets are laid out in the appendix table 2. However a cursory look at 
some of the cabinets shows that a large range of crises can lead to drastic changes in the ruling 
coalition.  
There are cases where a victorious faction emerges from an internal struggle within the regime, and 
purges the government of their internal rivals. One example is Joyce Banda ascending to the 
presidency of Malawi after the death of President Mutharika. Banda had fallen out of favour with 
Mutharika’s party but gained the presidency in accordance with the constitution. She used the 
opportunity to expel all ministers loyal to Mutharika from the cabinet (Dionne and Dulani, 2013; 
Cammack, 2012). There are cases where mass changes to the cabinet are used to integrate a 
threatening opposition. Examples include Bozize’s attempt to create a unity government with the 
Seleka rebel coalition in early 2013 in the Central African Republic, to try to deter their march towards 
Bangui (Bradshaw and Fandos-Ruis, 2016). The crisis cabinets also include three coups – Zimbabwe 
2017, Mali 2012 and Guinea 2009 – which cause significant volatility as the new regime tries to 
consolidate power and undermine elites associated with the old regime. 
This raises a serious issue of how to accurately, and without bias, select which crisis cabinets were 
created as a direct reaction to protests by the regime or leader. To address this problem we rely on the 
Worldwide Integrated Crisis Warning System (ICEWS). The ICEWS is an event dataset which 
consists of coded interactions between socio-political actors (Boschee et al., 2015). The main 
advantage of ICEWS is that the dataset records a large array of non-violent political interactions 
between actors such as criticisms and denunciations, attempts at mediation and diplomatic or material 
cooperation. The dataset is also considered to be more reliable and have fewer false positives than 




To assess which crisis cabinets were likely to be created in response to protest, we isolated instances 
in which the government explicitly yielded to or cooperated or negotiated with protests in the six 
months prior to the formation of the crisis cabinet. Appendix table 3 provides a full list of the different 
government to protester interactions which take place prior to crisis cabinet formation, along with the 
interactions we consider indicative of a ‘protest-motivated crisis cabinet’.  Using this classificatory 
mechanism only three out of the sixteen crisis cabinets, just under a fifth, were motivated by protest. 
They are: 
1. Guinea 2007 
2. Tunisia 2011 
3. Ethiopia April 2018  
The fact that only three crisis cabinets, a sixth of all isolated crisis cabinets, can be convincingly tied 
to demonstrations shows that popular protest is not a common cause of crisis cabinet formation. This 
supports the finding in figure 7.1 that high protest – defined by either aggregate protest events, 
fatalities or geographic dispersion – is not normally correlated with elite volatility within the cabinet.  
There are also crisis cabinets which are formed in high protest environments yet the formation appears 
to be due to other political factors. Appendix Table 3 breaks down all crisis cabinets by ACLED 
protest metrics. For example protest is high in the six months before the crisis cabinets which 
accompany the Zimbabwe 2017 coup or Goodluck Jonathan’s purge of the Nigerian cabinet in 2010.  
This raises the questions of what features and strategies define protest-motivated crisis cabinets, and 
what factors cause protests to be successful in forcing crisis cabinets. These questions are addressed 
in the next two sections through comparing patterns of cabinet change in the protest-related crisis 
cabinets to those in the remaining fifteen crisis cabinets, and through a qualitative investigation of the 
events preceding the three protest-motivated crisis cabinets and how the cabinet changes were 
specifically tailored to address protester grievance. 
 
7.3.3 Comparing Crisis Cabinets 
The crisis cabinets are compared using a number of metrics derived from the ACPED data to measure 
the degree of change and volatility. These metrics measure the following: 
1. Change in personnel in the cabinet 
2. Change in personnel in the ‘inner circle’, the most important posts in the cabinet73 
                                                          
73 The concept of the inner circle is borrowed from Lindemann (2011) and Francois et al. (2015). The 




3. Change in the regional representation of the cabinet and inner circle 
4. Change in how proportionally cabinet and inner circle posts are allocated among a country’s 
regions 
5. The average length of time served by ministers dropped from the cabinet.74 
Table 7.1 shows the comparison between crisis cabinets formed in response to protest and those 
formed in response to other crises. The average metrics for all cabinet reshuffles75 are also included 
for reference.  
Table 7.1 – Cabinet volatility in Crisis Cabinets 
 
Crisis Cabinets in 
Direct  Response to 
Protest 








N = 417 
Percent Change in Personnel 87.65 69.72 16.21 
Percent Change in Inner Circle 79.76 70.12 19.12 
Change in Representation -3.31 -0.50 0.09 
Change in Inner Circle Representation 6.25 4.19 0.19 
Change in Disproportion -1.22 3.19 0.00 
Change in Inner Circle Disproportion 0.59 0.49 -0.06 
Mean Tenure of Dropped Ministers 61.98 24.87 35.84 
Regime Legislative Seats at Previous 
Election 
75.23 65.31 56.82 
VDEM Score of Democracy 0.18 0.40 0.51 
 
Crisis cabinets, by our definition, have a much higher turnover of personnel than most reshuffles. But 
crisis cabinets motivated by protest have a higher turnover of personnel in both the cabinet at large 
and the inner circle than other types of crisis cabinet. The mean the tenure of dismissed ministers is 
much higher for protest-motivated crisis cabinets than other types of crisis cabinet and the average 
cabinet reshuffle.  
Due to the rarity of protest-motivated crisis cabinets and the low number of observations, it is 
impossible to draw statistical conclusions. However, this finding does corroborate with the argument 
that protesters often seek a visible change in the ruling elite. This can include a widespread changing 
of the guard or the dismissal of key ministers deemed emblematic of the regime’s failures or excesses 
(Lust-Okar, 2004; Josua and Edel, 2014; Africa Confidential, 2019a).   The interests of embedded 
regime elites frequently rely on the maintenance of the status quo and as a result are seen as obstacles 
to reform or change within the regime (Albertus, 2012; Rivera, 2000; Bratton and Van de Walle, 
                                                          
74 A more detailed explanation of the variables is outlined in Appendix Table 4. 




1992). Therefore, the jettisoning of longstanding elites is an effective strategy for the regime to signal 
that it is willing to engage in substantial reform and trade major concessions – in the form of key allies 
– for peace.  
All types of crisis cabinet involve larger shifts in regional representation and disproportion than the 
average reshuffle, suggesting that crisis cabinets frequently involve a recalibration in the regime’s 
regional power sharing strategy. Feelings of regional disenfranchisement have driven protests, 
rebellions, coups and internal struggles (Amin and Takougang, 2018; Langer, 2005; Lindemann, 
2011a; Boggero, 2009), all of which are potential triggers for crisis cabinets. Regional representation 
declines for crisis cabinets created in response to protest, while the inner circle becomes only 
marginally more inclusive compared to other types of crisis cabinet. These differences are less 
dramatic than those seen in ministerial turnover or the tenure of dropped ministers. This could show 
that issues of representation are less important in protest-motivated crisis cabinets compared to the 
widespread dismissal of enduring elites. However, further analysis in the next section shows that 
although overall regional representation does not drastically change, protest hotspots do appear to reap 
a boost in representation in the crisis cabinet.   
The final major difference is in the electoral quality of the regime overseeing the crisis cabinet. 
Electoral quality is measured by the Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) electoral component index, an 
ordinal variable (0-1) which measures the “responsiveness and accountability between leaders and 
citizens through the mechanism of competitive elections” (Coppedge et al., 2017). Crisis cabinets in 
general on average occur in regimes with a lower VDEM score. This finding corroborates with the 
existing literature on anocracies and autocracies which describes elite rotation as part of the ruler’s 
‘toolkit’ to ensure political survival (Albertus, 2012; Woldense, 2018; Roessler, 2011). However, 
crisis cabinets made in response to protest occur in drastically less democratic environments than other 
crisis cabinets. Appendix figures 1 and 2 show that the correlation between ministerial volatility and 
ACLED protest metrics is stronger in more autocratic or electorally dominant regimes. 
Less democratic regimes are generally understood to be more vulnerable to protest. In more 
democratic or competitive regimes, the legitimacy of government and leader is continually critiqued 
and protests against government actions are perceived as ‘politics as usual’ (Schedler, 2013). In these 
settings, the political opposition has a greater chance of either gaining the leadership through elections 
or capturing a significant amount of power through the legislature and so have an incentive not to 
support protests calling for radical change (Trejo, 2014; Lust-Okar, 2004). In contrast, in more 
autocratic regimes, the public’s perception that the regime is invulnerable is a major political asset. 




(Schedler, 2013; Arriola and Lyons, 2016; Levitsky and Way, 2002).76 Accordingly, protest-
motivated crisis cabinets occur in settings where the regime dominates parliament, occupying on 
average over three quarters of the lower house.  
Within these settings, public protest can inform would-be dissenters that dissatisfaction with the 
regime is widespread and could encourage cascading protests against a weakened and delegitimised 
government (Kricheli et al., 2011). Major protests in authoritarian regimes provide useful information 
for rival elites, showing that public loyalty to the government is low, reducing the cost of launching a 
coup (Magaloni and Wallace, 2008; Caspar and Tyson, 2014). In short, large-scale protests form a 
more severe political threat to the regime in autocratic governments, necessitating drastic changes in 
the elite coalition to mitigate the political threat and satisfy the public’s demand for change.  
The dramatic changes seen in protest crisis cabinets can be interpreted as a pre-emptive revolution, in 
which widespread changes to the elite coalition are implemented, albeit under the stewardship of the 
regime. Out of the three protest crisis cabinets, only in Guinea did the incumbent retain power. In 
Ethiopia the ruling party remained in charge but under a new leader, while the leader and party was 
replaced by an interim government in Tunisia.  
In the following section, the three protest-motivated crisis cabinets are qualitatively investigated to 
show how the protests caused a fissure within the ruling elite, leading to dramatic change in the ruling 
coalition; and secondly, how the resulting crisis cabinets were specifically tailored to address protester 
grievances.  
 
7.4 The politics of crisis cabinets after mass protests 
7.4.1 Ethiopia 
In Ethiopia, a number of cabinets were created between 2016 and 2018 by the ruling Ethiopian 
People’s Revolutionary Front (EPRDF) to address the widespread protests and violence that had 
occurred since late 2015.  The protests were concentrated in the Oromia region in response to the 
Addis Ababa Master Plan which would expand the boundary of the capital into farms in the 
surrounding area, leading to fears amongst Oromo farmers that they would lose their land (Fisher and 
Gebrewahd, 2018). The EPRDF’s use of repression and coercion during the previous elections in 
2005, 2010 and 2015 had demonstrated that the regime could not be removed at the ballot box (Arriola, 
2013; Arriola and Lyons, 2016). The government reacted to the protests with repression, a tactic used 
                                                          
76 For example during the 2010 Egyptian Parliamentary elections, President Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party increased its share of seats to occupy 81% of parliament. In Burkina Faso, President 
Blaise Compaoré won 80% of the presidential vote in 2010 and 55% of the parliamentary vote in 2012.  




during previous post-election protests (ibid.). The crackdown led to a widespread loss of life while a 
state of emergency led to a restriction of rights and civilians being arrested for social media posts.  
The government also sought to assuage protester demands by suspending then scrapping the Master 
Plan in early 2016. In spite of this gesture, other regions harboured grievances against the EPRDF and 
the perceived Tigray domination of the supposedly multi-ethnic ruling coalition (Fisher and 
Gebrewahd, 2018). As a result, the protests spread to the Amhara region and the Southern Nations 
and Peoples region. Though these protests were largely rooted in ethno-regionalist grievances, 
protesters from different regions began to associate their struggles with each other (ibid.). The regime 
then engaged in a reshuffle in late 2016 in which the number of Oromo ministers increased, but 
longstanding party loyalists retained important posts in Defence, Telecommunications and the Deputy 
Premiership, while Tigrayans continued to dominate the senior military and intelligence sectors 
(Africa Confidential, 2016b). These changes were perceived as token or cosmetic by the opposition. 
The government crackdown on Oromo and Amhara protesters eventually created a split within the 
EPRDF regime. The Oromo People’s Democratic Organisation (OPDO) and Amhara National 
Democratic Movement (ANDM) – members of the ruling EPRDF coalition – eventually openly 
criticised the government in order to retain some connection with their protesting constituents (Fisher 
and Gebrewahd, 2018). Furthermore, the EPRDF’s use of repression was condemned by the US 
through a bipartisan bill in the House of Representatives (Jeffrey, 2018). Internal factionalism and 
external condemnation of the regime eventually led to leader Hailemariam Desalegn resigning under 
pressure from his own party as the regime tried to restore its legitimacy with a new power 
configuration. 
Abiy Ahmed, an Oromo, was elected the new leader of the EPRDF at the start of 2018 in an internal 
election which was marred by open conflict between the coalition’s constituent parties (Africa 
Confidential, 2018a). Abiy was presented by the regime as a reformist who could placate the 
protester’s demands for renewal. Abiy announced his inaugural cabinet in April 2018.   
Abiy’s cabinet showed a high degree of ‘renewal’, representing the largest turnover in cabinet 
personnel in an Ethiopian reshuffle outside elections recorded in ACPED (52.5 percent, against a 
previous average of 7.9 percent). Many of the ministers who were dismissed were longstanding 
stalwarts of the now discredited regime. Out of the 21 dismissed minister, three had been in cabinet 
since the 1990s and ten had been in cabinet before 2012, when Meles Zenawi was in power. Zenawi 
was seen as the architect of both Tigray domination within the EPRDF and the ‘developmental state’ 
system which prioritised economic development over political consensus and deprived people of their 
land (Zahorik, 2017). It was also during the latter part of the Zenawi era that repression became the 




Another major change was a regional rebalancing of the cabinet. The protests had been stirred by 
largely regionalised grievances against the state, though the complaints of the different groups – 
primarily Oromo and Amhara – resonated with other groups critical of the regime. Figure 7.2 shows 
that the crisis cabinet regionally rebalanced the allocation of posts to mollify these two restive regions. 
The Amhara region saw its representation in the cabinet at large increase from 23 to 30 percent. The 
crisis cabinet also allocated more than half of the important inner circle posts to the Oromo region. 
Outside of the more visible executive, Abiy Ahmed also reduced Tigray influence in the security 
sector which the protesters held responsible for the government atrocities during the crackdown 
(Africa Confidential, 4 May 2018). 
Figure 7.2 - Regional Changes in Representation - Ethiopia 
 
 
In short, the Abiy’s crisis cabinet (and the EPRDF’s appointment of Abiy as the party’s leader) was 
tailored to address the demands of the protesters. The dismissal of long-term ministers and the 
appointment of a new leader satisfied the protesters demands for significant change, short of the 
replacement of the EPRDF regime, from a government that was perceived to be both unwilling to 
cede power and unwilling to consult its citizens or constituent parties. The rebalancing of the cabinet 








In Guinea a crisis cabinet was appointed after a year of highly organised strikes and protest against 
the regime lead by a coalition of two large trade unions, the Union syndicale des travailleurs de 
Guinée (USTG) and the Confédération nationale des travailleurs de Guinée (CNTG). The regime of 
long-time president Lassana Conte had lost much of its popularity due to decreasing wages and 
rampant inflation during the 2000s.  Since the introduction of elections in the 1990s, the opposition 
had failed to present a credible alternative to the Conte regime and most opposition parties boycotted 
elections. The different opposition parties were overwhelmingly believed to represent particularistic 
ethnic or subnational interests (Engeler, 2008). In contrast, trade unions retained a national identity 
due to their role in the independence struggle and managed to encourage passive strikes in early 2006 
which were observed by the population at large (McGovern, 2007). 
Following these strikes, two relatives close to Conte were convicted of embezzling $22 million from 
the treasury, prompting Conte to overtly intervene on their behalf and break any pretence of separation 
of powers within his government. This prompted the USTG and CNTG to launch a strike in January 
2007 which lasted nineteen days and was widely supported by the Guinean population. Protests in 
Conakry were violently repressed by the military and Conte declared a state of emergency which 
imposed martial law (ibid.). Conte tried to placate union demands for new leadership by returning 
substantial powers to the post of Prime Minister. However, he appointed Eugene Camara, a close ally, 
as the new Prime Minister (Africa Confidential, 2007).  This half-hearted attempt at negotiation led 
to the unions renewing their protest while the National Assembly – previously a rubber stamp 
parliament – reasserted its independence by refusing to prolong the state of emergency (McGovern, 
2007; Engeler, 2008). This signified a break within the regime elite and the increasing political 
isolation of Conte.  
No longer able to rely on the regime elite and facing pressure from the strong Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS) to resolve the issue, Conte capitulated and selected the unions’ 
preferred candidate, Lansana Kouyate, as the new Prime Minister and a new cabinet with much of the 
old guard purged (Africa Confidential, 2007). The new cabinet, appointed by Kouyate, was 
constructed to project the impression of renewal, efficiency and integrity. The number of ministers 
was cut from 28 in December 2006 to 21 in March 2007.  
Nearly all former ministers tied to Conte were dropped, resulting in the highest turnover of personnel 




Conte’s reign. This changing of the guard included a candidate to be Conte’s successor, Minister-
Secretary General to Presidency, Fodé Bangoura (Africa Confidential, 2006).  
The Guinea case differs from Abiy’s crisis cabinet in that the dropped ministers did not have 
particularly long tenures, averaging a tenure of just over two years. This is because Conte pursued a 
personalist strategy of repeatedly rotating elites to prevent independent bases of power from forming 
(Kroeger, 2018; Roessler, 2011).77 Nevertheless, the dismissal of his possible successor showed that 
Conte was willing to replace core members of his elite circle to placate the protesters. 
The main complaints against Conte’s regime were corruption and ineffectiveness at rectifying the 
country’s economic problems, as opposed to ethnic or regional complaints. Nevertheless, Kouyate’s 
cabinet expanded regional representation within the inner circle (see figure 7.3). The opening of the 
political space was also demonstrated by the political backgrounds of the new ministers. The majority 
were technocratic professionals who were unconnected to Conte’s clique, the ruling party or the 
opposition. These technocrats occupied the key ministries of Finance and Justice (Wikileaks, 2007). 
Ministers associated with the unions secured the positions of Financial Oversight and Transparency, 
Labour and Administrative Reform, and Education. However, the military and security apparatus 













                                                          




Figure 7.3 - Regional Changes in Representation - Guinea 
 
 
All these factors meant Kouyate’s cabinet was interpreted as a “victory for the people over a totally 
discredited power – a real revolution” (Engeler, 2008). Kouyate’s crisis cabinet was designed to 
address the grievances that had driven the protest. The turnover of most of the cabinet including 
Conte’s potential successor signalled government would no longer be stuffed by loyalists. The 
appointment of technocrats and union officials demonstrated that the new government would be 
staffed by those who could fix Guinea’s economic issues and effectively represent the populace. 
Finally, by ceding a large amount of power Conte had held onto the presidency and the ability to get 
the regime back under his control.78 
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Confidential, 6 June 2008). Kouyate’s new government had failed to resolve the cost of living issue while 
soldiers and police rioted over salary arrears (Engeler, 2008). Furthermore, Kouyate had launched an 
independent audit into embezzlement by the president’s relatives (Africa Confidential, 2008). Conte and the old 
guard reacted as soon as Kouyate’s support among the general public and unions was waning, enabling Conte 






In Tunisia, the appointment of two crisis cabinets in January and February 2011 was a direct 
consequence of the protests that spread across the country starting in December 2010, when a street 
vendor set himself on fire in the city of Sidi Bouzid. Demonstrations were held in several cities, 
quickly coalescing into a large protest movement against Tunisia’s long-time ruler Zine El Abidine 
Ben Ali. The response to the sweeping unrest consisted of a mix of repression and accommodation.  
While security forces were responsible for killing dozens of people between December 20 and January 
14, Ben Ali also attempted to mollify the demonstrators by firing ministers and local governors in late 
December, announcing job creation plans and pledging to hold legislative elections and step down in 
2014. The reshuffle announced on December 29 involved changes to minor cabinet portfolios, 
including the communications, trade, religious affairs and youth ministers, which ultimately failed to 
placate the protesters who continued to mobilise well beyond the autocrat’s departure on January 14. 
Furthermore, the protests caused a splinter in the regime. Both the Minister of the Interior and Chief 
of Presidential Security chose to mutiny against the regime, and some security service units mobilised 
to arrest members of the Ben Ali family (Holmes and Koehler, 2018). Ben Ali subsequently fled to 
Jeddah. Three days after Ben Ali left the country, the long-time technocratic Prime Minister 
Mohammed Ghannouchi announced a crisis cabinet composed of members of the dissolved ruling 
party, technocrats and opposition figures, many of whom resigned before taking office to express their 
unhappiness about the continued presence of associates of the former regime. Although only five 
ministers from the previous regime were reappointed and the most unpopular figures had left the 
government, demonstrations continued unabated for over a month with protesters denouncing the 
continuity of the interim government and demanding more radical changes. On February 27, 
Ghannouchi announced his resignation, leaving the post of Prime Minister to Béji Caid Essebsi, a 
former ambassador and minister in the 1970s who formed a caretaker government consisting entirely 
of non-party ministers (Bin Aschour, 2016). 
In the months between December 2010 and March 2011, widespread, persistent unrest pressured 
Tunisian elites to make significant changes to the government and to increase its overall 
representation. By March 2011, all ministers associated with the Ben Ali regime had been purged 
from the cabinet, representing an unprecedented level of turnover. Previous reshuffles outside of 
elections resulted in an average 8.5 percent change in personnel. The first attempt at a crisis cabinet 
in January 2011 resulted in the dismissal of three quarters of the cabinet, and the subsequent reshuffle 
in February 2011 resulted in half of the new cabinet being dropped. 
Some of Ben Ali’s closest associates, including members of his extended family, the head of 
presidential security Ali Seriati and the former Interior Minister Rafik Belhaj Kacem, were arrested 




The continuation of the protests following Ben Ali’s departure contributed significantly to the ongoing 
changes in the cabinet (Boubekeur, 2018). Despite  Prime Minister Ghannouchi expelling Ben Ali’s 
loyalists from the executive’s inner circle and his own technocratic profile, he was himself still tainted 
by his association with the former regime, and demonstrators accused him of retaining some of Ben 
Ali’s ministers to water down the outcomes of the revolution. As a result, popular pressure mounted 
between January and February 2011 to also expel ministers that, despite their alleged technocratic 
profile, had served under Ben Ali, in some cases for more than a decade. The role played by the 
protests during the interim period therefore explains the high rate of observed ministerial turnover, as 
well as the relatively long average tenure – five and a half years – of the dismissed ministers. 
At the same time, the protests also contributed towards modifying the cabinet’s geographical 
representation. Under Ben Ali, ministerial positions were disproportionately distributed among elites 
from Tunisia’s coastal areas, and particularly from his home region of Sousse (Camau and Geisser, 
2003). In December 2010, the Prime Minister, as well as the Defence, Foreign Affairs and Agriculture 
ministers, were all from Ben Ali’s region.  
By contrast Tunisia’s inner regions, which had been a hotbed of protest, had often been marginalised, 
sparking highly contentious popular grievances. Among these regions, Zaghouan and Kebili never 
enjoyed ministerial representation, while Le Kef, Sidi Bouzid and Tataouine had only one minister 
each in twenty-three years. 
It is therefore not surprising that one of the main goals of the protest movement was to ensure more 
equitable political representation. The cabinet appointed by Essebsi in March 2011 was more 
geographically diverse, in spite of the number of available ministerial posts being reduced by one third 
and the technocratic profile of many of its ministers, who typically came from the capital and the 
largest urban centres. The government’s inner circle, comprising ministers appointed to the most 
influential portfolios, also became more representative as a consequence of the expulsion of Ben Ali’s 











Figure 7.4 - Regional Changes in Representation - Tunisia  
 
In sum, the appointment of two consecutive crisis cabinets in Tunisia was a consequence of the protest 
movement that led to Ben Ali’s ousting in January 2011. The pressure exerted by popular protests 
pressured transitional elites into appointing more inclusive governments and breaking with the 
authoritarian past by dismissing ministers that had been part of Ben Ali’s cabinets. At the same time, 
hostility to Ben Ali’s former prime minister heading the transitional government led several 
opposition figures to resign from Mohammed Ghannouchi’s government in January 2011, and to cease 
any collaboration with former regime members, who were eventually banned from running in the 
subsequent elections.  
In Tunisia, as in the other two cases, the protests caused a split in the ruling elite when members of 
the regime recognised that peace was unattainable while Ben Ali remained in power and that the old 
regime was unsustainable. In Ethiopia, the protests and the violence of the government crackdown 
forced internal elites to confront the regime on the behalf of their constituents while providing 
disgruntled factions in the regime with the opportunity to become dominant. In Guinea, the protests 
enabled a previously pliant legislature to start imposing its authority on the leader and demanding that 






This study illustrates how regimes react to existential challenges through the appointment of crisis 
cabinets, using the example of mass protest. The cabinet constitutes one of the main arenas where 
democratic and non-democratic leaders renegotiate the bargains that sustain their regimes, and are 
therefore vitally important during times of political stress. It investigated how non-routine mass 
cabinet reshuffles enable regimes to increase their chances of survival during periods of acute crisis. 
This study adds to the literature on political survival strategies through focussing on how actions 
external to the regime elite can drive change. Much of the current literature on leadership transitions 
and elite volatility emphasises the role of elite decisions and internal rivalries (Albertus, 2012; 
Albertus and Menaldo, 2012; Roessler, 2011; Lindemann, 2011a). Yet how external events, such 
episodes of popular unrest, inform elite decisions is rarely studied.  
Protests have the potential to exacerbate internal splits within the government, weakening the 
perceived strength of the leader and the regime. External elites can then pressure a fractured regime 
for concessions, as shown in Guinea. Factions within the regime can capitalise on public discontent 
to improve their position in the political hierarchy, as shown in Ethiopia. Mass protest can convince 
regime elites that the existing order is destined to fall and can encourage insiders to steward a managed 
transition, as shown in Tunisia.  This study demonstrates that, although crisis cabinets in Africa are 
rarely made in response to protests, the occasions where protests do result in substantial cabinet 
turnover is when the unrest changes the political calculations and strategies of elites both inside and 
outside of the regime.  
Existing literature on protests and government response has typically focussed on the timing and the 
geography of repression79, but has often failed to account for strategies of regime accommodation or 
co-option. When accommodation has been examined, the lack of data on political appointments means 
that researchers have had to use regime/opposition rhetoric to approximate for concessions (Bhasin 
and Gandhi, 2013; Carey, 2006). Protest-motivated crisis cabinets, albeit rare, are influential and 
display high rates of ministerial turnover, the removal of long-tenure ministers and increased 
representation of regional centres of unrest. These substantial changes represent a dramatic shift in 
the distribution of political power. This in turn signals to the protesters that the regime is changing the 
status quo and is willing to engage in significant reform. 
Because of the limited sample used for this study, this analysis cannot infer causal claims about the 
origin of cabinet volatility in Africa, but should be best viewed as a theory-building exercise to 
generate hypotheses. More stringent statistical studies covering a wider sample of country/year cases 
                                                          




could test the theories outlined in this paper to better assess the impact of protests on cabinet 
































African leaders do not rule alone: they are dependent on mutually beneficial political alliances made 
with subnational elites. Through an inclusion process, many political elites are granted preferential 
access to political and economic organs of the state, in exchange for regime support and limiting 
violent competition with the state. These practices increase regime consolidation and limit the risk of 
civil war (Rothchild, 1997), and other anti-state violence. Further, by offering competitors state 
positions and access to patronage networks, leaders ‘coup-proof’ their regimes (Roessler, 2011).    
Clientelism and patronage are often presented as centralized, pre-determined, narrow political systems 
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007) where African leaders bestow power to co-ethno-regional groups. 
But these are futile and risky arrangements in democratizing societies, and rarely does a country’s 
demographics support this choice. Rather than exclusive political arrangements and marginalization, 
African leaders are more likely to engage in inclusive representation to distribute some formal power 
to politically relevant groups. Across most African states in the post-Cold War period, elites negotiate 
and exchange loyalty and community alliances for political positions, state rents, and influence. 
Patronage is the vehicle of the ‘politics of survival’ (Migdal, 1988), the ‘political marketplace’ (De 
Waal, 2015) and ‘militarized ethnic bargaining’ (Roessler, 2011). The distribution of power in society 
and across elites emerges from bargaining “among contending elites” (Di John and Putzel, 2009) with 
an outcome that is mutually compatible and sustainable for the purposes of economic and political 
viability (Khan, 2010). These practices are not static, stable, or without conflict. Political bargaining 
allows regimes to adapt to different pressures, crises, and political developments, and reflect changing 
power hierarchies, leverage, and the needs of the regime and populations. As a result, many 
developing African states suffer from high levels of instability at senior levels of government, 
including the cabinet, but these same regimes are often characterized by longevity. 
The distribution of power in developing states is a volatile process, and even inclusive regimes 
experience high rates of political violence. This violence is often between militias competing on behalf 
of elites who are included in regimes and groups that are represented in government (Raleigh, 2016). 
This paradox of representation and violence is a result of ‘competitive clientelism’ that emerges 
between elites for relative positions within the political hierarchy of the state. Because ongoing 
political negotiations lead to different rates of elite representation and accommodation within even 
short periods of time, volatile negotiations lead to violence to secure or challenge those decisions over 
elected or appointed office (Arriola and Johnson, 2014). Violence is an effective tool of competition, 




African states, political violence is increasingly used by and for included elites and ethnic groups to 
alter or increase their power share, rather than a resort of excluded groups. This article explores how 
regimes accommodate competing elites, and under which competitive conditions and changing 
contexts political violence emerges. It finds that conflict arises from a contest for power, not its 
vacuum. Further, the inequality of power between included elites, rather than exclusion from central 
government, is closely associated with political violence.  
Conflict research has generally concentrated on exclusive and biased political settlements and 
institutional arrangements as necessary and sufficient precursors for conflict. Political exclusion 
specifically increases the risk of regime replacement or civil war (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min, 
2010; Roessler, 2011; Arriola, 2011) and is robustly associated with horizontal and vertical 
inequalities in representation (Lindemann, 2011a; Langer, 2005; Østby 2008; Buhaug, Cederman, and 
Rød, 2008). Yet, civil wars have declined precipitously across Africa, largely in line with the adoption 
of democratic and participatory institutions (Boix, 2003). However, almost all African states 
characterized as semi-democracies, one-party electoral democracies, or hybrid regimes experience 
some form of sustained political violence. The link between power distributions and modern political 
violence becomes more complicated in regimes and states which practice widespread inclusion. The 
“elite bargain” provides an important context to explain conflict, but it cannot explain the modality of 
violence and changing levels of conflict risk across states.  
This article analyses the governance of African states with a two-level approach. Leaders choose who 
to represent and at what level. At the national level, African political systems consist of rival political 
groups who are competing for their access to state power and resources. We estimate the degree of 
“representation,” or the share of ethno-political groups represented in senior central government 
relative to the total population, every month for twenty years. At the elite level, we investigate how 
power is distributed between included groups in the executive branch of government for the same 
period. We do so by measuring the level of “malapportionment,” or the degree to which included 
groups are overrepresented or underrepresented in government. Finally, we assess the rate of 
“volatility” in cabinet size and position allocation using a new dataset on the position, tenure, and 
demographics of individual cabinet ministers, by month, in 15 African countries from 1997 to 2016.   
 
With respect to ethno-political management, African regimes are more often inclusive than exclusive: 
about 85 percent of ethno-political communities are represented in the national cabinet. Furthermore, 
the number of seats occupied by elites from particular groups often matches the demographic weight 
of the communities they represent: about one quarter of seats are malapportioned. Yet, inclusive 
political settlements do experience political conflict. Excluding large, internally coordinated ethnic 




likelihood of political violence is highest when senior government positions (e.g., cabinet ministers) 
are malapportioned. Those included groups assigned a number of seats or positions that they deem 
insufficient are more likely to engage in violence against the state. Finally, cabinet positions are 
volatile, and short-term changes in cabinet positions have a positive impact on conflict. We find that 
a large-scale cabinet reshuffle over a short period of time can generate more political violence by 
increasing the likelihood of elite infighting.  
Our findings reflect pragmatic political calculations: even in states with high levels of ethnic inclusion, 
if strong elites who represent large or wealthy communities fail to acquire a due share of ministerial 
positions, higher levels of political violence are expected. Similarly, if small communities acquire too 
much power relative to their size, higher levels of political violence are also expected. These findings 
suggest that political inclusion of ethnic groups does not necessarily bring about a peaceful society. 
Violence is used by included groups and elites to assert their control of the state, and this reinforces 
that groups in power, large and small, have significant influence on levels of peace or conflict in 
developing countries. Beyond the knowledge that excluded groups are more likely to rebel, those with 
state power must be considered when explaining political violence.  
Our conclusions have implications for conflict studies and wider disciplines. The domestic politics of 
developing states have often been overlooked in the study political violence. Yet, politics generates 
the motivation, agents, forms, and dynamics of political violence. It shapes the agenda of those who 
use it, elevates the authority and legitimacy of those who benefit from it, and ultimately, reproduces 
itself in part through the use and threat of violence. As political institutions have changed across 
Africa, the strategic calculations of leaders and subnational elites have changed to reflect the political 
contests in new institutions. In turn, conflict has adapted, changing form to fit into the present power 
contest.  
 
8.2 Leaders Make Choices, Choices have Consequences 
Leaders across the developing world extend and consolidate their regimes by co-opting elites and their 
constituencies. Consequently, leaders endanger their regimes if they do not integrate other powerful 
domestic agents to secure continued power and extend authority across the state (Bueno de Mesquita 
et al. 2003; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). The logic of inclusion and 
‘rent-sharing’ is expanded upon in Gandhi and Przeworski (2006), Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), 
and Boix (2003), who noted that transitions to democratic institutions required inclusive regime 
management of subnational powers and resources. Because democratic transitions required a greatly 
increased number of participating elites and selective inclusion, African leaders changed practices 
from exclusive and co-ethnic dominance in government towards inclusive and multi-ethnic 




politics of subnational elites became a key factor in the survival and instability of African leaders 
(Svolik, 2009).  
Leaders ‘manage’ association, loyalty, and alliances in processes detailed by Goldsmith (2001) and 
Svolik (2009), described as ‘political bargaining’ by Benson and Kugler (1998), ‘ethnic balancing’ 
by Lindemann (2011), and the ‘political marketplace’ by De Waal (2015). Each detail how leaders 
accommodate powerful elites and communities who in turn leverage their local influence for rewards 
and recognition by regimes. ‘Limited access orders’ or ‘closed’ systems and ‘political settlements’ 
(Khan 2010; Di John and Putzel, 2009) summarize the political environment that emerges as leaders 
integrate powerful elites from institutional, military, ethnic, and social backgrounds.  
 
These different conceptions of developing world governance suggest that regimes manage subnational 
elites using the tools of accommodation, and this results in flexible, volatile, and competitive 
bargaining. Accommodation is in the terms of the patronage bargain between the leader and elite. 
Patronage – or more accurately for this purpose, clientelism – involves the cultivation and co-option 
of elites as a means to distribute power where offices effectively become private property (Clapham, 
1985; Erdmann and Engel, 2007). Relationships of loyalty and dependence are incentivized through 
rents, allocation of funds, the creation of public sector jobs in strategic constituencies, and the 
distribution of government posts among certain ethnic communities (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994, 
458; Lindemann 2011b). This system allows for regimes and subnational elites to build and supply 
their own networks to consolidate power. Whereas the immediate objective is to purchase loyalty and 
deflect challenge, the larger purpose of patronage in Africa is to “facilitate intra-elite accommodation 
in young, multi-ethnic and poorly integrated political systems” (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 15). 
Essentially, this practice means to tie together strong, subnational elites in order to consolidate regime 
power. As such, African governments benefit from extensive and ethnically inclusive representation 
that stabilizes and reinforces political alliances where power is shared across intermediary elites 
(Arriola 2009; Goldsmith 2001; Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015).  
Leaders seek accommodation and alliance with powerful elites, including ministers, security sector 
leaders, governors, and select customary authorities because it is essential for order and regime 
continuity. This is especially true where non-regime elites, or elites outside of the regime’s typical 
support base, have significant national or regional power. Accommodation results in configurations 
of national power highly dependent on the incentives and power of subnational actors to oppose, limit, 
or support it (Green, 2010). These practices are designed to accommodate many potential subnational 
centers of strength regardless of ethno-regional affiliation. In selecting representatives, leaders 
demonstrate their biases towards communities, identify the beneficiaries of their power, limit the 




access to patronage and state rents, leaders create loyalty amongst those who gain access and 
competition with those who have little or insufficient access. 
African leaders have several representation strategies to build inclusive coalitions that are neither fair 
nor balanced. These strategies may disproportionately benefit co-ethnics by prioritizing the allocation 
of key government positions (Arriola, 2008) or may limit co-ethnic power because of the guaranteed 
support of a leader’s constituency (Kasara, 2007).  Leaders may also exclude ethnic rivals from state 
power and limit the size of the groups who dominate in government. Examples of discriminatory 
regimes who exclude some sizeable proportions of their society include Micombero’s Burundi (1966-
1976) and Amin’s Uganda (1972-1979). These systems are profoundly unstable. In contrast, regimes 
practice ‘coup-proofing’ when potential challengers are co-opted into government with mutually 
beneficial arrangements (Roessler, 2011). Local elites with significant power may exchange influence 
for loyalty to the regime (De Mesquita et al., 2003); this loyalty norm is based on fear of losing access 
to state resources if the new leader comes to power. Relying on the loyalty principle, those benefitting 
from power may be less likely to upset it. Yet regimes may also distort the power of strong, potential 
challengers by packing the government with groups from smaller communities (Arriola, 2011). 
‘Cabinet packing’ creates alliances among small but locally useful constituencies and allows regimes 
to appear ‘inclusive’. ‘Counterbalancing’ creates multiple versions of the same department or 
positions within government to keep possible competitors weak and disorganized while creating new 
allied recipients of patronage. These practices can result in the skewed distribution of material benefits 
to a combination of groups (Arriola, 2009; Bayart, 1993; Van de Walle, 2006). Finally, regimes further 
bias representation by letting positions accrue to powerful elites representing locally strong and 
possibly independent communities. The support of these elites and groups is more important to capture 
than weaker constituencies.  
These calculations often produce an inclusive but unbalanced power system that favours strong elite 
groups. These arrangements reflect a reality: subnational elites leverage their ethnic, regional, 
financial or religious associations in their negotiations with leaders. Consequentially, elites differ in 
their political weight compared to each other. Distorted distributions of elite power emerge when it is 
strategic for leaders to recognize and reinforce power differentials to their benefit, to limit power or 
take advantage of intra-elite competition.  
Constricting the number of elite benefactors does not always create exclusive regimes. The inclusion 
of social groups and the distribution of government jobs between included groups are distinct 
measures of political settlements and have separate but inter-related consequences. In practice, 
African states practice highly inclusive but volatile representation (Raleigh, Wigmore-Shepherd and 
Maggio, 2018; Francois et al., 2015; Goldsmith, 2001). As a result of a regime’s political calculus, 




ethnically inclusive may have a highly malapportioned government where one, or a few ethnic groups 
have a ‘disproportionate’ share of cabinet positions, or an exclusive regime may distribute power 
equally across the few included groups. Consider the example of Tanzania, which is a multi-ethnic 
country with more than 120 distinct ethno-regional groups. Although Tanzania has built ethnically 
inclusive governance in which diverse ethnic groups are represented in government, in some periods, 
members of Chagga and Hehe groups have taken up together almost half of cabinet ministers.  
Figure 8.1 is a graphical illustration of two hypothetical configurations of a state with multiple ethnic 
groups of relatively equal size. Figure 8.1A represents an ethnically inclusive regime where most 
ethnic groups except one (Group 6) are included within government. Yet this regime has a 
malapportioned cabinet where Group 1 holds dominant power. By contrast, figure 8.1B represents an 
ethnically exclusive regime where Groups 4-7 are excluded from participation in central government. 
It has a well-apportioned cabinet where three included ethnic groups equally divide executive power. 
Both are common results of different accommodation strategies practiced between regimes and elites. 

















Figure 8.1: Ethno-political configurations of the state80 
 









Much of the recent literature on civil wars placed the inclusion-exclusion dimension at the centre of 
their analysis. They argue that groups excluded from senior positions for sufficient periods foster 
grievances and have little leverage outside the use of violence. It follows that high and stable rates of 
representation create a context of relative peace. Cederman et al. (2010) argue that ethnic groups 
excluded from central executive power are about three times more likely to rebel than are included 
groups. Further, relatively wealthy or poor excluded groups are more likely to engage in armed 
conflict than are those of average wealth (Cederman, Weidmann, and Gleditsch, 2011). Rebel violence 
is most likely to occur in non-democratic systems with small ruling coalitions (Choi and Kim, 2018), 
as with little opportunity to politically engage, armed rebellion presents as a legitimate and necessary 
strategy to overthrow regimes. Despite the cost of increasing the risk of rebellion in Africa, 
governments pursue these policies because ethnic exclusion reduces the risk of coup d’état (Roessler, 
2011). Taken together, these studies indicate that ethnic exclusion increases the likelihood of violent 
conflict. By taking advantage of a grievance motivation, excluded groups mobilize to challenge the 
                                                          
80 Solid circle represents the territorial boundary of the state. Shaded circle represents the boundary and size of 
political representation. Each segment within the shaded circle represents the proportion of cabinet positions 





incumbent and ultimately redress their political status. This leads to the first hypothesis: 
 
H1:  Higher levels of ethnic exclusion from central government will increase the risk of anti-state 
violence by rebels. 
 
Indeed, as regimes have expanded through inclusion, the rate of civil war occurrence has decreased 
across Africa. Research on exclusive regimes suggests that civil wars are the option of choice by 
marginalized communities seeking to overthrow the state (Buhaug, 2006). However, since the decline 
of civil wars, multiple other forms of political violence occur with a persistently high rate across many 
African states. But it is unknown how inclusive regimes generate or affect political violence. Further, 
regimes and leaders persist, despite violent disorder and mass volatility. How is the composition of 
government both generating conflict and serving as a negotiation tactic between elites and leaders? 
African political leaders face both internal and external threats to their tenure as leaders (Quiroz-
Flores and Smith 2011). The cause and the solution to these threats are the same: when leaders 
incorporate an elite into a senior government position, they do so realizing that these elites are also 
competitors. Yet, leaving out strong elites can create conditions for anti-state violence. Inclusion is, 
therefore, the more risk averse choice.  
Explanations for internal conflict against the state suggest that strong elites are likely to engage in 
coup-like actions towards leaders and aim to overtake the leader’s position. But coups are rare, while 
the integration of strong elites into government is common. Further, elites can contest positions in 
government without contesting the legitimacy and position of the leader. De Waal (2009), Raleigh 
(2016) and several others suggest that elites challenge the government to extract greater rents, but not 
to replace the leader. The practices of negotiation between elites and leaders can be intermittently 
violent, but the threat and risk of defection is enough leverage for a leader to strategically integrate or 
improve the position of elites.  
Governments in many developing states are beset by ‘competitive clientelism’. Inter-elite contestation 
is the most likely outcome of a competitive political process, especially since leaders are fortified—
therefore difficult to deal with directly—and they are eager to incorporate strong elites with significant 
leverage in exchange for government positions and mutual dependence. Elites compete to position 
themselves as the one to be negotiated with. Elite competition is acknowledged at key periods (e.g. 
elections) and through parties, but there are several other, common moments of elite competition, 
contests for subnational elite replacement; territorial/boundary disputes; voter, wealth, and position 
competition etc. where subnational elites will engage in violence against an opponent, often within 




bargaining position (De Waal, 2015). In short, representation and accommodation create unique types 
of competition. Competition creates anti-state violence by elites. This violence, often engaging 
political militias, increases with ‘imbalance’ across senior government positions where one, or a few 
ethnic groups are dominant enough to secure state power and resources. In such cases, 
underrepresented groups (i.e., groups whose share of cabinet positions is less than their population) 
may challenge the state through personal armies to secure greater access to government or starts a 
round of bargaining with the incumbent, or over-represented groups may use violence to reinforce 
their favoured positions. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Higher levels of ethnic imbalance in senior government positions will increase the risk of anti-
state violence by political militias.  
 
Levels of representation and power distribution are in constant flux in African politics. While overall 
community representation may be generally stable, elites shift in and out of power due to promotions, 
demotions, and reshuffles. African leaders often reshuffle senior positions (Quiroz-Flores and Smith, 
2011), and recent evidence suggests a 10 percent rate of inter-annual change in ministry positions 
(Francois et al.,  2015) and a 20 percent rate of intra-annual change (i.e., 20 percent of ministry 
positions last less than one year) (Raleigh et al., 2018). The average tenure of a cabinet member’s 
combined total service across administrations is 44 months or approximately 3.5 years. The average 
duration of a cabinet ministry is 5.3 years or 64 months. There is significant volatility in the people 
and positions across African cabinets. 
Volatility in representation is due to changes in regime alliance needs as leaders determine the timing, 
frequency, and extent of change in cabinet positions. A leader may choose to alter the cabinet to 
correct an appointment in a merit-based system (Huber and Gallardo, 2008; Dewan and Myatt, 2010), 
to improve electoral prospects, or to reflect coalition dynamics (Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999). 
Regimes are surrounded by numerous, volatile satellite elites and parties who represent identity groups 
and seek to demonstrate sufficient electoral support for entry into a ruling coalition and access to 
patronage (Van De Walle, 2007; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich, 2003). As regimes selectively 
accommodate or expand their co-option, more subnational elites bargain, compete, and fragment 
alliances over access to state resources and power (Lijphart, 1977; Brancati, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 
1999; Bratton and Chang, 2006; Raleigh, 2016). Within systems where political office has 
redistributive implications (Schedler, 2006; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Arriola and Johnson, 2014), 
included elites have incentives to design forms of violence to assure continued access to power. This 
is assumed to be heightened during periods of volatility. Thus, changes in ethnic representation and 




of posts within the ruling coalition. But leaders are strategic in their timing, and highly volatile periods 
can be interpreted as the regime’s response to elite grievances and representation. Therefore, elites are 
unlikely to engage in anti-state violence during that period, and more likely to compete with each 
other at the subnational level. 
Volatile access to state resources is likely to generate intense competition between elites as changes 
in government composition provide them with the opportunity to renegotiate and reposition 
themselves vis-à-vis other elites. This is another side of the loyalty principle: changing the power 
distribution may increase the loyalty of beneficiaries to the incumbent leader, but those who end up 
with reduced or challenges to positions and power may attempt to redress their position through 
violence with other elites. In short, conflict is a feature of political competition, rather than an 
indication of its breakdown.  
 
H3: Higher levels of cabinet volatility increases competitive violence amongst non-state actors.   
 
To understand the links between elites, leaders, and violence, consider two cases of where political 
manipulation on both the regional and national level has increased competition between elites, who, 
in turn, employed violence. In the first case, the regime of President Goodluck Jonathan in Nigeria 
(2010-2015) sought to divide the influence of a strong Southern region by counterbalancing and 
splitting positions. This restricted the organizing power of the regional elites and secured regime and 
leader strength. In 2009, the Nigerian government was engaged in a peace negotiation with the Niger 
Delta militants and during that year, no representatives of Delta state were awarded a position in 
cabinet. After a successful peace deal, two previous Delta cabinet members (Peter Godsday Orubebe 
and Ngozi Okonjo Iweala) were reinstalled and retained positions for several years. But the 
government sought to limit the powers of any particular Delta elite. ‘Delta’ representation can be 
counted in several ways: those from Delta state; the extended region (including Delta, Balaysa, and 
Rivers states); and the new region which was extended by the Obasanjo regime to include Abia, Akwa-
Ibom, Cross Rivers, Edo, Imo, and Ondo states. The extended region contains 23 percent of Nigeria’s 
population, while the ‘new’ extended Delta includes approximately 33 million people at 
approximately 25 percent of Nigeria’s population. In 2010, President Jonathan gave far more cabinet 
positions to elites from small and less populated states in the new extension than to those from larger 
states (Delta, Bayelsa and Rivers). As a result, there was a high degree of competition within the Delta 
for regional and national positions. Nigerian elections, in particular, took a violent turn between 
strongmen “who armed youths in the Delta, deploying them as saboteurs and storm troopers against 




regime to deliver its internal goals, and this, in turn, created violent competition within the Delta for 
political access.  
The same process of competition is found in DR-Congo, where “the most influential politicians come 
from…an armed group background” (Perera, 2017) and are willing to use armed conflict to continue 
their power by offering financial support to militants for control over communities, or challenge 
existing authority, or gain new political leverage (Perera, 2017). As Sterns et al. (2013) notes, 
politicians use violence to get electoral support and to maintain influence. In turn, elite representation 
in Congo’s violent regions is highly volatile, including annual extreme changes for South Kivu and 
Katangan politicians (now Tanganyika, Haut-Lomami, Lualaba and Haut-Katanga). The duration of 
any individual elite in cabinet is lowest for South Kivu, Bas Congo and Kasai Occidental. Violence is 




8.3.1 Operational Data 
Despite their importance, there are few measures of government composition and representation 
practices. In many states, cabinets are the locus of policy decision-making and patronage 
opportunities. Further, “a cabinet minister in Africa is considered ‘a kind of super representative’ 
(Zolberg, 1969) who is expected to speak for the interests of co-ethnics, as well as channel resources 
to them” (Arriola, 2011). Ministers influence where to allocate public resources and can supplement 
their personal incomes by offering contracts and jobs in exchange for other favours.  
 
Cabinet ministers are examples of both ethnic representation and balance, as ministerial positions 
serve as an important means through which to forge an intra-elite bargain (Roessler, 2011; Bratton 
and Van De Walle, 1994; Lindemann, 2011b; Rothchild, 1995; Arriola, 2009). Rather than being the 
result of voting outcomes, a cabinet is selected by the President or Prime Minister. The composition 
of the cabinet therefore offers insight into the strategic balancing that the regime engages in to manage 
the cleavages, competitors, and identities within a state. Consequentially, cabinet composition, 
change, and size represent “elite clients sustained by a regime’s leader, whether a democratically 
elected president or a coup-installed dictator. An increase in the number of cabinet ministers is 
interpreted as an attempt to expand the leader’s base of political support” (Arriola, 2011). Cabinets 
must include a collection of constituency representatives who are deemed necessary for the 
continuation of the regime (Arriola, 2009) within the context of judicious inclusion and exclusion of 
certain groups. Therefore, the creation of a cabinet and the balance of elites, groups and power is a 





The African Cabinet and Political Elite Data (hereafter ACPED) is a project that tracks the presence, 
position, and demographics of ministers within African cabinets for each month from 1997 to the 
present (Raleigh et al., 2018). ACPED collects information on all ministers within national cabinets; 
each minister is associated with several demographic and political identifiers, including home region 
and associated ethnic community, political party, gender, and position within the cabinet at each 
month. Ministers can move positions, move in and out of cabinet, and cabinets can expand and retract 
through adding or firing ministers and positions. A monthly assessment captures the variation in this 
activity. Information is sourced from published cabinet lists and in-country experts81.  
 
By tracking individual ministers and aggregating multiple ministers as the composition of the 
executive branch, these data generate a dynamic and salient approximation of national ethnic 
representation and intra-elite power balance. These data allow for distinct measures of country level, 
including the degree of ethno-regional representation, power distribution amongst elites, the scope 
and depth of dominant party infiltration, and the volatility in cabinet size and position allocation.  
ACPED is a supplement and expansion of other data, notably the Ethnic Power Relations project 
(Wimmer et al., 2009), and the African cabinet set by Francois et al. (2015). While the EPR data relies 
on experts’ assessment of aggregated ethnic positioning in government, no formal or identifiable 
positions are compared across groups, times or states. As Francois et al. (2015) note in reference to 
EPR, ‘hard’ information on the participation of groups in government is more objective. Further, the 
artificial clustering of groups into EPR’s seven-point categories obscures rather than elucidates the 
role, relationships and variability between ethnic groups. ACPED uses objective information on 
formal positions rather than expert opinions, enabling the measurement of subtle changes in elite 
bargaining, representation and power-sharing.  
 
Relatedly, ACPED is more up-to-date than Francois et al. (2015)’s cabinet data, which ranges from 
1960-2004. The period covered by ACPED (1997 to the present) witnessed extreme changes in the 
structure of African governments, as democratic transitions, new political parties and power-sharing 
agreements brought widespread elite inclusion and competition for power. ACPED accurately tracks 
these developments through formal cabinet positions, by month, across Africa and into real time. 
Furthermore, while Francois et al. (2015) collect annual data, ACPED is disaggregated to the monthly 
level. About 19 percent of African ministers under study have tenures shorter than 12 months; these 
shortened tenures are most common during periods of crisis. Not integrating these crucial short-term 
developments limits a researcher’s ability to analyse dynamics at points where the elite bargain and 
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settlement is breaking down. In sum, ACPED is a disaggregated, updated, and expanded set of cabinet 
ministers, representing the heterogeneous political environments developing across African states. It 
is public and all data are openly available.  
 
8.3.2 Measure of Representation 
The extent of subnational ethnic representation is measured by the presence or absence of a cabinet 
minister at a given time and comparing the aggregated elite composition in cabinet to the ethnic 
composition of the state82. To operationalize this measure, the ethno-political groups are identified 
in an ethnic macro-roster for each state. These rosters are composed from several relevant sources, 
including Scarritt and Mozaffar’s (1999) Ethnologue, Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) lists, as well as 
national experts. Multiple sources reflect the variety of subnational identities that may be politically 
relevant in states at different time periods. Expert opinion is privileged if a discrepancy between 
source materials arises.  
For each month, we assess whether assembled cabinet ministers represent one of the ethno-political 
groups. Communities who have a representative through one or more cabinet positions in a given 
country-month are recorded as ‘represented’ for the period of appointment(s). The aggregated 
monthly share of included group populations83 is the representation score, summarized by the 
following notation: 
 
where ‘Representation’ for state c at time t is the combined population share (y) of represented ethnic 
groups i.  The Representation index varies between 0 and 1; values near 0 denote high exclusivity and 
values near to 1 indicate all ethno-political groups are represented in the cabinet. In addition, the 
demographic size of each group is used as a ‘weight’ when determining the relative size. Population 
weights are computed at ethnic level from Ethnologue and checked within geospatial population 
measures, and at district level (ADM2), as reported by states’ statistical office. 
 
8.3.3 Measure of Malapportionment 
ACPED generates a measure of malapportionment in the national cabinet based on previously 
established methods (Duncan and Duncan 1955; Samuels and Snyder 2001). This measure defines 
how cabinet appointments are distributed across represented ethnic groups. To create this measure, 
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all the identified ethnic groups represented by ministers within the cabinet-month are merged with 
their correspondent ethno-political characteristics. The malapportionment index is calculated using 
only the represented groups in a given state-month, and therefore, it describes how power is 
distributed across cabinet members.   
Studies on the electoral system have employed ‘disproportionality’ measures for describing the 
deviations resulting from the difference between party votes share and party seats share and other 
contexts (Gallagher, 1991; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2003; Lijphart, 1994). ACPED’s malapportionment 
score measures a similar characteristic.  A modified version of the ‘disproportion’ index, popularized 
by Loosemore and Hanby (1971) and Gallagher (1991)84, is employed as a means to determine the 
discrepancy between the shares of cabinet positions and the shares of population held by included 
ethnic groups. Thus, the formula becomes: 
 
The malapportionment measure for state c at time t is computed as the summation across all ethnic 
groups of the difference between x, which is the share of the cabinet positions allocated to group i, 
and y, which is the share of the population of group i in the total population. The above index ranges 
between 0 and 1, where 0 denotes a perfectly-apportioned cabinet where the demographic weight of 
an ethnic group is matched to held seats out of the total size in cabinet, and 1 denotes a highly 
malapportioned case as one or more groups hold many more positions than their relative demographic 
weight suggests they should.  
 
8.3.4 Measure of Volatility  
ACPED’s monthly tracking of senior government activity confirms that African cabinets can be 
extremely volatile, with several reshuffles and alterations occurring within a single year. 
Consequently, who and where is included and excluded within a cabinet can shift dramatically over a 
short period of time. In select cases, the values of ethnic representation and/or malapportionment 
increased or declined sharply following a large-scale cabinet reshuffle, such as the negative change in 
representation between October and November 1997 in Nigeria (-64 percent). We estimate the effects 
of volatile cabinet in the following way: for each country and month, we calculate the deviation of 
cabinet size, defined as the number of ministers, from the long-term average (1997–2016) and divide 
this score by the standard deviation of cabinet size. The variable Volatility takes the value of 1 if the 
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number of ministers is considerably above or below average (greater than two standard deviations 
above or below the long-term mean), and 0 otherwise.85  
 
8.3.5 African Political Settlements 
Table 8.1 offers descriptive statistics for Representation, Malapportionment, and Volatility variables. 
The mean level of representation is 85.5%, providing robust affirmation that African governments 
generally represent their populations. Yet, representation is volatile and varying. For example, the 
lowest level of representation is registered for Mali during April 2012 (8 percent) and April 2011 (15 
percent), which preceded the onset of the civil war that affected the north of the country in 2012. The 
mean level of malapportionment in African cabinets is equal to 25 percent, indicating that, on average, 
25 percent of a country’s represented ethno-political population are over or underrepresented. The 
highest malapportionment value (50 percent) of the sample is in Tanzania during August 1998. The 
Pearson Correlation coefficient between Representation and Malapportionment is not high (-0.163), 
suggesting that these measures do not capture a dual latent dimension or collinearity. On the other 
hand, the mean value of Volatility is 0.025; a total of 86 country-months within the sample had a 
volatile cabinet whose size is significantly reduced or enlarged relative to the long-term average.  
 
Table 8.1: Summary Statistics for Explanatory Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Representationt-1 0.855 0.121 0.230 1.000 
Malapportionmentt-1 0.247 0.076 0.047 0.498 
Volatilityt-1 0.025 0.157 0.000 1.000 
 
Figure 8.2 offers a more detailed picture of the cross-country variation of representation and 
malapportionment scores by state. Observations located in the bottom-right part of the graph include 
states characterized by high levels of inclusion and well-apportioned cabinets (low 
malapportionment). These cases are a contrast to those in the upper left quadrant (e.g., Uganda and 
Liberia), which exclude some segments of their ethnic population and have higher levels of 
malapportionment. Moving towards the upper right are states with both high representation and 
malapportionment levels. States such as Tanzania, Cameroon, and Ivory Coast include most ethno-
political groups but distort elite power through allocating more positions to some group 
representatives over others. For example, in Tanzania, the Chagga group is the most overrepresented 
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group in the cabinet. This was pronounced during President Mpaka’s rule (who was not a Chagga), 
while President Kikwete’s Hehe group are often given more positions than their demographic weight 
during his tenure. Most African states are in the bottom right-hand position indicating that they are 
inclusive and allocate power proportionally across elites. Yet, there is significant variation over time 
even within these relatively inclusive, balanced cases.  
 




8.3.6 Research Design 
This study uses country-months as the unit of analysis. The conflict data came from the Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED) (Raleigh et al., 2010) whose political conflict 
data are distinguished by event characteristics and group(s) participating, with geographical location 
and date. The dependent variables are the number of conflict events for three distinct types of violence: 
1) rebels against the state; 2) political militias against the state; and 3) political militias against non-
state armed groups (rebels and political militias). ACLED is the sole conflict data project which allows 
for these types of interaction in political violence to be measured during and outside of typical ‘civil 
war’ periods in a systematic way. 
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These aggregations of conflict events are chosen so as to reflect how African conflict has shifted 
significantly in recent years. Rather than being characterized by civil wars fought by rebels and states, 
African political violence is now primarily clashes and attacks perpetrated by political and communal 
militias. These groups seek to influence the political trajectory of the state, rather than to replace it. 
As table 8.2 reports, about 35 percent of the state-month observations used in this study experience a 
civil war. In its place, the manifestation of political competition is in the use of militias as personal 
armies for politicians (e.g., Somali regional militias) to challenge voters or oppose candidates during 
election periods (e.g., Mungiki in Kenya), employing militias to challenge co-ethnics and possible 
intra-party competitors (e.g., Nigeria and South Africa), and the splintering of regime militias to 
challenge internal competitors (e.g., Zimbabwe ZANU-PF activity). For this reason, the conflicts 
considered here are focused on common agents and forms of political violence but allows for a wide 
consideration through using all acts involving state forces.  
 
Explanatory variables include measures of ethnic Representation, cabinet Malapportionment, and 
Volatility derived from ACPED. All of these variables are lagged by one month to reduce endogeneity 
bias, that is, to ensure that they are political traits preceding the occurrence of violent events. Cabinet 
data from 1997-2016 are included for the following states: Algeria, Cameroon, Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.87 This sample of 15 African states represents 
a range of regions, violence rates and types and institutional structures, and ultimately, the continent 
at large. Our argument stipulates that African governance challenges have arisen across institutional 
forms (e.g., complete autocracies, competitive autocracies, hybrid and democratizing states); the 
variation in both the type and scale of inclusion, and the absence or presence of conflict make this 
sample of states a robust test of the hypotheses.  
 
We include several control variables to capture factors that are known to influence conflicts through 
other channels. We control for the number of ministers (Cabinet Size) and discrete ethnicities 
represented within the cabinets (Ethnicities in Cabinet). According to Arriola (2009), a larger number 
of cabinet ministers is expected to lower the risk of internal revolt (e.g., coup d’état) by making the 
incumbent less dependent on the loyalty of any single elite group. We also expect that the number of 
ethnicities in cabinet may correlate with violence independently from power distributions (Alonso and 
Ruiz-Rufino 2007). Their inclusion allows an identification of the effect of the main explanatory 
variables of power distribution, while fixing the number of politicians or ethnic groups in the central 
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government. The Democracy variable captures the quality of democracy in African states and has 
been found to influence the onset and degree of armed conflicts in previous research (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 2004; Lacina, 2006). To measure the level of democracy, we utilize the Polity IV’s 
democracy index (Marshall and Jaggers, 2011). 
We also include the natural log of GDP per capita and Population as proxies for socioeconomic 
development and demographic conditions of the conflict state. Economic Growth is measured by 
dividing the current year’s GDP by the previous year’s GDP; this variable has been found to be a 
significant predictor of armed conflict, with increases in economic growth resulting in decreases in 
the risk of civil war (Alesina et al., 1996; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004; Choi and Kim, 2016).88 These 
variables are taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). Lastly, 
a dichotomous variable, Civil War, is included as this event creates large increases in violence 
independently from power distribution explanations. Civil War equals 1 if the country is engaged in 
a civil war that reaches at least 25 battle-related deaths within a given year based on the UCDP/PRIO 
Armed Conflict Dataset (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Table 8.2 provides summary statistics for control 
variables. 
Table 8.2: Summary Statistics for Control Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Cabinet Size 29.566 6.246 1.000 48.000 
Ethnicities in Cabinet 8.954 3.139 1.000 18.000 
Democracy 1.422 3.926 -6.000 9.000 
Log(GDP per capita) 6.367 0.781 4.631 8.624 
Economic Growth 4.187 9.373 -46.082 106.280 
Log(Population) 16.734 1.012 14.674 19.015 
Civil War 0.352 0.478 0.000 1.000 
 
Model. A negative binomial model with fixed effects tests the hypotheses and accounts for the discrete 
nature of the conflict variables.89 By adding country fixed effects, the benchmark model accounts for 
state invariant, unobserved characteristics that are likely to influence the average level of conflict 
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that the conditional negative binomial regression for panel data is “not a true fixed-effects method” and does 




within a state, such as historical grievances and geographic characteristics (e.g., mountainous terrain, 
natural resource endowments). We estimate models with bootstrap standard errors based on 1,000 
replications and country-level resampling clusters.  
 
8.4 Results: Allocation of Power and Conflict 
Table 8.3 presents coefficients and standard errors from the empirical tests of conflict events for three 
distinct types of violence: rebels against the state (models 1a/b/c), militias against the state (model 
2a/b/c), and militias against non-state armed actors (model 3a/b). In model 1a, the impact of ethnic 
representation on rebel violence is found insignificant, and with an unexpected positive sign. This 
result runs contrary to a common view among policy makers and academics that ethnicity based 
exclusion from state power is a principal source of civil war (H1) (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer 
2013). In model 1b, which contains a full set of explanatory variables, we find that cabinet 
malapportionment is a significant and strong predictor of rebel violence against the state. When the 
score of Malapportionment increases from 0 to .5, the level of anti-state violence by rebels is expected 
to increase by about 400 percent, holding other variables constant. Given that African states generally 
practice inclusive representation today, the main factor in cross-national variation of rebel violence is 
not ethnic exclusion but distorted distribution of elite power. Meanwhile, increases in cabinet 
volatility are not associated with rebel violence.  
Figure 8.3: Expected number of rebel violence against the state90 
 
                                                          




Table 8.3: Impact of Representation, Malapportionment and Volatility on different types of violence 
 1a 1b 1c 2a 2b 2c 3a 3b 
Variables Rebels vs. Government Militias vs. Government Militias vs. Non-state actors  





 (0.962) (0.937) (2.284)***  (0.588)*** (1.776)  (0.976) 
Malapportionmentt-1  8.184 38.374 2.020 1.794 -13.220  3.685 
  (0.982)*** (7.125)*** (0.798)** (0.848)** (6.775)*  (1.203)*** 
Volatilityt-1  0.022 -0.351  -0.106 0.019 1.714 1.568 
  (0.405) (0.461)  (0.513) (0.547) (0.363)*** (0.351)*** 
RepresentationⅹMalapportionment   -34.144   16.344   
   (8.103)***   (7.490)**   
Cabinet Size 0.008 0.021 0.004 0.023 0.021 0.025 -0.019 -0.014 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.010)** (0.012) (0.012) 
Ethnicities in Cabinet -0.213 -0.143 -0.119 -0.040 -0.073 -0.065 0.117 0.145 
 (0.046)*** (0.045)*** (0.048)** (0.037) (0.034)** (0.037)* (0.047)** (0.044)*** 
Democracy -0.323 -0.305 -0.279 -0.044 -0.049 -0.047 -0.124 -0.116 
 (0.030)*** (0.031)*** (0.030)*** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.019)** (0.029)*** (0.028)*** 
Log(GDP per capita) 1.046 0.984 0.857 0.303 0.307 0.323 -0.880 -0.836 
 (0.225)*** (0.218)*** (0.229)*** (0.129)** (0.126)** (0.134)** (0.205)*** (0.204)*** 
Economic Growth -0.025 -0.015 -0.017 0.003 0.001 -0.000 0.022 0.023 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.013)* (0.011)** 
Log(Population) 1.480 1.806 2.152 2.633 2.567 2.524 3.638 3.866 
 (0.683)** (0.661)*** (0.682)*** (0.598)*** (0.586)*** (0.607)*** (0.746)*** (0.743)*** 
Civil War    0.861 0.827 0.827 0.939 0.913 
    (0.162)*** (0.160)*** (0.160)*** (0.147)*** (0.151)*** 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -29.137 -35.697 -48.041 -47.500 -47.377 -43.336 -56.606 -60.659 
 (10.026)*** (9.867)*** (10.659)*** (9.220)*** (9.014)*** (9.468)*** (11.169)*** (11.067)*** 
Akaike information criterion 8619.38 8537.83 8514.73 7349.02 7344.96 7339.39 4758.73 4749.23 
Number of Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 




Model 1c repeats the second model but tests for an interaction between Malapportionment and 
Representation by including the multiplicative term of the two variables. The coefficient on 
Malapportionment   Representation is negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, 
indicating that the effect of cabinet malapportionment on rebel violence is maximized when the degree 
of ethnic representation is low. Figure 8.3, which is based on Model 1c, plots the predicted number of 
rebel events based on two sets of explanatory variables, holding other variables at their means. Overall, 
higher levels of ethnic representation serve as a moderating channel to alleviate the effects of 
malapportioned cabinet on rebel violence.     
Figure 8.4: Expected number of militia violence against the state 
 
 
Model 2a shows that an increase in intra-cabinet malapportionment is associated with an increase in 
militia violent events against the state, lending support to H2. When Malapportionment changes from 
0 to .5, the number of anti-state militia violence increases by about 100%, holding other variables 
constant. This is consistent with our expectation that anti-state violence by militias will increase as a 
result of elite competition or in response to the rising level of ethnic imbalance in senior government 
positions. In model 2b, the coefficient on Representation is also positive and significant at the 1% level. 
This suggests that high levels of ethnic representation create more fertile breeding grounds for 
competing elites to challenge the state. Further, model 2c shows a significant interaction between 
Malapportionment and Representation, which indicates that the positive effect of cabinet 




ethnic groups. Figure 8.4 displays the predicted number of militia violence against the state as a function 
of two explanatory variables, holding other variables at their means. We observe an effect of ethnic 
imbalance in high representation regimes (Representation = 1); as malapportionment gets higher, so 
does the risk of anti-state violence by militias. 
Figure 8.5: Expected number of militia violence against non-state actors 
 
 
In model 3a, the coefficient for Volatility is statistically significant for militia violence against non-state 
actors (p< .01), providing support for H3. In model 3b, higher levels of Malapportionment have a 
strong, positive influence on violence among non-state actors, while Representation fails to exhibit any 
substantive effect. This shows that an alternative modality of political violence ─ violent competition 
among non-state actors ─ tend to increase in African states that have ethnically inclusive but 
malapportioned government. Figure 8.5, which is based on model 3b, shows that a unit change in 
Volatility is expected to increase the number of militia violence against non-state actors by more than 
four times, holding other variables at their mean values. How can these findings be explained? When 
regimes include more varied groups and elites within senior levels of government, existing elites 
encounter increased competition and enjoy less secure leverage. In such cases, the strongest elites fight 
over the spoils, competing for more power to secure positions from large sectors of population who 
have new access. This is the reason for a close association between increasing cabinet volatility and 
non-state infighting, as has been confirmed in other studies of militia conflict (Raleigh 2016; Choi and 




elite co-existence: such a volatile policy is prone to multiple upsets between the regime and the growing 
number of elites to negotiate and deal with.  
 
The control variables provide additional insights. Larger Cabinet Size significantly increases the 
number of militia violence against the state. Higher numbers of ethnic groups in cabinet (Ethnicities in 
Cabinet) significantly decrease anti-state violence by rebels but increase violence among non-state 
actors. In addition, African countries with higher levels of Democracy are less likely to experience all 
types of violence. Higher levels of GDP per capita have significant, positive effects on anti-state 
violence by rebels or militias, while having a negative impact on violence between non-state groups. 
Economic Growth is negative and significant in model 1, implying that better economic performance 
and job growth decrease the number of rebel violence. Both types of militia violence - anti-state and 
inter-militia – tend to increase in times of Civil War where political militias often function as 
supplementary agents of violence for government or rebels. Lastly, larger Population increases the 
number of all conflict events.       
 
Our main findings are as follows: in African polities, higher levels of ethnic representation fail to 
prevent civil wars, but rather increase the risk of anti-state violence by political militias. The effect of 
ethnic representation on rebel violence is constrained by how cabinet positions are distributed across 
represented ethnic groups. Second, the inequality of power between included groups is a better predictor 
of which countries are at risk for political violence than is ethnic exclusion. This includes a 
malapportioned cabinet where one, or a few, select ethnic groups have dominant influence. Third, the 
risk of infighting among non-state actors increases in malapportioned regimes, especially following a 




Institutional changes from the early 1990s across Africa led to the decline of one party, autocratic 
governments and opened the political environment to competition. New elites entered government and 
the size of cabinets expanded significantly. But despite these changes, very few leaders have been 
removed through the ballot. The regime survival paradox is explained by the cohort surrounding leaders 
(De Mesquita, Siverson, and Woller, 1992; De Mesquita and Siverson ,1995; Goemans 2000a, 2000b; 
Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). However, the composition of elites in democratizing African states, 
and the survival of large and unwieldy governments who fail to deliver basic services, has received 





Here we argue that the link between conflict and representation has been unduly limited to exclusion 
and civil wars. But other modalities of political violence have increased while political inclusion has 
risen. How can this be explained through the framework on ‘exclusive violence’? We find that political 
violence is widespread across democratizing states because of ‘competitive clientelism’: where elites 
are vying for senior positions, and leaders are seeking to accommodate minimum winning coalitions, 
violence becomes a strategy of negotiation. Organized violence is, most commonly, a strategy of elites 
to increase power; it is directed against regimes and other elites. It is also mainly a practice amongst 
those who already have power through senior positions in government. 
These findings suggest that power politics, or ‘realpolitik’ principles, are apt representations of elite 
competition across African states. Leaders, and their regimes by extension, are engaged in a two-level 
game: leaders will appoint elites to the cabinet from a large swathe of the population, maximizing 
‘representation’ and ‘inclusivity’, and providing enough rents and positions to potential spoilers. This 
is necessary for legitimacy, consolidation of authority and influence across the state. However, there 
are consistent levels of malapportionment in the cabinet, and higher levels of imbalance in elite 
representation increase the risk of violence against the state. This suggests that ‘dissatisfied’ elites may 
engage in anti-state violence for greater access to state power and resources. Therefore, ethnic 
imbalance creates conflict, but rarely challenges leaders.  
 
Mal-apportioned cabinet may result from leaders’ strategy to reward electorally pivotal groups (or 
swing groups). In Africa’s emerging democracies, electoral competition exists alongside clientelistic 
exchanges (Weghorst and Lindberg, 2013). Leaders in these new democracies can buy political support 
by distributing more resources to ‘swing’ groups than to ‘loyal’ or ‘opposition’ ones.91 Loyal groups 
(e.g., regime co-ethnics) have limited influence to press the regime to offer more as their loyal support 
is guaranteed rather than used as effective leverage. Opposition groups (e.g., separatists or those with a 
history of armed rebellion against the government) may require unacceptable levels of accommodation 
or be unresponsive to redistributions of welfare; hence they should receive few benefits. On the other 
hand, swing groups are most likely to won over by clientelistic goods. These elites contest the regime 
to signal a negotiation, but also contest between each other to vie for greater local authority and power 
to leverage against the regime. These elites benefit the most from political bargaining within patronage 
systems.   
 
Zimbabwe’s new cabinet after the 2018 election offers a good example of malapportionment (Raleigh 
and Morris, 2018). Although the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) 
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Londregan (1996), and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) ― argue that leaders can purchase votes by allocating 




secured a two-thirds majority in the house of assembly, margins of victory were not large in most 
districts. Especially, three of the ZANU-PF’s traditional heartlands ― Manicaland, Mashonaland East 
and West ― turned into swing provinces. Since these areas are crucial for the consolidation of power, 
President Emmerson Mnangagwa allocated key cabinet posts to elites from swing provinces, and the 
distribution was markedly different from the last Mugabe government. For example, Manicaland elites 
secured several high value appointments, including Defence and War Veterans Affairs Minister, Home 
Affairs Minister, Minister of Information, and Deputy Minister for Information Technology and Courier 
Services. Elites from Mashonaland East and West secured positions in the ministries of Agriculture, 
Energy, Transport, Justice, Tourism and Mines. Despite being densely populated, both Bulawayo and 
Harare elites have little representation in the new cabinet. 
 
To conclude, a leader is closely dependent on the correct balance of co-opted subnational elites. But a 
leader’s correct balance is not necessarily one that is fair. Strategies employed to generate a compliant 
coalition and cabinet are not likely to be stable or peaceful. Regimes across African states have managed 
to include great numbers of ethno-political communities, expand and retract cabinets frequently, and 
withstand variable levels and modalities of political violence, both against the state and between elites. 
These factors underscore that competitive clientelism is a core feature of African politics, despite 
violence or mis-representation. Further, it reinforces the importance of subnational elites as critical 
political figures within African politics and as objects of study amongst scholars seeking to understand 
the changing dynamics of violence across the continent.  
 
To that end, this expanded understanding of domestic politics in African states – and the strategies of 
power accumulation across politically relevant groups and elites – differs considerably from the ‘ethnic 
exclusion’ model that is frequently referenced in conflict literature. As conflict has changed to reveal 
increasing state violence, militias, and elite manipulation of violent agents, investigations of how 
domestic politics promotes these trends are compelling: subnational elites are flexible in their 
associations with leaders and regimes, often crossing ethnic and regional lines. The result is often a 
coalition that is pragmatic, rather than limited by identity politics. However, the leverage of elites is 
constantly in flux relative to other elites and the leader. This, in turn, affects their ability to negotiate 
their relevance with the regime. The regime is subject to constant political recalibration of which 
violence is a strategy, rather than an indication of government breakdown.  
In competitive clientelism, violent strategies are closely associated with included elites, rather than 
marginalized communities. Pursuing armed, organized violence is a strategy of those with the means 
and ability to generate significant pressure on the regime; smaller and excluded groups are limited in 




and coalitions. To that end, conflict is not due to a breakdown in competitive clientelism; it is often a 






























9.1 Project Aim, Question and Sub Questions 
The aim of this thesis is to address the following question:   
Does the composition of the senior government represent the distribution of political power in African 
states? 
This overarching question is broken down into several sub-questions. 
 
9.1.1 How to Measure Representation in the Senior Government? 
This question covers the decision over which branches of senior government to investigate and what 
metrics of representation to employ.   
This research project opted to focus on the executive branch of government, due to the concentration 
of political power within the executive in Africa (Prempeh, 2007; Francois et al., 2015; McKie and 
Van de Walle, 2010), but also because the cabinet members are directly appointed rather than elected, 
providing insight into the leader’s decision making process on elite power-sharing. A large existing 
body of literature uses cabinet as an approximation of the regime’s clientelist network, ethnic 
representation and power brokers (Arriola, 2009; Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 2011b; Kroeger, 
2018; Francois et al., 2015). This research project built upon these works by creating a more detailed 
and disaggregated dataset on cabinet ministers. 
The research project investigates changes in cabinet composition over time using several metrics 
including size, ethnic composition, regional composition and party composition. Given the centrality 
that ethnicity is ascribed in African politics (Chabal and Daloz, 1999) and the role of elites as ethnic 
‘super-representatives’ (Arriola, 2009; De Mesquita et al., 2005), the ethnic composition of the 
cabinet took a central role in many of the chapters of this research project. 
 
9.1.2 What Factors Effect the Distribution of Power? 
To examine how cabinets reflect the distribution of power, factors which affect the distribution of 
power need to be isolated. The research project identified external factors and events which the 
existing literature argues should alter the power sharing calculations of the leader and the political 
decisions of the elite to investigate if these showed any correlation with changes in the composition of 
cabinets. The selected factors were ethnic demography, economic performance, regime strength, 





9.1.3 Do These Factors Explain Variance in Senior Government Patterns of Representation? 
The historical record shows that coalitions are not static: many African regimes experience regular 
changes in the elite through standard reshuffles, purges, transitory coalitions of convenience and 
rebellions. Africa includes a broad range of regimes spanning dominant party systems, military junta, 
personalist dictators and highly competitive systems with multiple viable coalitions (Marshall et al., 
2002; Coppedge et al., 2018; Schedler, 2013; Wahman et al., 2013). This project demonstrates that the 
variance in elite power-sharing strategies is at least partly explained by different distributions of 
political power. This is achieved through using a mixture of quantitative and qualitative methods to 
show how cabinets vary according to ethnic demography, economic performance, regime strength, 
opposition strength, elections and public unrest.  
A review of the findings in the previous chapters demonstrates how different factors within countries 
contribute to the diversity in political arrangements witnessed across the continent and how the 
composition of cabinets reflect varying political stresses and opportunities. While the composition of 
cabinets cannot provide information on all aspects of elite politics, this project has demonstrated that 
it does provide a good representation of the distribution of power within an African state. Given the 
level of detail and extensive coverage in the ACPED data, it is one of the best estimators of the 
distribution of political power across Africa during a period of significant change in regime 
characteristics and institutional forms. 
 
9.2 Chapters 
9.2.1 Ethnic Arithmetic or Political Calculus 
Ethnicity is commonly treated as a key factor influencing the distribution of political power in the 
African state (Ndegwa, 1997; Mhlanga, 2012; Berman, 1998; Rothschild, 1995; Szeftel, 2000; Azam, 
2001; Langer, 2005), to the degree that ethnic heterogeneity has been used as a proxy for estimating 
the topography of political competition and patronage networks (Posner, 2004a). Yet this literature 
has two weaknesses: that it focuses mainly on patterns of exclusion rather than patterns of power-
sharing and that it fails to account for volatility in elite power-sharing arrangements. 
This project finds that elite power sharing arrangements are not simply a reflection of a state’s ethnic 
demography.  While regimes tend to grant most of the main ethno-political blocs some level of 
inclusion within the senior government, cabinet posts are not shared proportionately between the 
different groups. Leaders over and underrepresent different ethnic groups within the cabinet, 
demonstrating that while African cabinets rarely fit the stereotype of exclusive ethnocracies, certain  




why, and whether these imbalances reflect imbalances of political power between different ethnic 
constituencies.  
Secondly, the project finds that the ethno-political hierarchy is volatile in some states, with formerly 
underrepresented groups coming to dominate the cabinet and vice-versa. This demonstrates that the 
political calculations of leaders and regimes are liable to change based on changes in the distribution 
of political power. This finding then raises the question of what events or other political factors cause 
leaders and regimes to change their strategies of elite power sharing, including how power is shared 
amongst ethic groups, and whether these shifts in representation reflect shifts in political power. The 
following chapters explore these questions.  
 
9.2.2 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility 
This chapter is the first to investigate whether specific factors, which are deemed to affect the 
distribution of political power, lead to visible changes in the composition of the cabinet. The factors 
studied in this chapter include regime strength, economic performance and whether there is an 
upcoming election. Existing literature on African politics largely agrees on the importance of state 
largess in coalition building (Arriola, 2009; Szeftel, 2000; Lindemann, 2008; Berman, 1998) and 
elections are often seen as potential flashpoints for upheaval (Schedler, 2013). But how these 
flashpoints affect leader or regime strategies of elite management is understudied.   
Logistic regressions find that cabinets are not necessarily more volatile during these stress periods:  
mass changes of personnel do not occur with more regularity during periods of weak economic 
growth and are, in fact, less common in the run up to elections. Nevertheless, permutation tests 
demonstrated that these stress periods do exert an influence on how leaders organise their cabinet, 
dependent on the strength of a regime.  
Competitive regimes, which are more vulnerable to external competition, create larger and more 
ethnically proportionate cabinets in the run up to elections to dampen the attraction of opposition 
parties.  Leaders in hegemonic regimes do the opposite, creating more ethnically malapportioned 
cabinets in pre-election periods, with the leader’s co-ethnics dominating the inner circle. This reflects 
the power dynamic in hegemonic regimes, where the real competition happens within the regime, 
often during electoral primaries, meaning leaders need to elevate their own supporters within the 
ruling coalition.  
Leaders in competitive regimes contract their cabinet, making them smaller and less ethnically 
representative, during economic slumps because there are less resources to share with elites. 





This chapter demonstrates how different combinations of regime strength and external conditions 
influence the variety of elite power-sharing arrangements seen across Africa. The chapter provides 
evidence that strategies of elite power-sharing co-vary with external events which change the 
distribution of political power and the distribution of posts in the senior government. It therefore 
supports the argument that the senior government is an effective means of estimating the topography 
of political power in African states.  
9.2.3 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains 
This chapter examines cabinet volatility post-elections to determine whether power-sharing strategies 
vary based on different power relationships between the regime and the electoral opposition. It does 
this by examining post-electoral cabinet reshuffles to show how different power relationships between 
the regime and the opposition result in leaders opting to engage in two different strategies frequently 
mentioned in the Africanist literature: the politics of the belly and the politics of co-option.  
African regimes are described as both exclusionary, focused on cultivating the support of co-ethnics 
and loyal constituents, and broad-based coalitions which engage in co-option to minimise dissent 
(Dollbaum, 2017; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Lindemann, 2011b; Van de Walle, 2007; Langer, 2005; 
Posner, 2007; Ndegwa, 1997). But the contexts which motivate leaders or regimes to favour one 
strategy over the other remain understudied. Chapter four (Ethnic Arithmetic and Political Calculus) 
showed that regimes are rarely ethnically exclusive but that different groups are over or 
underrepresented at different points: this chapter demonstrates how political circumstances can lead to 
leaders promoting or demoting different groups.   
Repeated out-of-sample non-parametric tests showed that leaders in competitive regimes co-opt ethnic 
groups affiliated with the opposition when democratic challengers are strong but if the opposition is 
fragmented, they capitalise on the opportunity to boost the representation of their co-ethnics. Leaders 
in hegemonic regimes also tend to grant more cabinet representation to opposition co-ethnics when 
facing a cohesive opposition, though this does not happen via immediate post-election reshuffles. This 
shows that hegemonic regimes also need to mitigate opposition threats with co-option and use the 
opportunity posed by a fragmented opposition to engage in the politics of the belly, but that these 
strategies are implemented on a slower timescale. 
The main contribution of this chapter is that it contextualises popularly cited regime strategies as 
responses to the political environment.  Regime strategies of prioritising co-ethnics or co-opting 
dissident groups are often treated unconditional traits of African regimes in the existing literature 
(Jackson and Rosberg, 1984; Van de Walle, 2007; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This chapter also 
provides robust evidence that political circumstances influence how leaders prioritise different groups 





9.2.4 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa 
This chapter provides a more in-depth examination of how elite power-sharing strategies are adapted 
by the regime or the leader to counter specific types of political threat. It introduces the concept of 
‘crisis cabinets’, where leaders instigate widespread reshuffles outside of the procedural cabinet 
changes which occur post-election. This chapter defines these reshuffles as occasions where more 
than half the cabinet is removed. By isolating cases of crisis cabinets over the past decade, the 
research found that these non-routine reshuffles were generally made after specific political crises or 
transitions. These crises included coups, factional infighting and mass protests.  
Focussing on dramatic reshuffles made in response to mass protests, this chapter showed that although 
mass protests rarely prompt regimes to create crisis cabinets, in specific circumstances protests can 
have a major impact on the distribution of power in senior government.  In response regimes create 
crisis cabinets defined by a high turnover in personnel, the dismissal of longstanding regime elites and 
a boost in the representation of protest hotspots. This chapter demonstrates how leaders and regimes 
seek to mollify public discontent through a mass influx of new elites into the power-sharing bargain. 
This chapter also shows that different regime types are vulnerable to different threats, with more 
autocratic regimes being highly vulnerable to protest while more democratic regimes are 
comparatively immune.  This again demonstrates how different configurations of regime traits and 
external threats require leaders or regimes to engage in different survival strategies and forms of elite 
power-sharing.  
A qualitative investigation of the political and historical context of the three protest-motivated crisis 
cabinets, shows that they all occur when protests cause a rupture within the regime elite. This could 
explain why some protests lead to crisis cabinets and a major reshaping of the elite power sharing 
bargain and others do not. Much of the current literature on volatility at the senior government level 
focusses on intra-elite rivalries (Albertus, 2012; Albertus and Menaldo, 2012; Roessler, 2011; 
Lindemann, 2011). But this chapter demonstrates how external events can cause leaders, regimes and 
regime elites to alter their political calculations and perceive previously stable power-sharing bargains 
as unsustainable.   
In the case of Tunisia, the internal rupture led to the fall of the regime and the exile of the leader. In 
Ethiopia, the rupture in the elite caused a reformist faction within the regime to gain dominance and 
reconfigure the power-sharing arrangement. In Guinea, the protests weakened the perceived strength 




This chapter contributes to the core question of this thesis by showing how acute political crises, 
which dramatically change the balance of power in a country through exposing public discontentment 
with the regime, result in dramatic changes in the cabinet. 
 
9.2.5 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes 
This chapter examines how different types of threat and political violence emerge from different 
power sharing arrangements. It expands upon the current literature’s focus on ethnic exclusion and 
state vs rebel civil wars to show that both included and excluded communities engage in political 
violence to put pressure on the regime (Østby, 2008; Buhaug et al., 2008; Roessler, 2011).  Chapter 
four shows that African regimes are rarely exclusive ethnocracies. Furthermore, recent studies on 
political violence in Africa show that non-rebel violence, such as political militia activity, accounts 
for a large portion of violent events (Raleigh, 2016).  
Quantitative tests demonstrated several key findings. Firstly, higher levels of ethnic representation do 
not necessarily prevent civil wars. Instead, the inequitable apportionment of cabinet posts among 
ethnic groups, rather than outright exclusion, increases the likelihood of anti-state rebel violence. 
Secondly, highly representative but malapportioned cabinets result in a higher level of anti-state 
violence by political militias, typically acting on behalf of elite interests. Lastly, higher levels of 
volatility in the cabinet increased the risk of infighting among non-state actors. 
This chapter presents two key contributions. Firstly, the results show that violence is not restricted to 
marginalised communities but also includes elites and communities at the centre of the regime’s 
power-sharing bargain. This runs contrary to a common view that ethnic exclusion from state power is 
a principal source of political violence (Cederman et al. 2010; Wimmer 2013). This finding is 
important as chapter three shows that while exclusive ethnocracies are a rarity in African states, the 
allocation of posts is frequently unbalanced. Instead, the analysis presents a more nuanced picture in 
which violence is used as a tool of competition within the political hierarchy. 
Secondly, multiple studies argueelites employ violence to alter the distribution of power and therefore 
alter their place within the elite power-sharing settlement (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Raleigh, 2016; 
Mehler, 2007). That different traits and changes in the cabinet significantly changes the level and type 
of political violence indicates that cabinets are reflective of the distribution of political power. 
 
9.3 Limitations 
The main limitation of this study is firstly that the ACPED dataset only records a certain subsection of 




by which to forge an intra-elite bargain (Roessler, 2011; Bratton and Van De Walle, 1994; Lindemann, 
2011a; Lindemann, 2011b; Rothchild, 1995; Arriola, 2009).  Moody Stuart (1997) found that 
throughout the global south ministers represent the first tier below heads of state in terms of influence 
that can be bought and generally cost ten times as much to bribe as the next highest level, permanent 
secretaries. This high cost of bribery is indicative of the degree to which ministers can politically or 
economically advantage those within their patron-client network.  
However, the cabinet is not an exhaustive record of relevant elites and the historical record points to 
many influential elite actors occupying positions outside of the cabinet. Many notable anti-government 
rebels have been drawn from the ranks of the military, such as Paul Rwarakabije of the Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda and Francoise Bozize in CAR, or from the middle civil service or 
regional executives, such as Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed of the Justice and Equality Movement in Sudan 
or Charles Taylor of Liberia. Coup leaders are most frequently drawn from the military rather than the 
executive, for example Idi Amin of Uganda, Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo and Mathieu Kerekou of 
Benin. In some cases, more junior members of the government have proven important. Ahmed Gaid 
Salah, who pressured Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika to resign during the 2019 Algerian 
protests, occupied a junior post in the Ministry of Defence. Governors have proven to be influential in 
securing funds and support for regimes, including President Buhari’s 2015 victory (Kenhammer, 2010; 
Africa Confidential, 2015b). Other studies focussed on one or two countries have typically included not 
just cabinet posts but the senior ranks of the military and civil service (Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 
2011b; Woldense, 2018).  
Another limitation in the data is that the title of a ministerial portfolio may not reflect the actual 
influence the minister wields. For example, during the Zimbabwean unity government of 2008-2013, 
the opposition controlled the finance ministry. The ruling ZANU-PF controlled the ministry of mines, 
which functioned as a de facto treasury outside of the reach of the official finance ministry (Boosyen, 
2014). Eventually finance minister Tendai Biti had to plead state bankruptcy and seek aid from the 
international community while President Mugabe and ZANU-PF retained control over an important 
stream of patronage. The ACPED database tries to remain consistent in its assessment of ministry 
importance but cannot account for willful subterfuge which clandestinely reallocates political power 
and influence between ministries. 
Most of these limitations stem from time constraints and are due to this research project’s focus on 
large-N comparable analysis. The project was unable to analyse how the different branches of the 
state – the junior executive, the judiciary, the security services and the legislature – reflect the 
distribution of political power. Other projects within the VERSES and GEOPV projects – which 
funded this thesis – focus on creating an ‘elite census’ of influential figures across all branches of 





9.4 Contributions and Implications for Future Research 
Despite these limitations, the previous chapters demonstrate convincingly that the senior government 
reflects the distribution of political power at any given moment. The question is then how these 
findings aid our understanding of the core themes within the African governance literature.  
Political survival, or at least the maintenance of political order, remains a priority in practically all 
states across the globe, which allowed this research project to borrow heavily from the literature on 
elite bargaining, leadership survival and cabinet creation outside Africa. This has included a cross 
section of literature that analyses regimes in Latin America (Martinez-Gallardo, 2014; Camerlo and 
Perez-Linan, 2015), Europe (Indridason and Kam, 2008; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo; 2008; 
Dollbaum, 2017), the Middle East (Josua and Edel, 2015; Lust-Okar, 2004), Asia (Barraclough, 1985) 
and studies which cut across all regions (Miller, 2015; De Mesquita et al., 2005; Schedler, 2013; Choi 
and Kim, 2018; Wimmer et al., 2009).  
However politics in Africa is frequently portrayed as uniquely unstable, as demonstrated by the 
continent’s prevalence of coups and civil wars (Decalo, 1989; Arriola, 2009), and lack of economic or 
human development (Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Kramon and Posner, 2016; Lindemann, 2011b). 
‘African’ states are often grouped, or treated as exceptional, due to shared political histories of rapid 
colonisation and decolonisation, cultural heterogeneity and pluralism, and high levels of poverty and 
stunted human development (Fourie et al., 2017). Consequently, Africa’s diverse array of polities is 
often subject to overarching statements, which inevitably leads to arguments and contradictions within 
the literature. A key contribution of the research project is that it demonstrates empirically how some 
of these contradictions can be explained by varying political contexts and distributions of power. 
An example is how this project resolves some of the contradictions in the literature on ethnic 
representation and exclusion. African regimes have been characterised as both exclusionary winner-
takes-all ethnocracies and broad-based co-optative coalitions. Yet, while each of these 
characterisations is accurate for specific states at specific times, they obscure the variety demonstrated 
across and within the countries examined in this research project.  
This project finds that most regimes represent most ethno-political blocs, but which blocs are 
represented is subject to change based on political factors such as economic conditions and regime 
strength. Similarly, just because ethnic groups are included in the cabinet does not mean that they are 
fairly represented. Leaders still judiciously choose which relevant groups to give prominence to in 
their regime and which groups to grant ‘tokenistic’ representation. Again, this decision is guided by 




Generalisations in the literature on African governance seem undermined by the actual variety of 
regimes and power-sharing strategies employed across the continent, raising  the key question of 
whether there is one or many Africas and whether one can talk about ‘African politics’ without being 
misleading (Allen, 1995). 
This project shows that common themes in the literature on African politics - subnational identities, 
patronage and the personalised links between elites and communities – do not fully explain the 
diversity of elite settlements throughout Africa when studied in isolation. Instead, these factors 
interact with external events and elite ambitions to influence the power-sharing strategies and political 
survival calculations of leaders and regimes. Therefore, while the concept of ‘African politics’ or 
‘African governance’ does have merit, the reality shows that the strategies of power-sharing are 
nuanced. 
The project improves upon much of the existing literature on elite power-sharing and volatility in 
several ways. Firstly, existing large-N studies on representation in the senior government do not 
address how patterns can change in response to different political conditions (Arriola, 2009; Francois 
et al., 2015). Secondly, most of the literature addressing volatility within the government and elite 
primarily attributes patterns of change to intra-elite conflict and ambition (Jackson and Rosberg, 
1984; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Bayart, 1993; Berman, 1998; Reno, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997). This thesis 
demonstrates how external factors such as public discontent or economic performance influence the 
political calculations of the leader and regime elites, which in turn changes the distribution of power 
and results in changes in senior government composition. It is the relationship between the varying 
internal and external pressures on the regime which help to explain the observed variety of power-
sharing strategies seen across Africa. 
The other major contribution is the ACPED data itself. Chapter three shows the advantages ACPED 
offers over existing datasets, through its disaggregation by month and multiple forms of identity. 
Chapters’ four to seven provide examples of how ACPED can be used to identify how different 
circumstances affect the balance of subnational identities within the governing elite (chapter four and 
five deal with just ethnicity, chapter six deals with ethnicity and political affiliation and chapter seven 
deals with regional affiliation).  
This research project has covered just a few of the factors that could affect the size, composition and 
stability of the senior government. The existing literature shows many other political phenomena 
which could affect the composition of the senior government. Examples include the composition of 
the military (Lindemann, 2011b), whether the regime is supported by external patrons (Decalo, 1989), 
the reliance of the economy on taxation vs resource rents (De Mesquita et al., 2005) and the capacity 




The focus of this research project is on how political events influence elite power-sharing strategies. It 
does not assess how these strategies actually affect regime or leader survival. Much of the literature 
on coalition management and African governance argues that miscalculations about elite power-
sharing can quickly end in the regime or leader falling from power. Many of these studies rely on 
cruder measures such as EPR (Roessler, 2011; Roessler and Ohls, 2018), cabinet size (Arriola, 2009) 
or number of reshuffles per year (Albertus, 2012). More detailed studies tend to focus on one or two 
countries (Lindemann, 2011a; Lindemann, 2011b), meaning that larger trends across countries are 
extrapolated rather than observed and quantified. ACPED provides the means to create a detailed and 
comparative large-N analysis. The individual chapters of this thesis have demonstrated the variance of 
elite power-sharing strategies, but ACPED also provides the necessary data for future research to 
analyse the effectiveness of these different strategies. 
Existing studies on how the composition of government affects the distribution of patronage generally 
only focus on the leader (Franck and Rainer, 2012; Jablonski, 2014; Holder and Raschky, 2014). 
ACPED allows this relationship to be expanded to include other members of senior government – as 
seen in Kramon and Posner (2016) – and the influence of specific ministries on the distribution of 
public goods.  
A crucial, but untested, relationship in African politics is between an elite representative and their 
supposed constituency which is typically defined in ethnic, regional, party or religious terms (Chabal 
and Daloz, 1999; Ndegwa, 1997; Langer, 2005; Bratton et al., 2012). ACPED could be used to trace 
whether ethno-regional changes in the elite coalition can really influence the opinion of the 
subnational groups about the regime’s performance, inclusivity and fairness in the delivery of public 
goods and government services. 
This research project has sought to provide a reliable means of estimating the distribution of political 
power within a state. In attempting to fulfil this aim, this thesis has brought to the foreground factors 
which influence how leaders and regimes share power to ensure their political survival. These factors 
provide context for strategies of power-sharing and provide some explanation for the variety of 
regimes witnessed across Africa. This is especially important for a continent which is frequently 
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11.1 Literature Review 
 























11.2 Methodology and Data: the African Cabinet Political Elite Dataset 
 
Passage 1 – Methodology of assigning politically relevant ethnic categories 
We did not use a pre-formed ethnic list from which ministerial ethnicities were initially chosen. I 
researching the ethnic identity of ministers, we came across a large amount of political identities. Some 
of these identities referred to small ethnic groups, dialects and clans within ethnic groups, or branches 
of larger ethnic macro-groups. Those ethnic identities are noted as the ‘primary’ ethnic attribution in 
the ACPED dataset. 
At a second stage, we associated the identities of each minister reported to ‘macro-groups’ that come 
from existing ethnic rosters for each state.  This macro-group defines the association to a larger, 
political relevant community within the state. This decision was motivated Posner’s assertion that 
merely registering different ethnic groups provides not information on the salience of different ethnic 
cleavages within a state (for example Sri Lanka and Switzerland have similar levels of ethnolinguistic 
fractionalisation but very different ethno-political dynamics due to the salience of these identities). 
Further, while linguistic differences are common ways to assess the heterogeneity of African states, 
Africans often speak several languages and belong to multiple ethno-regional networks and other 
social categories (religious, livelihood etc.). Political identities are still often associated with ethnic 
association, but the ethnicity chosen as the dominant ‘political’ identity is based on a series of 
aggregation and strategic manoeuvring on the part on both the citizen and proposed representative. 
ACPED’s ministerial and macro identity groups are intended to show which ethnic identities or 
clusters of identities are ‘politically relevant’, allowing us to measure how leaders and regimes 
balance their cabinet to account for these different interests.  
To create a roster of macro-groups that incorporated realistic, robust and consistent interpretation of 
political identities, we generate lists from several complementary sources. Our primary source is the 
Scarritt and Mozaffar (2007) scaled identity list available as a supplement to an article on ethnic 
cleavages and ethno political groups. These data provide a list of disaggregated, and aggregated, 
communities in all countries, with details on the share of population for each group, their spatial 
clustering and a justification for coding clusters. We supplement when necessary with the GREG list of 
African groups (Weidmann, Rød, and Cederman, 2010), EPR (Wimmer et al., 2009) and Ethnologue. 
The process of assigning groups in the initial stages was completed using these datasets through creating 
a shapefile and seeing where ethnic categories matched Scarritt and Mozzafar’s (hereafter SM) 
classification system. All ethnic group spatial categories were created from three distinct sets. 
a. GEOEPR (large group but relatively poor coverage across Africa) 
b. GREG- good coverage, but not necessarily PREG 
c. Ethnologue- very good, disaggregated coverage but of linguistic communities and not 
PREGS 
These files were used to create a fishnet square (approximately 50km). Each ethnic community are 
defined by the three available files is grafted onto each square- therefore, initially each square has up to 
three possible ethnic designations. 
We then apply the following steps: 
1. If all datasets match and fall within an SM category, that is considered a macro-group. 
2. When Ethnologue has a group designation that is not a PREG macrogroup, we rely on the 
GREG or EPR designation. 
3. When GREG or EPR have a group that is either too aggregated or outside of the PREG 
designation made by SM, and ethnologue has the correct designation (or names a subgroup 





This process (hereafter ‘GISprocess’) was undertaken by Professor Clionadh Raleigh and Dr 
Giuseppe Maggio for the initial list of completed countries as the beginning of 2017: Algeria, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone, South Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
Increasingly, we began relying on the information of the country consultants who helped us find 
background information for the ministers. These would be cross-referenced with SM and EPR 
classifications. Discrepancies would be investigated and the country consultants would be asked for 
their opinion over what categorisations were appropriate. 
In many cases, the identity of the minister and the name of the macro-group are the same, however in 
other cases, we associated a disaggregated identity of the minister with a more aggregated category 
from a roster created by several relevant ethnic datasets. A list of macro-groups, their associated primary 
groups and their population is listed below in appendix table 1. 
 
Table 1 – Politically relevant macro-groups, associated ethnicities and population percentages 
Country Macro Group Population Associated Ethnic 
Groups 
Algeria Arab 72 Arab 
Berber 28 Berber 
Mozabite 
Tuareg 
Botswana Barolong 1.9 Barolong 
Kalanga 14.3 Kalanga 
Kgatla 5.2 Bakgatla 
Kwena 11.7 Bakwena 
Lete/Lokwa 3 Balete 
Ngwaketse 11.7 Bangwaketse 
Ngwato 33.3 Bamangwato 
Batalaote 
Other Tswana 0.9 Babirwa 
Batswapong 
Other 8 Afrikaner 
Bakgalagadi 
Bakhurutshe 
Tawana 7 Batawana 
Burundi Hutu 82.8 Hutu 
Tutsi 13.6 Tutsi 
Other 3.6 Ganwa 
Twa 
Cameroon Bamileke 23 Bamileke 
Bamoun 10 Bamum 







Beti 15 Beti 
Fang 









Gbaya 1 Gbaya 
Kanuri 1 Kanuri 
Kirdi 15 Maka 
Mandara 
Moundang 
North West 3 Tikar 
South West 3 Banyang 
Widekum 
Yambassa 













Fulani 1 Haoussa 
Mbororo 
Peuhl 










Mbum 7 Kare 
Ngbaka 4 Ngbaka 
















Yakoma 4 Yakoma 
Youlou 







Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Azande-Mangbetu 1 Azande 
Babwa 




Bemba-Enya-Lungu 2 Bemba 
Enya 
Lungu 
Hema-Lendu 1 Hema 
Lendu 
Hutu 2 Hutu 




Kwilu region 4 Mbata 
Luba-Kasai 7 Luba (dependent on 
regional background) 
Luba-Songe 
Luba Shaba 5 Luba (dependent on 
regional background) 
Luntu 
Lulua 5 Rega 
Songe 
Mongo 16 Mbole 
Mongo 
Nande 3 Nande 
Ngbaka 2 Ngbaka 
Ngbandi 2 Ngbandi 
Pende-Yaka 1 Pende 
Yaka 
Tetela-Kusu 8 Kusu 
Tetela 
Tutsi/Banyamulenge 1 Tutsi 








Ethiopia Afar 4.5 Afar 
Amhara 25 Amhara 
Banishangul/Gumez 3 Banishangul/Gumez 
Gambella 6 Gambella 
Harari 0.2 Harari 
Oromo 40 Oromo 
Somali 5.3 Somali 











Guinea Fulani 28 Fulani 
Kissi-Toma 4 Kissi 
Toma 
Kpelle 4 Kpelle 
Malinke 30 Konianke 
Malinke 
Susu 16 Susu 
Yalunka 
Other 18 Diakhanke 
Foulakounda 
Mano 
Ivory Coast Agni-Attle 7 Agni 
Attie 





Bete 9 Bete 




























Kenya Boran 1 Boran 
Coast 2 Coast 
Embu 2 Embu 
Gusii/Kisii 5 Gusii/Kisii 
Kalenjin 12 Kalenjin 
Kamba 10 Kemba 
Kikuyu 17 Kikuyu 
Luo 13 Luo 
Luhya 16 Luhya 
Masai 2 Masai 
Meru 5 Meru 
Mijikenda 4 Mijikenda 
Pokot 1 Pokot 




Turkana 2 Turkana 
Other 3 Kuria 
Taita 
Liberia Americo-Libs 2 Americo-Libs 
Bassa 15 Bassa 
Gbandi 4 Gbandi 
Gio 9 Gio 
Gola 6 Gola 
Grebo 11 Grebo 
Kissi-Toma 6 Kissi 
Kpelle 21 Kpelle 
Krhan 7 Krhan 
Kru 6 Kru 
Loma 4 Loma 
Mandingo 3 Mandingo 
Southern Mande 1 Dan 
Vai 4 Vai 
Other 1 Mano 
Other 
Malawi Chewa 28 Chewa 
Lhomwe 19 Lhomwe 
Ngoni 9 Ngoni 
Mananja-Nyanja 15 No records 






Yao 14 Yao 
Other 3 European 
Indian 
International 
Mali Arab 3 Arab 
Bambara 30 Bambara 
Bozo 3 Bozo 
Dogon 3 Dogon 





Peul-Fulani 14 Fulani 
Sarakole/Soninke 8 Soninke 
Songhai 6 Songhay 
Tuareg 8 Bellah 
Tuareg 
Other 1 Wolof 
Bobo (Bwa/Bwaba) 
Morocco Arab-Berber 99 Arab-Berber 
Rif 0.25 Riffian 
Sahrawi 0.25 Reguibat 
Shleuh 0.25 Chleuh 
Tamazinght 0.25 Tamazight 
Nigeria Edo 2 Edo 
Esan 
Fulani 4 Fulani 






Hausa-Fulani 3 Hausa and Fulani 
(together) 










Jukun 2 Jukun 


















Tiv 3 Tiv 
Yoruba 21 Baruba 
Uhrobo 
Yoruba 







Rwanda Hutu 15 Hutu 
Tutsi 84 Tutsi 
Sierra Leone Krio 3 Creole 
Fulani 7 Fulani 
Gola 1 Gola 
Kissi-Toma 3 Gola 
Kissi 
Kono 5 Kono 
Limba 8 Limba 
Loko 
Mandingo 3 Mandingo 
Mende 31 Mende 
Sherbro 3 Sherbro 
Susu 2 Sherbro 
Temne 34 Temne 





Coloured 9 Coloured 
Sotho-Twana 24 Tswana 





Swazi 2.5 Swazi 
Tsonga 4 Tsonga 
Venda 2 Venda 
White 12.5 Anglo 
Afrikaans 
Xhosa 18.5 Xhosa 
Zulu 24.5 Zulu 
Ndebele 
South Sudan Azande-Mangbetu 10 Azande 
Bari 1 Bari 
Bari Lobonok 
Didinga 1 Didinga 














Madi 1 Moru 
Murle 4 Murle 








Shilluk 5 Shilluk 
Toposa 8 Toposa 








Tanzania Chagga 3 Chagga 
Bena 3 Bena 
Gogo 5 Gogo 
Ha 4 Ha 
Haya 4 Haya 






Iraqw 2 Iraqw 
Iramba 2 Iramba 
Makonde 4 Makonde 
Masai 3 Masai 
Makua 2 Makua 
Ngindo 
Pare 2 Pare 
Nyambo 2 Nyambo 
Nyakyusa 3 Nyakyusa 
Nyamwese 3 Nyamwese 
Nyaturu 2 Turu 
Sukuma 20 Jita 
Sukuma 
Zinza 
Shambala 3 Bondei 
Shambala 
Yao-Mwera 2 Mwera 
Yao 
Zaramo 3 Kwere 
Zaramo 
Zigula 2 Zigula 
Zanzibar 2 Pimbwe 
Swahili 











Tunisia Arab-Berber 100 Arab-Berber 
Uganda Acholi 5 Acholi 
Ankole 10 Ankole 
Hororo 
Baganda 17 Ganda 
Bakonjo 1 Konjo 
Banyarwanda 5 Fumbira 
Banyoro 3 Nyoro 
Basoga 9 Soga 
Gisu 5 Gisu 
Gwere 1 Gwere 
Kakwa 2 Kakwa 
Karamojong 2 Karamojong 
Kiga 7 Kiga 
Langi 6 Langi 
Lugbara 4 Lugbara 
Madi 1 Madi 
Padhola 1 No records 
Sebei 1 Sabiny 
Teso 7 Teso 
Toro 3 Toro 




Zimbabwe Karanga 22 Karanga 
Korekore 9 Korekore 
Manyika 13 Manyika 
Ndau 3 Ndau 
Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga) 20 Ndebele 
Tonga 
White Zimbabwean 4 European 
Zezuru 18 Budya 
Zezuru 
Other Shona 8 No records 






























Table 2 – Ethnic categorisation and population sources 
Country Sources of Ethnic Categories Sources on Ethnic Populations 
Algeria GISprocess GISprocess 
Botswana All existing datasets do not mention 
relevant subtribes of the Tswana. 
Relevant ethnic categories were got 
from wider research and country 
consultant 
Rule, 1995 
Burundi Ganwa included as a separate ‘Other’ 
category. Other category also included 
in EPR. 
Alesina et al., 2003 




Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 Estimated between Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and 





Ethiopia Country consultant  Estimated between Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and 
Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 
Guinea Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 and 
Alesina et al., 2003 
Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 and Alesina et al., 
2003 
Ivory Coast Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 but 
‘Southern Mande’ added as a category 
due to ethnic categorisation in Langer, 
2005 
New calculations required given the addition of 
Southern Mande category 
GISprocess 
Kenya Scarrit and Mozafar, but Keyio, Nandi, 
Kipsigis and Tugen were deleted and 
considered subsections of the Kalenjin. 
Rendille was moved to ‘Other’ because 
of how small and insignificant on the 
national stage it 
Estimated between Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and 
Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999. I think your 
calculations using ethnologue/GREG counts also 
did it 
Liberia Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Scarritt 
and Mozzafar, 1999 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Scarritt and Mozzafar, 
1999 
Malawi Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 
Mali Country consultant and Scarritt and 
Mozzafar, 1999  
Added Bozo as discreet category and ‘Other’ 
category to capture groups such as the Wolof and 
Mossi, based on country consultant. Malinka and 
Duala combined based on country consultant. 
Scarrit and Mozzafar used otherwise 
 
Morocco GISprocess GISprocess 
Nigeria GISprocess GISprocess 
Rwanda EPR EPR 
Sierra Leone Fearon and Laitin, 2003 and Scarritt 
and Mozaffar, 1999 
I think again the population was estimated by you 
and Giuseppe, but conforms closely (but not 
identically) to Fearon and Laitain, 2003 and 
Alesina et al. 
South Africa Country Consultant Country Consultant and EPR 
South Sudan Country Consultant and EPR EPR 
Tanzania Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 and 
Fearon and Laitin, 2003  
Fearon and Laitin, 2003 
Tunisia GISprocess GISprocess 
Uganda Scarritt and Mozzafar, 1999 with 
changes: 
Konjo/Bakonjo and Bambaa are 
considered part of the Rwenzuru group 
GISprocess 
























Cabinet Size 6.46 40.09
Inner Circle Size 0.09 3.69
Outer Circle Size 5.29 35.36
Ethnic Representation 6.72 244.68
Ethnic Representation Inner Circle 27.66 512.5
Ethnic Representation Outer Circle 10.6 364.85
Regional Representation 31.87 469.77
Regional Representation Inner Circle 58.54 534.9
Regional Representation Outer Circle 41.08 586.15
Ethnic Disproprotion 4.08 94.09
Ethnic Disproprotion Inner Circle 1.41 111.56
Ethnic Disproprotion Outer Circle 2.38 97.49
Regional Disproprotion 0.74 45.02
Regional Disproprotion Inner Circle 8.2 106.64
Regional Disproprotion Outer Circle 1.43 58.45
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation 19.44 440.55
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Inner Circle 29.37 663.32
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Outer Circle 20.72 466.81
Leader Co-Regional Representation 33.45 203.85
Leader Co-Regional Representation Inner Circle 9.84 344.49
Leader Co-Regional Representation Outer Circle 40.26 226.94
No Of Parties 0.15 5.46
























Cabinet Size 3.25 25.03
Inner Circle Size 0.34 2.65
Outer Circle Size 2.04 23.43
Ethnic Representation 32.61 309.3
Ethnic Representation Inner Circle 127.91 442.76
Ethnic Representation Outer Circle 23.28 395.87
Regional Representation 132.22 337.51
Regional Representation Inner Circle 145.07 406.61
Regional Representation Outer Circle 148.71 399.9
Ethnic Disproprotion 81.75 68.99
Ethnic Disproprotion Inner Circle 51.08 134.51
Ethnic Disproprotion Outer Circle 78.43 79.8
Regional Disproprotion 6.27 35.49
Regional Disproprotion Inner Circle 28.56 71.98
Regional Disproprotion Outer Circle 5.89 41.97
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation 15.71 267.28
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Inner Circle 50.99 585.67
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Outer Circle 17.36 290.47
Leader Co-Regional Representation 6.74 140.55
Leader Co-Regional Representation Inner Circle 16.92 296.44
Leader Co-Regional Representation Outer Circle 7.3 155.64
No Of Parties 3 8.62
























Cabinet Size 0.75 46.95
Inner Circle Size 0.29 4.01
Outer Circle Size 0.12 42.99
Ethnic Representation 1.61 280.89
Ethnic Representation Inner Circle 3.25 610.42
Ethnic Representation Outer Circle 4.6 404.65
Regional Representation 25.07 467.42
Regional Representation Inner Circle 41.68 427.84
Regional Representation Outer Circle 23.33 577.99
Ethnic Disproprotion 7.86 112.47
Ethnic Disproprotion Inner Circle 3.51 142.76
Ethnic Disproprotion Outer Circle 4.82 117
Regional Disproprotion 0.1 46.35
Regional Disproprotion Inner Circle 1.26 108.35
Regional Disproprotion Outer Circle 0.33 61.98
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation 10.38 554.68
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Inner Circle 5.48 755.54
Leader Co-Ethnic Representation Outer Circle 9.76 580.04
Leader Co-Regional Representation 14.1 171.08
Leader Co-Regional Representation Inner Circle 5.3 332.62
Leader Co-Regional Representation Outer Circle 17.94 184.5
No Of Parties 1.86 5.31




11.3 Economic Performance, the Pre-Electoral Period and Cabinet Volatility 
 
Table 1 - Means Table by Regime Table 











Total Cabinet Size 26.523 1 47 6.773 26.004 5.751 27.524 8.311 
Inner Circle Size 7.168 1 13 2.040 6.890 1.841 7.703 2.285 
Outer Circle Size 19.352 0 36 6.444 19.114 5.378 19.812 8.096 
Representation 75.640 6.250 100 15.254 76.819 14.951 73.367 15.579 
Inner Circle 
Representation 
45.708 6.250 100 19.146 45.503 16.652 46.105 23.211 
Outer Circle 
Representation 
68.643 0 100 18.490 70.337 18.283 65.379 18.457 
Disproportion 
Cabinet 
24.920 7.850 51.167 7.893 25.078 7.735 24.617 8.182 
Disproportion 
Inner Circle 
27.765 1.167 67.933 8.986 27.713 8.045 27.865 10.567 
Disproportion 
Outer Circle 
25.610 7.074 100 8.264 25.506 8.575 25.811 7.628 
Leader Co-Ethnic 
Representation 








25.547 0 75 16.228 25.833 16.650 24.995 15.371 
GDP Growth 4.993 
-
36.700 
106.280 6.667 4.609 7.853 5.735 3.231 





94.159 7.475 -0.310 8.746 0.092 4.006 
Low Growth Year 0.213 0 1 0.410 0.225 0.418 0.191 0.393 
High Growth Year 0.247 0 1 0.431 0.233 0.423 0.274 0.446 
Below Mean 
Level Growth 
0.488 0 1 0.500 0.532 0.499 0.403 0.491 
Below Median 
Level Growth 
0.468 0 1 0.499 0.486 0.500 0.435 0.496 
Before Any 
Election 








0.196 0 1 0.397 0.206 0.404 0.178 0.383 
Any Reshuffle 0.146 0 1 0.353 0.167 0.373 0.106 0.309 
Major Reshuffle 0.056 0 1 0.229 0.062 0.241 0.043 0.204 



















All Data High vs 





All Data High 
vs Low Growth 
- Hegemonic 
Cabinet Size 0.017 0.011 0.110 0 0.931 0.005 
Disproportion 0 0.067 0 0 0.216 0.002 
Inner Circle 
Disproportion 
0.496 0.435 0.002 0 0.001 0 
Inner Circle Size 0.021 0.072 0.055 0.040 0.384 0.232 
Leader Co-Ethnic 
Representation 








0.617 0.019 0.280 0.004 0.714 0.867 
Outer Circle 
Disproption 
0 0.019 0 0.020 0.001 0.222 
Outer Circle Size 0.100 0.001 0.158 0 0.797 0.065 
Representation 0.561 0.176 0.611 0.306 0.232 0.819 
Representation 
Inner Circle 
0.021 0.274 0.055 0.011 0.384 0.251 
Representation 
Outer Circle 
0.044 0 0.222 0 0.155 0.239 
 
Table 3 – Independent variable correlations table 




– No Change 
In Leader 
After Election 










1 0.015 -0.127 -0.079 0.039 -0.090 
GDP Growth 0.015 1 0.007 0.070 -0.171 -0.135 
After Election – 
No Change In 
Leader 
-0.127 0.007 1 -0.109 -0.061 -0.040 
After Election – 
Change In 
Leader 





0.039 -0.171 -0.061 -0.019 1 0.182 
Unity 
Government 







Table 4 – Logistic Regression Base Model – All Regimes  















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Before Any Election -0.286 0.075 -0.781** -0.355 -0.267 -0.396 -0.295 
 (0.154) (0.121) (0.246) (0.246) (0.218) (0.254) (0.222) 
Growth Category - 
Low Growth 
0.358* 0.088 0.158 0.271 0.535* 0.106 0.511* 
 (0.171) (0.148) (0.249) (0.265) (0.248) (0.278) (0.248) 
Growth Category - 
High Growth 
0.050 -0.0005 -0.026 -0.099 0.171 0.059 0.061 
 (0.155) (0.128) (0.225) (0.246) (0.229) (0.249) (0.231) 
Constant -2.719*** -2.334*** -0.987*** -1.385*** -1.247*** -1.461*** -1.241*** 
 (0.133) (0.111) (0.192) (0.209) (0.199) (0.215) (0.199) 
Observations 4,536 4,536 708 712 712 712 712 
Log Likelihood -1,091.990 -1,387.423 -392.106 -347.686 -402.325 -340.011 -393.153 
























Table 5 - Volatility by Political Binaries and Economic Growth – Competitive Regimes 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Before Any Election -0.311 -0.055 -0.776* -0.232 -0.061 -0.076 0.043 
 (0.194) (0.152) (0.328) (0.335) (0.258) (0.345) (0.283) 
Growth Category - 
Low Growth 
0.067 0.160 -0.208 0.270 0.464 0.064 0.686 
 (0.228) (0.198) (0.370) (0.404) (0.305) (0.430) (0.356) 
Growth Category - 
High Growth 
-0.109 0.014 -0.065 0.210 0.364 0.434 0.284 
 (0.194) (0.163) (0.314) (0.356) (0.273) (0.363) (0.312) 
After Election – No 
Change In Leader 
0.467* -0.303 1.466*** 0.728* 0.508 0.832* 0.304 
 (0.198) (0.195) (0.314) (0.360) (0.278) (0.373) (0.333) 
After Election – 
Change In Leader  
0.627** -0.263 1.577*** 1.343*** 1.127*** 1.355*** 1.206*** 
 (0.239) (0.245) (0.365) (0.395) (0.315) (0.388) (0.351) 
Non- Democratic 
Change In Power 
1.363*** 0.198 1.661** 1.276* 0.841 1.722** 0.543 
 (0.357) (0.426) (0.548) (0.613) (0.453) (0.648) (0.512) 
Unity Government 0.640* -0.435 1.071* 0.826 0.777 0.479 0.297 
 (0.306) (0.356) (0.505) (0.584) (0.411) (0.671) (0.519) 
Months Since Last 
Reshuffle 
0.044** 0.012      
 (0.015) (0.014)      
Constant -3.254*** -2.766** 0.007 -1.696 -1.682*** -2.752 -1.600 
 (0.877) (0.868) (1.246) (1.423) (0.255) (1.446) (1.354) 
Observations 3,010 3,010 543 547 547 547 547 
Log Likelihood -751.118 -964.335 -256.177 -215.883 -297.426 -206.854 -271.107 













Table 6 - Volatility by Political Binaries and Economic Growth – Hegemonic Regimes 















 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Before Any 
Election 
0.001 -0.054 -1.706 1.485 -0.178 0.731 -1.891 
 (0.377) (0.305) (1.134) (1.092) (0.804) (1.194) (1.020) 
Growth Category 
- Low Growth 
1.269* 0.187 0.348 5.356* 1.307 0.570 -0.706 
 (0.532) (0.452) (1.208) (2.615) (1.236) (1.479) (1.224) 
Growth Category 
- High Growth 
1.125** -0.038 1.970* 3.434 0.776 1.704 -0.292 
 (0.401) (0.353) (0.950) (1.952) (0.934) (1.239) (0.845) 
After Election – 
No Change In 
Leader 
1.188*** -0.328 4.065*** 5.310** 2.110* 2.070 0.459 
 (0.344) (0.341) (0.984) (1.772) (0.852) (1.066) (0.806) 
After Election – 
Change In Leader  
1.198 1.184 2.462 -3.782* 1.038 1.446 2.998 
 (0.760) (0.797) (1.494) (1.846) (1.377) (1.734) (1.648) 
Non- Democratic 
Change In Power 
3.908* 2.781 3.329 32.873 1.323 -0.954 -17.441 
 (1.694) (1.589) (2.334) (14,941.650) (1.998) (14,176.720) (4,612.202) 
Unity 
Government 
       
Months Since 
Last Reshuffle 
0.082*** 0.022      
 (0.020) (0.020)      
Constant -4.660*** -17.468 -19.719 12.947 -0.530 -1.431 -17.113 
 (1.276) (959.171) (1,270.655) (4,959.412) (2.076) (2.364) (3,606.147) 
Observations 1,401 1,401 165 165 165 165 165 
Log Likelihood -246.706 -311.725 -58.352 -41.078 -66.227 -45.676 -56.304 












Figure 1 – Pre-Electoral Permutation Welch’s T-Tests Competitive Regimes 
 
Figure 2 – Pre-Electoral Permutation Welch’s T-Tests Hegemonic Regimes 
 




































11.4 Regime Strength, Opposition Unity and Post-Electoral Elite Bargains 
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Table 2 - KNN Results - bootstrap basic 
Type k Accuracy Kappa AccuracySD KappaSD 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 1 0.458 -0.053 0.129 0.243 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 3 0.470 -0.045 0.142 0.266 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 5 0.485 -0.015 0.136 0.246 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 7 0.504 0.023 0.141 0.251 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 9 0.511 0.049 0.140 0.239 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 1 0.405 -0.130 0.152 0.280 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 3 0.484 0.006 0.157 0.267 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 5 0.496 0.030 0.157 0.253 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 7 0.488 0.021 0.155 0.230 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 9 0.481 0.008 0.155 0.208 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 1 0.653 0.309 0.115 0.215 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 3 0.653 0.309 0.134 0.255 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 5 0.648 0.310 0.129 0.234 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 7 0.633 0.290 0.129 0.229 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 9 0.620 0.277 0.127 0.213 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 1 0.512 0.044 0.147 0.271 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 3 0.520 0.067 0.156 0.273 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 5 0.495 0.046 0.169 0.267 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 7 0.493 0.045 0.160 0.231 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 9 0.490 0.044 0.157 0.212 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 1 0.565 0.103 0.123 0.235 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 3 0.581 0.152 0.129 0.241 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 5 0.610 0.216 0.136 0.248 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 7 0.633 0.266 0.135 0.249 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 9 0.637 0.286 0.135 0.242 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 1 0.686 0.374 0.143 0.273 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 3 0.689 0.382 0.166 0.305 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 5 0.707 0.414 0.161 0.292 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 7 0.715 0.428 0.165 0.296 















Table 3 - KNN Results - bootstrap with 632 correction results 
Type k Accuracy Kappa AccuracySD KappaSD AccuracyApparent KappaApparent 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
1 0.654 0.327 0.133 0.248 1 1 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
3 0.581 0.160 0.142 0.264 0.750 0.482 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
5 0.575 0.154 0.136 0.249 0.719 0.424 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
7 0.576 0.156 0.141 0.242 0.688 0.352 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
9 0.579 0.158 0.139 0.242 0.688 0.336 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
1 0.621 0.279 0.162 0.293 1 1 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
3 0.576 0.167 0.163 0.273 0.739 0.473 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
5 0.617 0.253 0.162 0.261 0.826 0.649 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
7 0.550 0.114 0.154 0.237 0.652 0.281 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All 
Variables) 
9 0.542 0.105 0.160 0.235 0.652 0.281 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 1 0.780 0.562 0.116 0.216 1 1 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 3 0.728 0.454 0.138 0.251 0.844 0.672 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 5 0.728 0.462 0.132 0.241 0.844 0.688 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 7 0.681 0.382 0.133 0.236 0.750 0.517 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 9 0.663 0.350 0.129 0.222 0.719 0.450 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 1 0.626 0.262 0.143 0.267 0.826 0.652 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 3 0.583 0.182 0.159 0.276 0.696 0.383 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 5 0.556 0.139 0.157 0.259 0.652 0.292 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 7 0.568 0.169 0.157 0.235 0.696 0.383 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 9 0.553 0.137 0.161 0.217 0.652 0.281 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 1 0.722 0.423 0.119 0.230 1 1 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 3 0.655 0.295 0.128 0.242 0.781 0.541 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 5 0.665 0.303 0.129 0.243 0.750 0.455 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 7 0.677 0.343 0.128 0.235 0.750 0.482 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 9 0.681 0.357 0.134 0.246 0.750 0.482 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 1 0.783 0.567 0.146 0.274 0.957 0.913 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 3 0.749 0.501 0.168 0.308 0.870 0.738 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 5 0.760 0.520 0.167 0.295 0.870 0.738 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 7 0.732 0.460 0.167 0.289 0.783 0.556 










Table 4 - KNN Results - 4 Fold Repeated Cross Validation 
Type k Accuracy Kappa AccuracySD KappaSD 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 1 0.463 -0.071 0.152 0.295 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 3 0.471 -0.083 0.161 0.320 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 5 0.512 -0.004 0.163 0.321 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 7 0.563 0.106 0.165 0.324 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 9 0.555 0.088 0.156 0.316 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 1 0.406 -0.186 0.183 0.363 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 3 0.527 0.037 0.163 0.326 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 5 0.529 0.032 0.140 0.281 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 7 0.547 0.061 0.126 0.256 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change (All Variables) 9 0.526 0.010 0.089 0.171 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 1 0.658 0.318 0.140 0.272 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 3 0.717 0.428 0.148 0.293 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 5 0.687 0.394 0.135 0.250 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 7 0.669 0.367 0.145 0.262 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Change 9 0.634 0.312 0.141 0.250 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 1 0.543 0.068 0.167 0.338 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 3 0.574 0.127 0.155 0.315 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 5 0.536 0.056 0.157 0.313 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 7 0.550 0.071 0.125 0.248 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Change 9 0.575 0.120 0.121 0.243 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 1 0.567 0.082 0.146 0.297 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 3 0.615 0.200 0.134 0.273 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 5 0.697 0.367 0.131 0.272 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 7 0.728 0.449 0.133 0.264 
Competitive Regime - Cabinet Status 9 0.724 0.444 0.132 0.260 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 1 0.723 0.441 0.160 0.321 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 3 0.797 0.588 0.158 0.323 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 5 0.766 0.516 0.128 0.269 
Hegemonic Regime - Cabinet Status 7 0.784 0.551 0.129 0.273 















Table 5 – KNN Bootstrap Confusion Matrices and Results 
Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Competitive Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Status – Competitive Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Competitive Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Status – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (all predictors) 
 
Competitive Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (all predictors) 
 
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 



































Accuracy 0.653 0.52 0.636 0.712 0.509 0.496 
Kappa 0.301 0.026 0.263 0.415 -0.007 -0.024 
AccuracyLower 0.644 0.509 0.627 0.702 0.5 0.486 
AccuracyUpper 0.661 0.53 0.644 0.722 0.518 0.507 
AccuracyNull 0.598 0.522 0.593 0.519 0.591 0.524 
AccuracyPValue <0.001 0.666 <0.001 <0.001 1 1 
Pos Pred Value 0.743 0.497 0.716 0.85 0.588 0.457 
Neg Pred Value 0.557 0.531 0.546 0.66 0.405 0.515 
Balanced Accuracy 0.656 0.513 0.635 0.704 0.496 0.488 
 
 
Table 6 – KNN Bootstrap Efron Correction Confusion Matrices and Results92 
Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Competitive Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Status – Competitive Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Competitive Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 












                                                          
92 Efron correction is applied after bootstrapping and calculation. Therefore accuracy estimates will not reflect 




Post-Election Cabinet Status – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (all predictors) 
 
Competitive Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (all predictors) 
 
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 





























Accuracy 0.652 0.51 0.561 0.68 0.454 0.402 
Kappa 0.304 0.006 0.077 0.359 -0.099 -0.198 
AccuracyLower 0.643 0.499 0.552 0.67 0.445 0.392 
AccuracyUpper 0.661 0.521 0.57 0.69 0.463 0.413 
AccuracyNull 0.598 0.523 0.592 0.519 0.594 0.526 
AccuracyPValue <0.001 0.991 1 <0.001 1 1 
Pos Pred Value 0.75 0.481 0.621 0.675 0.546 0.371 
Neg Pred Value 0.554 0.525 0.458 0.685 0.356 0.431 












Table 7 – KNN 4 Fold Repeated Cross Validation Confusion Matrices and Results 
Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Competitive Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Status – Competitive Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Competitive Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Status – Hegemonic Regimes (best predictors) 
 
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Change – Competitive Regimes (all predictors) 
 
Competitive Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 









Post-Election Cabinet Change – Hegemonic Regimes (all predictors) 
 
Hegemonic Regime Cohesive 
Opposition 


































Accuracy 0.717 0.573 0.728 0.796 0.562 0.544 
Kappa 0.426 0.119 0.447 0.589 0.097 0.058 
AccuracyLower 0.712 0.567 0.723 0.791 0.556 0.538 
AccuracyUpper 0.722 0.579 0.733 0.802 0.567 0.551 
AccuracyNull 0.594 0.522 0.594 0.522 0.594 0.522 
AccuracyPValue <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 <0.001 1 <0.001 
Pos Pred Value 0.788 0.675 0.797 0.858 0.634 0.59 
Neg Pred Value 0.634 0.555 0.647 0.758 0.462 0.538 
Balanced 
Accuracy 
0.717 0.558 0.728 0.792 0.549 0.528 
 
 






















Change in Inner 
Circle 
Representation 































































1 0.580 0.940 0.420 0.460 0.150 -0.360 -0.200 -0.230 0.370 -0.140 0.450 -0.520 -0.310 -0.510 0.470 0.470 0.430 
Change in Inner 
Circle Size 
0.580 1 0.280 0.290 0.450 0.070 -0.290 0 -0.290 0.280 -0.180 0.420 -0.550 -0.280 -0.560 0.560 0.310 0.570 
Change In Outer 
Circle Size 
0.940 0.280 1 0.380 0.360 0.160 -0.310 -0.230 -0.160 0.310 -0.080 0.350 -0.390 -0.250 -0.370 0.330 0.430 0.270 
Change in 
Representation 
0.420 0.290 0.380 1 0.070 0.600 -0.270 0.010 -0.170 0.070 -0.420 0.300 -0.430 -0.260 -0.410 0.360 0.290 0.330 
Change in Inner 
Circle 
Representation 
0.460 0.450 0.360 0.070 1 -0.230 0.060 -0.110 0.030 0.150 0.040 0.150 -0.460 -0.320 -0.430 0.330 0.440 0.280 
Change in Outer 
Circle 
Representation 
0.150 0.070 0.160 0.600 -0.230 1 -0.400 -0.110 -0.270 -0.090 -0.180 0.020 -0.310 -0.030 -0.360 0.290 0.290 0.250 
Change in Leader 
Co-Ethnic 
Representation 
-0.360 -0.290 -0.310 -0.270 0.060 -0.400 1 0.300 0.750 -0.480 0.070 -0.520 0.390 0.150 0.400 -0.260 -0.160 -0.250 




-0.200 0 -0.230 0.010 -0.110 -0.110 0.300 1 -0.330 -0.260 -0.400 -0.120 0.080 -0.070 0.080 -0.050 -0.010 -0.040 









0.370 0.280 0.310 0.070 0.150 -0.090 -0.480 -0.260 -0.300 1 0.280 0.880 -0.280 0.100 -0.330 0.380 0.120 0.400 
Change in 
Opposition Co-












0.450 0.420 0.350 0.300 0.150 0.020 -0.520 -0.120 -0.420 0.880 -0.170 1 -0.430 -0.060 -0.460 0.490 0.180 0.510 
Change in Leader 
Party Cabinet 
Presence 
-0.520 -0.550 -0.390 -0.430 -0.460 -0.310 0.390 0.080 0.370 -0.280 0.210 -0.430 1 0.620 0.960 -0.800 -0.680 -0.750 
Change in Leader 
Party Inner Circle 
Presence 
-0.310 -0.280 -0.250 -0.260 -0.320 -0.030 0.150 -0.070 0.160 0.100 0.290 -0.060 0.620 1 0.390 -0.260 -0.520 -0.170 
Change in Leader 
Party Outer 
Circle Presence 



















11.5 Crisis Cabinets and the Influence of Protests on Elite Volatility in Africa 
 
Table 1 – ACLED Variables 
Variable Description 
Demonstrations in 
Previous Six Months 
The number of discreet events involving riots or protests in the previous six months. 
Percent Change in 
Demonstrations 
The percent increase or decrease between the number of demonstrations in the previous 
six months and those in the prior six-month period. 
Demonstrations as a 
Percent of Conflict 
The proportion of total conflict events in the previous six months which are 
demonstrations. 
Number of Clusters 
100km  
This counts the amount of distinct clusters of protest. Demonstrations within 50km or 
100km of each other are counted as the same cluster.93 
Herfindahl Index of 
Clusters 
A herfindahl index which captures the degree of fragmentation among the clusters. A 
high value shows that one cluster is responsible for the majority of demonstration events 
while a low value shows an even distribution of demonstrations across clusters. 
 








52.17 Vice President Martin Nduwimana resigns to break a political deadlock which 
had spurred an opposition boycott of parliament. Nduwimana’s resignation 
allowed President Nkurunziza to create a new ‘government of national 
consensus’ which included opposition parties (Swiss Peace, 2007; Basutama, 
2007). 
CAR 2008 50.00 Prime Minister Elie Dote resigns after a threatened vote of no confidence. The 
proposed vote of no confidence happens within the context of a public sector 




82.76 Bozize forms a unity government in an attempt to stall the territorial gains of 
the rebel Seleka coalition (Bradshaw and Fandos-Ruis, 2016). 
CAR April 
2013 
53.85 Bozize is deposed in March 2013 and Seleka political leader Michel Djotodia 
becomes president (Bradshaw and Fandos-Ruis, 2016). 
CAR 2014 79.31 Michel Djotodia steps down amid escalating sectarian violence. The recently 
created National Transitional Council elect Catherine Samba-Panza as the 
interim president (Bradshaw and Fandos-Ruis, 2016). 
Ethiopia 
April 2018 
52.50 Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn resigns after two years of ongoing 
protests in Ethiopia. Ahmed Abiy is elected leader of the ruling Ethiopia 
People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) and thus prime minister. 
He sets about creating a cabinet to appease the unrest (Maasho, 2018; Africa 
Confidential, 2018a).  
                                                          
93 This is achieved through hierarchical clustering methods with the distance (in kilometres) between events 
used to dictate the cutting threshold. 







53.33 Abiy makes another large cabinet reshuffle in the face of continued protest, 
ethnic violence and a potential attempted coup by the military (Africa 
Confidential, 2018b; Reuters, 2018) 
Guinea 
2007 
88.89 Protests force President Lansana Conte to name a new Prime Minister from a 
shortlist of candidates selected by unions and civil society groups. The process 
is mediated by neighbouring states and the trade union candidate, Lansana 
Kouyate, is selected (Africa Confidential, 13 April 2007). 
Guinea 
2008 
60.00 After Prime Minister Kouyate launches an audit investigating corruption by the 
President’s allies, Conde fires Kouyate and refills with cabinet with allied 
politicians (Africa Confidential, 2008). 
Guinea 
2009 
85.29 After President Conde’s death, a faction of the military led by Captain Dadis 
Camara launch a coup. 
Guinea 
2010 
60.00 The Presidential Guard of Moussa Dadis Camara massacre protesters from 
opposition parties in Guinea stadium (Africa Confidential, 6 November 2009). 
Camarra resigns after being shot by a former aid and Defence Minister Sekouba 
Konate becomes interim president (Africa Confidential, 2009). 
Malawi 
2012 
61.11 President Mutharika dies in office. Vice-President Joyce Banda, as per the 
constitution takes over as leader. Banda had been expelled from the ruling party 
after failing to support Mutharika’s plan to nominate his brother as successor 
(Dionne and Dulani, 2013; Cammack, 2012). Upon taking control of the 
cabinet, Banda ousts Mutharika’s old allies. 
Mali 2012 100.00 Soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo launch a coup after the army is routed 
by Tuareg rebels in the north of the country (Africa Confidential, 2012). 
Nigeria 
2010 
100.00 Acting President Goodluck Jonatan removes cabinet ministers loyal to the 
ailing President Musa Yar’Adua (Smith, 2010) 
Tunisia 
2011 
100.00 Widespread demonstrations combined with the military’s refusal to fire upon 
protesters forces long-time president Ben Ali to flee the country. An interim 
regime is set up and promises elections and a new constitution within six 
months (Africa Confidential, 2011). 
Tunisia 
2014 
92.86 Ennadha government resigns as a part of a political agreement with opposition 
parties to break Tunisia’s political deadlock (Gall, 2014). 
Tunisia 
2016 
67.74 President Essebsi tries to oust unpopular president Habib Essid, who argues the 
vote should be put to parliament. He is voted out in a vote of no confidence. 
Zimbabwe 
2017 
54.55 President Robert Mugabe is deposed by a coup led by the former Vice President 
Emmerson Mnangagwa and his military allies. The coup comes after years of 













Table 3 – ICEWS Government to Protester Interactions and Protest-Motivated Crisis Cabinet 
Selection 










Criticize or denounce 
 
Engage in diplomatic cooperation X 
Engage in mass killings 
 
Express intent to accept mediation 
 
Express intent to meet or negotiate 
 
Express intent to release persons or property 
 
fight with artillery and tanks 
 
fight with small arms and light weapons 
 







Praise or endorse 
 




Threaten with repression 
 
Use conventional military force 
 
Use tactics of violent repression 
 















Figure 1 – Protest against Ministerial Volatility – Autocracy vs Democracy95 
 
                                                          
















                                                          
96 Hegemonic observations have a regime which occupies more than two thirds of the seats in the lower house, 





Table 4 – Crisis Cabinets and Preceding Protest Activity  
Country Year Preceding Protest Activity Country Year Preceding Protest Activity 
Burundi 2007 Demonstrations: 0  
Fatalities: 0 
% of all events: 0 
% involving state forces: 0 
% change: 0 
Clusters: 0 
Guinea 2009 Demonstrations: 5 
Fatalities: 0 
% of all events: 45.45 
% involving state forces: 80.00 
% change: ∞ 
Clusters: 1 
CAR 2008 Demonstrations: 0 
Fatalities: 0 
% of all events: 0 
% involving state forces: 0 
% change: -100 
Clusters: 0 
Guinea 2010 Demonstrations: 12 
Fatalities: 159 
% of all events: 50 
% involving state forces: 50 
% change: 1100 
Clusters: 4 
CAR February 2013 Demonstrations: 11 
Fatalities: 1 
% of all events: 13.92 
% involving state forces: 18.18 
% change: 175 
Clusters: 6 
Malawi 2012 Demonstrations: 3 
Fatalities:  0 
% of all events: 37.5 
% involving state forces: 33.33 
% change: -70 
Clusters: 1 
CAR April 2013 Demonstrations: 18 
Fatalities: 94 
% of all events: 20.69 
% involving state forces: 11.11 
% change: 500 
Clusters: 5 
Mali 2012 Demonstrations: 7 
Fatalities: 0 
% of all events: 13.73 
% involving state forces: 0 
% change: ∞ 
Clusters: 1 
CAR 2014 Demonstrations: 122 
Fatalities:  166 
% of all events: 20.85 
% involving state forces: 0.82 
% change: 713.33 
Clusters: 10 
Nigeria 2010 Demonstrations: 62 
Fatalities: 36 
% of all events: 27.19 
% involving state forces: 9.68 
% change: 181.82 
Clusters: 18 
Ethiopia April 2018 Demonstrations: 206 
Fatalities: 255 
% of all events: 54.64 
% involving state forces: 41.75 
% change: 126.37 
Clusters: 30 
Tunisia 2011 Demonstrations: 127 
Fatalities: 95 
% of all events: 92.70 
% involving state forces: 45.67 





Fatalities:  73 
% of all events: 44.68 
% involving state forces: 26.94 
% change: -6.31 
Clusters: 39 
Tunisia 2014 Demonstrations: 129 
Fatalities:  3 
% of all events: 73.30 
% involving state forces: 27.13 
% change:  37.23 
Clusters: 10 
Guinea 2007 Demonstrations: 21  
Fatalities: 42 
% of all events: 70 
% involving state forces: 52.38 
Tunisia 2016 Demonstrations: 241 
Fatalities: 1 
% of all events: 82.53 




% change:  600 
Clusters: 7 
% change: -31.34 
Clusters: 18 
Guinea 2008 Demonstrations: 0 
Fatalities: 0 
% of all events: 0 
% involving state forces: 0 
% change: 0 
Clusters: 0 
Zimbabwe 2017 Demonstrations: 68 
Fatalities: 3 
% of all events: 43.87 
% involving state forces: 44.12 




Table 4 – ACPED Variables 
Variable Description 
Percent Change in 
Personnel/Percent 
Change in Inner Circle  
Calculates the number of dropped ministers as a percentage of the previous cabinet’s 
size. Can also be applied to more important posts known as the ‘inner circle’. 97  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 =  (1 −
P − D
𝑃
) ∗ 100 
P represents previous cabinet/inner circle size, while D represents the number of 
ministers dropped from the cabinet/inner circle. 
Change in 
Representation 
Government ‘representation’ is assessed by calculating the percent of primary 
administrative divisions which have a representative in cabinet. The index assumes a 
value between 0 and 100, where 100 means total representation of all politically 
relevant regional in the population. This variable is applied to the whole cabinet and 
the inner circle. During cabinet reshuffles, a change in representation measure is 
created through subtracting current representation against the previous cabinet-
month’s value. 
Change in Disproportion The disproportion measure calculates whether representatives in a cabinet have a share 
of the seats that reflects their regional population.  The measure is an indication of 
whether power in a cabinet is balanced between included groups and adapted from 
studies by Samuels and Snyder (2001).98  
 
𝐷𝐼𝑆 =  (
1
2





Sigma indicates the summation over all region i, xi is the percentage of all cabinet 
positions allocated to province i, and yi is the percentage of population living in region 
i. This measure is applied only to identity groups occupying at least one post within 
the cabinet. During cabinet reshuffles, a change in disproportion measure is created 
through subtracting current disproportion against the previous cabinet-month’s value. 
Mean Tenure of 
Dismissed Ministers 
An average tenure (in number of months) of ministers dropped from the cabinet prior 
to their dismissal. 
                                                          
97 All cabinet posts are not of equal importance and existing studies on cabinet composition agree that different 
posts hold different degrees of importance (Lindemann, 2011; Francois et al., 2015). Consequently posts in the 
cabinet are further separated into the inner circle posts, representing posts which hold significant power over the 
state apparatus, and outer circle posts which generally deal with service provision and cultural issues. 
98 A score of 10 would indicate that 10 percent of cabinet posts are allocated to groups that would not receive 




11.6 Inclusion, Volatility and Political Violence across African Regimes 
 
This document presents a correlation matrix for explanatory variables and the results of robustness 
checks that could not be included in the text due to space constraints. Models 4a-6b in Table A2 include 
a lagged dependent variable (LDV) and yearly dummies. LDV adjusts for autocorrelation within 
clusters in the time-varying dataset (Wilson and Butler 2007). Yearly dummies capture the effect of 
widespread shocks as well as other dimensions simultaneously affecting the entire sample, such as a 
sudden shift in global demand. These events could affect income and consequently, the state’s 
propensity to engage in conflict.  
Models 7a and 7b in Table A3 test whether our results are sensitive to the change in the 
operationalization of volatile cabinet. Here we decrease the threshold level of volatility that is used to 
code the Volatility variable. It is now coded as 1 if the number of ministers in a given month is greater 
than one and a half standard deviations above or below the long-term average, and 0 otherwise. In 
models 8a and 8b, we test H3 using an alternative measure of non-state infighting: political militias 
against political militias. 
These changes make no substantive difference for our main findings. The only exception is 
that there is no longer a significant interaction between Malapportionment and Representation in model 
5c. Nevertheless, in models 5a and 5b, the level of malapportionment in the cabinet remains a significant 
and powerful determinant of anti-state militia violence (H2). 
 
 






Table A1: Correlation Matrix for Explanatory Variables, Pearson’s r 
 
 










Population Civil War 
Representation 1.0000          
Malapportionment -0.1634 1.0000         
Volatility -0.0370 0.1952 1.0000        
Cabinet Size 0.3172 -0.0735 -0.0139 1.0000       
Ethnicities in 
Cabinet 
-0.2513 0.2286 0.0099 0.1269 1.0000      
Democracy 0.1400 -0.2210 -0.0160 -0.0822 0.2270 1.0000     
GDP per capita 0.5024 -0.2160 -0.0111 0.3639 -0.3283 -0.0015 1.0000    
Economic Growth -0.1412 0.0667 -0.1122 -0.0246 0.1106 0.1207 -0.0539 1.0000   
Population 0.0937 -0.1684 -0.0421 0.2999 0.1708 0.0302 0.4591 0.0183 1.0000  








Table A2: Adding lagged dependent variables and yearly dummies 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * p < .1;  ** p < .05;  *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
 4a 4b 4c 5a 5b 5c 6a 6b 
Variables Rebels vs. Government Militias vs. Government Militias vs. Non-state actors  
Representationt-1 0.004 -0.542 5.875  1.246 -0.581  1.493 
 (0.947) (0.942) (2.300)**  (0.589)** (1.643)  (0.796)* 
Malapportionmentt-1  4.968 28.240 2.134 2.004 -4.916  2.680 
  (0.898)*** (7.123)*** (0.774)*** (0.754)*** (6.011)  (1.144)** 
Volatilityt-1  -0.035 -0.291  -0.064 -0.016 1.070 1.037 
  (0.440) (0.487)  (0.480) (0.445) (0.513)** (0.495)** 
RepresentationⅹMalapportionment   -25.983   7.536   
   (7.984)***   (6.665)   
Cabinet Size 0.024 0.030 0.018 0.026 0.023 0.025 -0.014 -0.018 
 (0.016) (0.015)* (0.016) (0.009)*** (0.009)** (0.010)** (0.013) (0.014) 
Ethnicities in Cabinet -0.105 -0.093 -0.074 -0.002 -0.031 -0.027 0.074 0.032 
 (0.042)** (0.046)** (0.049) (0.034) (0.033) (0.035) (0.044)* (0.046) 
Democracy -0.247 -0.231 -0.219 -0.051 -0.056 -0.055 -0.092 -0.094 
 (0.028)*** (0.028)*** (0.025)*** (0.020)** (0.018)*** (0.020)*** (0.031)*** (0.029)*** 
Log(GDP per capita) 1.369 1.260 1.201 -0.195 -0.205 -0.199 -0.902 -0.931 
 (0.248)*** (0.267)*** (0.247)*** (0.150) (0.158) (0.156) (0.217)*** (0.213)*** 
Economic Growth -0.009 -0.004 -0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.015 0.015 
 (0.005)* (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008)* 
Log(Population) -3.985 -4.124 -2.798 -0.723 -1.052 -1.310 -6.507 -7.060 
 (1.469)*** (1.345)*** (1.390)** (1.005) (1.003) (1.067) (1.575)*** (1.625)*** 
Civil War    0.451 0.433 0.441 0.777 0.689 
    (0.144)*** (0.148)*** (0.145)*** (0.149)*** (0.144)*** 
Lagged DV 0.142 0.135 0.132 0.129 0.126 0.125 0.195 0.195 
 (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.010)*** (0.012)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.029)*** (0.031)*** 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Yearly fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 56.230 58.149 31.446 9.828 14.479 20.198 107.840 115.572 
 (23.437)** (21.657)*** (23.080) (16.211) (16.169) (17.469) (25.536)*** (26.094)*** 
Number of Countries 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 




Table A3: Using alternative measures of volatility and non-state infighting 
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. * p < .1;  ** p < .05;  *** p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
 
 7a 7b 8c 8b 
Variables Militias vs. Non-state actors 
with Volatility (S.D.>1.5) 
Militias vs. Militias 
Representationt-1  -1.841  -0.828 
  (0.969)*  (1.061) 
Malapportionmentt-1  4.008  3.496 
  (1.221)***  (1.276)*** 
Volatilityt-1 1.018 0.972 1.723 1.562 
 (0.222)*** (0.200)*** (0.543)*** (0.515)*** 
Cabinet Size -0.015 -0.009 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.014) 
Ethnicities in Cabinet 0.049 0.086 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.047) (0.043)** (0.055) (0.048) 
Democracy -0.107 -0.097 -0.055 -0.053 
 (0.030)*** (0.030)*** (0.031)* (0.031)* 
Log(GDP per capita) -0.909 -0.864 -1.074 -1.091 
 (0.196)*** (0.204)*** (0.215)*** (0.214)*** 
Economic Growth 0.012 0.015 0.006 0.010 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007) 
Log(Population) 3.487 3.752 7.073 7.524 
 (0.678)*** (0.713)*** (1.081)*** (0.986)*** 
Civil War 0.897 0.891 -0.052 -0.094 
 (0.149)*** (0.152)*** (0.237) (0.227) 
Country fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -53.508 -57.949 -113.081 -120.553 
 (10.193)*** (10.763)*** (16.742)*** (15.248)*** 
Number of Countries 15 15 15 15 
Number of Observations 3,409 3,409 3,409 3,409 
